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i 
ABSTRACT 
   
The main purpose of this study is not only to prove the impact of loan 
interest rates on the poor in the case of Tigray, Northern Ethiopia but 
also to recommend improvements to address the negative effects of 
interest rates that could benefit both the borrowers and the lenders. 
Combinations of quantitative and qualitative analytical tools were used; 
the data were collected through administration of a questionnaire to a 
sample of 471 respondents from three regulated MCIs, one 
cooperative enterprise, and one unregulated NGO. Results were 
analysed by using SPSS software. A multi-dimensional approach with 
respect to demand for credit, return on loan, loan repayment, savings, 
indebtedness, multiple loans, graduation process, and wellbeing was 
used and results were triangulated to obtain a full picture.  
 
The study has concluded that the interest rate in general, primarily 
charged by DECSI, eroded the envisaged profits that poor borrowers 
expected to gain. This caused diversified negative impacts on the poor, 
those who were entrusted to MCIs. It thus brings into question the 
efficacy of the social responsibility of MCIs. From a simple analysis, it 
is found that there is a trade-off between servicing the poor with a low 
loan cost and securing MCIs operational self-sufficiency. Furthermore, 
the poor are not only sensitive to the loan interest rate but also to the 
saving interest rate. Therefore, not only access but also the cost of 
credit and savings matters to the poor. Moreover, the study identified a 
positive relationship between the financial capacity of MCIs and lending 
interest rates. Institutions with higher profitability tend to offer lower 
interest rates on micro loans but not when commercialization is an 
issue. The study grasped that socially oriented and responsible MCIs 
can reach the poorest without compromising financial performances, a 
“win-win proposition”.  
 
Finally, the study offers comprehensive recommendations on policy 
and practice that address potential changes to how MCIs redesign their 
loan and savings interest rate. The recommendations also address 
how MCIs develop graduation processes and self-revolving credit 
scheme frameworks that strengthen pro-poor microcredit modality.  
Additionally, the study provides a way forward in the design of future 
microcredit that could help MCIs deliver on their core social mandate. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and rationale of the study 
 
Microfinance has been hailed by many to be one of the most effective tools in 
fighting global poverty in the developing world. It has been especially effective and 
beneficial in bringing products such as savings deposits, insurance and credit to the 
under-served sections of developing and transitional economies, those that do not 
possess the collateral or credit histories to satisfy the requirements of traditional 
financial services. In so doing, microfinance aims to “create economic and social 
development from below” (Julien K 2009:3). 
 
Further, Julien K. (2009:3) clarifies that microfinance has many issues that hinder its 
ability to be effective. One of those issues, and one of the elements that surprise the 
newly initiated to microfinance, is the interest rate. Interest rates charged by 
microfinance institutions on their loans to the poor have traditionally been very high 
compared with the levels offered through more established financial services in the 
developed world. These high interest rates are primarily related to the fact that it 
costs more to service a tiny loan than a large one. 
 
Even though poor and low-income people in developing countries are not viewed as 
marginal, but rather as central and legitimate clients of their countries’ financial 
systems, they do not have access to formal financial services and very few benefit 
from a savings account, loan, or convenient way to transfer money (CGAP 2006:1). 
CGAP (2006:1) also stated that financial services for the poor, often referred to as 
microfinance, couldn’t solve all the problems caused by poverty. However, they can 
help put resources and power into the hands of poor and low-income people 
themselves. This allows them to make daily decisions and chart their own paths out 
of poverty.  Both the potential and the challenge of microfinance are very significant.  
 
In most developing economies financial services are only available to a minority of 
the population, and frequently to only a very small minority. Although financial 
sectors are expanding as these economies grow, financial assets usually remain 
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highly concentrated in the hands of a few. The majority of the people in developing 
countries have no savings accounts, do not receive credit from a formal financial 
institution, and have no insurance policies. They seldom make or receive payments 
through financial institutions. Indeed, the majority in most countries rarely enter the 
premises of financial institutions. The use of financial services in developed countries 
could not be more different than what is currently available in developing countries 
(United Nations 2006:1). It should be noted that lending to the poor or lower income 
group raises many debates among practitioners and academicians, discussed 
below. The poor are excluded from credit facilities for many reasons. These include 
insufficient collateral to support their loans, high transaction costs, unstable income, 
lower literacy and high monitoring costs (Mead C.D and Liedholm C. 1998: 61).  
 
Even though microfinance has been initiated and widely accepted as a viable policy 
option for poverty alleviation by the donor community, international organizations, 
government and non-governmental organizations, the evidence suggests that 
microfinance has a higher impact for households closer to the poverty line, rather 
than the poorest of the poor (SIDA 2004:1-3). Hasan M. and Iglebaek M.  (2004:3-7) 
conclude that microfinance is yet to be recognized as important tool for outreach to 
the poorest of the poor and it is generally accepted that microfinance does not work 
for this group. Arguments lauding the success of microfinance initiatives have been 
countered by heavy criticism regarding the exploitation of women, the inability to 
effectively cater to the target groups, unchanging poverty levels, and high interest 
rates and loan repayment (Brau J. and Woller G.M 2004: 3-5) (Mallick R. 2002: 153-
154). 
 
Hudan M. (2006; 3-34) reports that debates on fair prices have a long history, 
starting with Aristotle’s denunciation of interest as the unnatural fruit of a barren 
parent. More recently, the fair trade movement initiated a lobby for a fair 
remuneration for the low-income countries’ workers. While high interest rates are still 
discussed and challenged inside the microfinance sector, the new and growing 
ethical debate is currently coming from outsiders, the civil society or the political 
world. Ethical issues, and particularly debates on the interest rate levels, are thus 
now widely accepted as a major threat to the whole microfinance sector’s 
sustainability.  
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Currently, microfinance has the attention of academicians and practitioners as an 
innovative method of fighting poverty; consequently, there are a number of studies 
and debates around microfinance. These studies and debates primarily concentrate 
on three key areas. The first area addresses whether or not microfinance reaches 
the poorest of the poor who are most in need of financial services. The second area 
addresses the issue of financial sustainability of the microfinance institutions 
themselves. The third area addresses the impact of microfinance programs on 
poverty reduction, on changing the lives of the poor. These three areas of 
microfinance also form the approaches to determine the performance of poverty 
reduction endeavours. The first and the second areas are related to the means or 
methodology of microfinance while the third area is related to the end goal of 
microfinance itself (ETC of ANC 2005: 6-10).  
 
These debates and issues indicate that further study on the microcredit lending 
interest rate and its effects on the poor are still crucial. This study intends to examine 
the impact of the loan interest rate on the poor and can contribute to filling the 
theoretical gaps and solving the empirical problems that exist. 
 
There are different types of interest rates. They include lending/borrowing, deposit 
rates, and bank rates/microfinance rates. Additionally, within microfinance there is 
microcredit, which are market based and a subsidized loan interest rate of regulated 
and unregulated microcredit services. For the purposes of this study, the main focus 
is on the lending interest rate of microcredit as the study examines the relationship 
between loan repayment and the building of capital (economic benefit) for clients on 
one hand, and the relationship between the loan interest rate and demand for credit 
of ex-clients and non-clients on the other. 
 
As Porteous D., Collins F., and Abrams D. (2010:2) mentioned, high interest rates on 
small loan remain highly sensitive and politically controversial. There is not enough 
research for Ethiopia in general and in the Tigray microfinance industry in particular 
on the effects of the loan interest rate on the poor. For this reason, the purpose of 
this specific research is to analyse the effect of the loan interest rate on the demand 
and supply side of microcredit service. 
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1.2 Statement of the problem 
 
Currently, there is an overabundance of those citizens in Ethiopia in general and in Tigray in 
particular who require micro financial services to engage actively in productive activities and 
improve their standard of living.  Over time, MFIs across Ethiopia have not been able to help 
the poor adequately with fair and affordable lending interest rates to enable them to change 
their lives significantly.  
Most MFIs in Ethiopia have been scaling up, leading to aggressive saving mobilization, high 
interest rates, multiple loans, service to the upper echelon of the poor, and poor client’s 
inability to save for the future. This trend has changed MFIs into profit-seeking entities, 
experiencing ‘mission drift’, deviating from their core mandate. Further, the number 
of privately owned MFIs in Ethiopia has continued to increase significantly, which 
has not yet triggered competition between the MFIs to better benefit the poor. Of 
note, despite the increased number of MFIs, interest rates have remained high.  
Letenah E. (2009:11) indicated that Ethiopian MFIs are poor performers on depth of 
outreach and their sustainability seems to have a correlation with their size. It seems 
that lowering interest rates even further to reach more poor will secure their 
sustainability from economy of scale and size, rather than from charging high rates 
from the upper end of the market.  
 
Furthermore, Amha W. (2010:33-35) indicated that despite the emergence of many 
financial providers, the PASDEP document indicates that only 6% of smallholder 
farmers in Ethiopia have access to financial services. Furthermore, the inclusive 
financial sector in Ethiopia is young and there are very limited financial providers 
competing in the market. Lack of competition has a negative impact on the prices 
(interest rates) charged by finance providers and customer services.  
 
Amha W. (2011:10-11) reported that there are currently about 31 MFIs in Ethiopia, 
serving 2.5 million clients throughout the country. However, a group based lending 
modality excluded the poorest sectors of the community. A lack of transparency 
around the loan interest rate, and unclear social performance management of the 
operating MFIs are other common limitations. These impact their original mission 
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and demand a controlling mechanism for social performance management of the 
MFIs. 
 
The interest rate charged on microcredit is one of the most-discussed issues in 
microfinance, capturing the attention of both the media and industry analysts alike. 
At the heart of this discussion, the question of how microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
can fulfil their social missions while charging their clients interest rates that are 
higher than those offered by non-microfinance financial institutions, such as 
traditional commercial banks remains. A rhetorical question usually follows: Are high 
microcredit interest rates not a sign that these institutions that proclaim development 
objectives are, in fact, gouging the poor? (Adrian G. 2010:1). 
 
On the other hand, while high interest rates have helped the industry to grow and 
enabled many millions of poor and low-income households to gain access to credit, 
there are still those who cannot afford such loans because of their high cost. 
Microcredit has not reached a majority of the poorest people and is not widely used 
for financing farming activities. Only those who can generate a sufficiently high 
surplus of funds can afford high interest rates on microcredit. More specifically, a 
borrower's realized rate of return on investment needs to be greater than the interest 
rate to service the loan (Nimal A. 2006:2-7). 
 
The debate on the fairness of microcredit interest rates can be embedded in the 
larger debate on fair prices. While the literature on the fairness of microcredit interest 
rates is relatively new, one will find relevant and valuable insights in the recent 
literature on fair prices (Hudan M. 2006:3-34).  
 
In Ethiopia, the field of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in general and the interest 
rate in particular is still a fairly recent topic in economic research; like the industry 
itself, microfinance literature in Ethiopia is still embryonic. Most studies have either 
concentrated on the impact of the industry on poverty alleviation or the financial 
performance of the MFIs.  
In Tigray, impact analysis on the loan interest rate, which is one of the most crucial 
issues for the poor, has not yet been studied adequately. This, when done, will 
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motivate others, enhance constructive debates within the microcredit market, and 
can help to improve the performance of other microcredit providers. 
 
The foregoing explains why this study was necessary.  It was conducted to explore 
the extent to which interest rates charged by MCIs affect the poor, how microcredit 
providers keep the proper balance between reaching the poorest and institutional 
financial sustainability and how to establish loan interest rates that are conducive for 
both poor borrowers and credit providers, a “win-win proposition”. It also 
recommends possible practical solutions to the challenges of microcredit.  
1.3 Objectives of the study 
 
a) General objective  
 
The main objective of this study was to analyse the impact of loan interest rates on 
the poor in Tigray Region.  
 
b)  Specific objectives 
 
The specific objectives were to: 
1. Examine the pull and push factors of microcredit institutions in Tigray, 
2. Investigate how interest rates are calculated and charged by different 
microcredit providers in Tigray region and how these motivate or de-
motivate the poor to participate. 
3. Assess the impact of interest rates of microfinance on the poor 
4.  Examine the relationship between non-clients of microcredit access to 
informal credit market 
5. Examine the complementarities of different types of microcredit 
programs on reaching the poor. 
6. Assess the integration of microcredit providers in enhancing inclusive 
microcredit financial service. 
7. Examine the ownership structure of microcredit institutions. 
8. Develop a framework for guiding interest rates that benefits the poor 
without undermining the financial sustainability of microcredit providers. 
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 1.4 Research questions 
 
To meet the above objectives, the following research questions were utilized as 
guidance. 
 
The main research question of the study was “What is the impact of the micro 
credit loan interest rate on the poor? 
 
The sub-questions of the study included: 
1. a. What attracts clients to loans? 
                 1.b. What motivates microcredit institutions to give loans in Tigray? 
2. How do beneficiaries respond to different loan interest rates by 
microcredit providers?  
3. What impact does a loan interest rate have on the poor? 
4. To what extent do non-clients of microcredit have access to the informal 
credit market?  
5. What mechanisms are in place that encourages different microcredit 
providers to complement one another and work jointly?  
6. To what extent do microcredit providers manage financial 
inclusiveness? 
7. What is the impact of the ownership structures of MCIs on the poor? 
8. What are the suggestions for developing guidelines that improve 
sustainability of fair interest rates? 
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
 
This research will contribute to the following:  
1. Review and revision of their loan modalities and complementarities to 
improve their social and financial performances by both regulated and 
unregulated microcredit providers  
2. Filling the theoretical gap and practical problems of loan interest rates of 
micro credit to enable the poor (clients, non-clients, and ex-clients) to 
benefit from microcredit services in an inclusive manner.  
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3. Review of the existing microfinance regulation, helping build the 
cooperation of all regulated and unregulated micro credit providers for 
the benefit of the poor clients and micro credit providers.   
4. Knowledge on the subject, leading to the development of a loan interest 
rate framework that can be useful in other regions and countries.  
 
 1.6 Scope of the study 
 
Microcredit is an area of research in which most researchers focus on specific areas. This 
study, therefore, covers how interest rates of microcredits affect the poor, those taking 
credit from regulated and unregulated microcredit providers. Furthermore, this study is 
also aware of how other microcredit modalities (loan amount, repayment period, 
multiple loans, enforcement mechanism, etc.) affect the poor. 
 
Due to the homogeneous nature of all MCIs in Ethiopia, this study focuses in one 
zone of Tigray Regional State as a study area. There is an assumption that findings 
from Tigray Regional State may represent other regions. 
 
1.7 Limitations and challenges of the study 
 
The major limitations and challenges of this study related to the bureaucratic and 
time consuming processes of microcredit institutions for data collection as well as a 
lack of transparency. This was addressed by using multiple means of access and a 
dissemination of the objectives of the study.  Further, an emphasis on the 
importance of the study to make a difference on the performance of the sampled 
microcredit providers in communications with them helped.  
 
Even though there are other factors that impact the decision of the poor on whether 
or not to get a loan, this study mainly focused on the loan interest rate. Thus, a 
challenging issue was controlling or measuring the factors other than the loan 
interest rate that impact whether the poor would get a loan or not. This challenge 
was treated by including factors other than loan interest rates that affect the decision 
of the poor to procure a loan. 
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A low literacy rate of most microcredit clients affects the availability of clear 
information of the impact of the loan interest rate and other factors on the poor 
households. Designing appropriate questionnaires and using multiple means of 
getting accurate information handled this. 
 
The reality of the microfinance service in general and the microcredit service in 
particular at national, regional, and zonal levels is homogeneous in terms of their 
credit methodologies and procedures. Thus, the national and regional microcredit 
providers and their clients are deliberately excluded from this study by the 
researcher in order to conduct this study in a confined area.   
 
In some cases, MFI in this study is used to mean microcredit. Even though this study 
focused consistently on microcredit as the main topic of the study, due to the 
interchangeable nature of MFI and microcredit, in some cases this study was forced 
to use these terms interchangeably,  
 
1.8 Structure of the study 
 
The study was structured as follows: The first chapter deals with the introduction, the 
central problem of the study, key research questions that the study addresses, and 
explains the reason why this study is of interest. Four other chapters followed 
logically; each dealt with more specific issues of microcredit loan interest rates that 
assisted the reader to follow the logic of the study. 
 
Following the brief overview in Chapter One, it was important for this study to review 
prominent theories in the field. Thus, Chapter Two focuses on a literature review of 
the theory regarding the schools of thought that influence microcredit loan interest 
rates and their effect on the poor. It is important to review the said theory, as it 
contributes to an appreciation of how microcredit loan interest rates and the poor are 
related. Chapter Two describes key principles and mechanisms of microcredit, the 
relationship between microcredit and the poor, perspectives and debates on 
microcredit loan interest rates, the pull and the push factors of microcredit and the 
social performance management of microcredit.  All these different views and/or 
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perspectives in terms of microcredit loan interest rates and the poor constitute the 
review of the theory for this study. 
 
Chapter Three covers the review of the empirical research.  It was useful to review 
the empirical studies that have been conducted in the field as this permitted the 
researcher to ascertain whether the theories reflected the reality and whether it 
would be valuable to revisit the policy and regulations. Thus, the reviews of empirical 
research in this field permitted the researcher to draw alternative views with regard 
to microcredit loan interest rates and the poor. Since the study focused on different 
microcredit modalities (regulated and unregulated), it was good to provide an 
overview of the principles, modalities, and complementarities of these microcredit 
modalities. This helped to better understand the acknowledged differences between 
them (regulated and unregulated) and manage the study effectively and efficiently. 
 
Chapter Four deals with the methodology of the research and offers details on both 
research techniques and the sample. Discussion of the sample deals with the size of 
the group, criteria for the selection of the group and the microcredit providers, 
location, the administration of the questionnaires, and the constraints that faced the 
research methodology. 
 
Chapter Five offers a discussion and analysis of the results.  The study employs 
various indicators and variables including microcredit loan interest rate settings, 
social performance indicators, dropouts, push and pull factors, the graduation 
process of the clients, and perceptions. The results of this chapter permit the 
researcher to categorically state whether or not the loan interest rate of the sampled 
microcredit providers attracts the borrowers to benefit from the services or 
discourages the borrowers from benefitting from the services. The results of this 
chapter throw light on whether the loan interest rates affect the poor; this enables the 
study to contribute something new to the microcredit loan interest rate literature. 
 
The final chapter (Chapter Six) summarizes and concludes this study by providing a 
general summary of the major findings as well as policy implications. Areas for 
further research are also included in this chapter. 
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 1.9 Conclusion  
 
The review of the interest rates charged for microcredit loans help provide detailed 
information on the challenges of the microfinance institutions (MFIs) to fulfil their 
social missions while charging their clients interest rates. The chapter assisted in 
formulating the study problems related to the impact of loan interest rates on the 
poor in Tigray Regional State. It also articulated the objectives of the study, and the 
questions that need to be addressed by the study in order to propose possible and 
practical solutions of loan interest rates that benefit the poor without undermining the 
financial sustainability of microcredit providers. The chapter also provided an 
overview on the methodology of the study and how the study is structured.  
 
The next chapter will focus on the literature review of different microcredit objectives, 
policies, theories and concepts related to microcredit the loan interest rate modalities 
that affect the poor in general and the Tigray microcredit clients in particular on their 
access to, benefit from, and decision making for microcredit services. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on a theoretical review, dedicated to those selected areas that 
are highly relevant to the topic’s objective and research questions. 
 
 2.2 Historical background of microfinance/microcredit 
 
Clarifying the historical origin of financing for the poor, Seible H.D. (2005:2-3) points 
out that microcredit is not a recent development. He also provided a historical 
mapping of microfinance institutions, showing that while microfinance in Europe 
dates back to the 16th and 17th centuries, the origins of India’s indigenous 
microfinance predate the German and Irish systems by around 3000 years. While 
there has been no systematic study done on microfinance in Africa, Seibel noted that 
microfinance existed in Nigeria at least as early as 500 years ago, namely in the 
form of rotating savings and credit associations. 
 
On the other hand, Yonus M. (2006: 1-4), the pioneer of microcredit, explains that 
the term “microcredit” did not exist before the seventies. Now, it has become a 
buzzword among development practitioners. In the process, the term has been used 
in ways that suggest it can mean almost anything. No one is shocked if someone 
uses the term “microcredit” to mean agriculture credit, or rural credit, or cooperative 
credit, or consumer credit, or credit from the savings and loan associations, credit 
unions, or money lenders. Further, if someone suggests that microcredit has a 
thousand-year history, or a hundred-year history, few find that an exciting piece of 
historical information.  
 
Yonus’s assertion that microcredit emerged in the seventies, as noted above, was 
supported by Woodworth W. and Woller G. (2001: 267-268) who asserted that prior 
to the early 1980’s financial services were essentially unavailable to the world’s 
impoverished populations, and that the first attempt was the creation of the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh in 1983. Since that time, the microfinance movement has 
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gained both momentum and success, with thousands of MFIs operating in almost 
every country in the world. 
 
Microfinance emergence coincided with the advent of neo-liberalism, a major new 
development paradigm that encompassed important ideological notions and policy 
measures. This became a platform for the promotion of microfinance as a strategic 
development tool. Neo-liberalism advocated market driven development policies, 
encouraged private initiative and entrepreneurship and promoted the reduction of the 
state’s role in development matters (Lucarelli B. 2005:78).   
 
Furthermore, Brigg M. (2001:233-234) emphasized that instead of being passive aid 
recipients, subject to state and international policies and political will, poor people 
could take responsibility for their poverty.  They could, then, with a little initiative, 
determination and capital improve their living conditions and escape or mitigate 
poverty. This sounded appealing in light of the failure of large-scale government-led 
programs to foster development and alleviate poverty. 
 
When examining the evolution of microfinance, Legerwood J. (1999:2-34) 
summarized that microfinance arose in the 1980s as a response to doubts and 
research findings about the delivery of subsidized credit to poor farmers. In the 
1970s, government agencies were the predominant method of providing productive 
credit to those with no previous access to credit facilities. Government and 
international donors assumed that the poor required cheap credit and saw this as a 
way of promoting agricultural production. In addition, donors set up credit unions 
inspired by the Raiffeisen model developed in Germany in 1886. The focus of these 
cooperative financial institutions was mostly on savings mobilization in rural areas in 
an attempt to teach poor farmers how to save. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the 
subsidized, targeted credit model supported by many donors was object of the 
criticism because most programmes accumulated large loan losses and required 
frequent re-capitalization. This led to a new approach that considered microfinance 
as an integral part of the overall financial system. 
 
Relevant to the history of loan interest rates, Hudan M. (2006: 3-34) points out that, 
before the 70s, interest rates charged to poor entrepreneurs, particularly the rural 
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ones, were very low in development projects. In due course, in the 70s and 80s, 
there were very serious debates on these low interest rate policies; the debates 
further covered the emergence of the very costly microcredit loans. Accordingly, 
Adams D., Graham D., and Von Pischke J.D. (1984:75) came up with a 
countervailing view to the rural poor having low, but also very subsidized interest 
rates. They held that cheap credits would destroy the incentives to save in financial 
forms and distort the way lenders allocate funds. The rationale is that “low interest 
rates on loans to rural people end, paradoxically, by restricting their access to 
financial services” (Von Pischke J.D. 1983:176). 
 
2.3 Theoretical and conceptual literatures of microcredit interest 
rate 
 
This section explores the link between microcredit loan interest rates and the poor. 
The basic question of the study is “What is the impact of microcredit loan interest 
rates on the poor? The concept of microfinance and microcredit is difficult to 
differentiate in most literature; most authors used them interchangeably.  
Nevertheless, this study tried to focus consistently on the main topic of the study, 
which is microcredit. However, due to the interchangeable nature of MFI and 
microcredit in some cases, this study was forced to use the terms interchangeably. 
2.3.1 School of thoughts of microfinance/microcredit 
 
Brau M. and Woller G.M. (2004:3-5) point out that the different perspectives on 
which microfinance performance is to be measured have created two opposing 
schools of thought, with the same goals in the microfinance industry. The first 
perspective is called ‘Welfarists’ and the second perspective is ‘institutionalism’. 
Welfarists argue that MFIs can achieve sustainability without achieving financial 
sustainability. They contend that donations serve as a form of equity and as such 
donors can be viewed as social investors. Unlike private investors, who purchase 
equity in a publicly traded firm, social investors don’t expect to earn monetary 
returns. Instead, these donor investors realize a social (intrinsic) return.  
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 Similarly, Woller G., Dunford C, and Woodworth W. (1999:29-31) offer a clear 
description of these perspectives. On the one side, there are “Institutionalists”, those 
who are mainly concerned with the creation of financial systems that are financially 
self-sufficient. They assume the positive clients’ impact the outreach to the poor. On 
the other hand, there are “Welfarists”, who emphasize the depth of outreach and 
focus on improving the wellbeing of the participants. Their focus is on maximizing the   
effect of access of financial services. Jonathan M. (2000:617) termed these opposing 
points of views the microfinance schism, an ongoing debate shaping the future of 
microfinance. 
 
Each school of thought, or perspective, evaluates the effect of MFIs in a different 
way, depending on their particular conceptualization of the intent of microfinance. 
The Institutionalist school views microfinance as a method of wealth creation, similar 
in nature to capital on a larger scale in more developed countries (Hoque M.Z 
2004:33). This perspective judges success by the participants’ ability to consistently 
pay back loans, expand the operations of their microenterprise, and eventually 
graduate out of the MFI into the formal financial sector as their microenterprises 
become self-sustaining (Wright G. 2000:43).  
 
The Welfarist school does not view MFIs as an exact equivalent of capital in more 
developed countries, where capital is used to increase and not to stabilize returns. 
These theorists view microcredit as a separate system, which increases income by 
smoothing consumption (Martin I., Hulem D., and Rutherford S. 2002:273-276; 
Weber H. 2004:367; Zohir S. 2004: 318) and allowing participants to draw 
progressively larger amounts to expand their enterprises (Yunus M. 1999:298). In 
their view, MFIs should not transition individuals and groups onto more traditional 
types of financial institutions. Instead, MFIs act as a system that lessens the 
frequency and severity of household budgetary shortfalls and provides insulation 
from macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Microfinance scholars may therefore be classified broadly into two groups. On the 
one side are those taking the narrower point of view of financial efficiency. They 
emphasize the necessity for being financially solvent. Adherents of the other side 
emphasize microfinance’s proven capacity to reach those who would otherwise 
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remain outside the orbit of formal financial services. Accordingly, these scholars do 
not want microfinance to charge a high interest rate and thereby neglect the poor in 
order to become financially viable. In fact, many of them have argued that it is 
worthwhile to provide subsidies to microfinance, at least until it reaches financial 
viability, calling such subsidies “smart subsidies” (Jonathan M. 1999:1569-1641). 
 
Gert M. (2004:17-75) classified the two schools of thought into the “sound business 
school” and the “development school”. The details are summarized as follows; 
 
Table 2.1: “Sound business school” and the “Development school”. 
 
School of 
thought 
Primary view or focus and 
justification 
 
Differences 
The “sound 
business 
school” 
x Primary focus is on the 
development of 
institutions that function 
properly and meet well-
defined organizational 
and financial criteria. 
x At the core of this 
approach is the belief 
that profitability is within 
the reach of well-
organized institutions 
and therefore must be 
one of their primary 
objectives - because 
profit is the ultimate proof 
of effectiveness, 
efficiency, and 
sustainability as an 
economic entity. 
x The result is that the 
definition of success has 
changed: success is now 
being defined and 
measured by the pace of 
their progression toward 
ultimate profitability. Cost 
recovery has become as 
x The first difference is in 
the setting of the interest 
rate. 
The sound business school 
expects the MFI 
9 To set the interest rate at 
such a level that with a 
proper growth of the 
portfolio the break-even 
point/profitability can be 
reached within a 
reasonable period of time; 
9 To relate - like any bank - 
the interest rate to the 
costs (cost of funds, 
operating costs, loan loss 
provision) plus a mark-up 
to arrive at a fair profit; 
9 To compare the interest 
rate to be charged with the 
alternative options for “un-
bankable”. As long as the 
MFI rate is more favorable 
than the rate moneylenders 
charge, it is a good and 
helpful alternative. 
x The second difference 
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important as loan 
recovery. 
x They promise that once 
profitability is achieved, 
microcredit institutions 
will no longer depend on 
benevolent funders, but 
can attract new capital 
on normal capital 
markets. They will even 
be able to “securitize” 
part of their business (i.e. 
selling part of their 
profitable portfolio to 
banks) and use the 
proceeds for expansion. 
has to do with growth 
and outreach. 
The sound business school 
9 Is keen that the 
scheme’s growth does 
not postpone the break-
even point for too long: 
“try to become profitable 
and let your growth not 
reduce that profitability.” 
The 
“development 
school” 
x Primarily views 
microcredit not as a 
business instrument but 
rather as a development 
instrument directed at the 
poor. 
x The primary measure of 
success is therefore the 
effect or impact of credit 
on the lives of the 
recipients. 
x They judge the success 
of an MFI primarily in 
terms of the loan 
repayment rate. If that 
rate is above 95%, it 
proves in retrospect that 
the product (i.e. the 
microloan) is relevant.  
x If that were not the case, 
their clients would not 
have been able to 
increase their income 
and to produce in masse 
such a repayment rate. 
x The question of cost 
recovery, leaving aside 
x The first difference is in 
the setting of the interest 
rate. 
The development school 
expects the MFI 
9 To treat “unbankables” not 
too differently from 
“bankables” (the latter label 
is what they deserve to be 
called if the repayment rate 
is higher than 95%); 
9 Therefore, to set the 
interest rate not much 
higher than the rate “the 
bankable neighbor” would 
pay; being the market rate 
for those who are better off; 
9 To aim within that context 
to reach break-even point, 
which is most likely 
reached somewhat later 
than if the clients were 
charged with the actual 
costs from the start. 
x The second difference 
has to do with growth 
and outreach. 
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profitability, is of another 
nature. That question is 
not related to how the 
target group is doing 
(development impact), 
but how the financial 
intermediary is doing (in 
mere financial terms). 
The development school 
9 promotes organic and 
gradual growth, seeing how 
many more clients could be 
served with this approach; 
9  is prepared to accept that 
reaching the break-even 
point is postponed until the 
MFI has reached a proper 
size/outreach; 
9 Believes that as long as 
sufficient development 
funds can be mobilized for 
microcredit, relevant 
growth is more important 
than profitability. 
 
Additionally, Gert M. (2004:17-75) noted that the differences between these two 
schools are not only philosophical, but also have consequences for daily practice; he 
states that the prospect of a full cost recovery depends to a large extent on: 
x The size of the portfolio; 
x  The average size of the loans; 
x The geographical reach of the programme (number of villages served); 
x The degree of labour-intensiveness; 
x The cost of living in the country (reflecting on the salaries they have to pay to 
qualified staff members); 
x  The interest rate charged. 
 
Negash Z. (2008:12) views microfinance institutions as operating under a twin 
mission system: a commercial mission and a social mission (also called commercial 
and developmental objectives). Their commercial mission basically refers to financial 
viability that of recovering costs and potentially making profits. The social mission 
involves serving the poor who are marginalized by the formal banking system, 
addressing poverty alleviation and minimizing income inequality. Microfinance 
institutions work to harmonize these objectives (commercial and social), which are 
not necessarily reconcilable.  
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Furthermore, Robinson M. (2001: 29-71) describes that microfinance providers 
gained substantial recognition in the 1990s and 2000s for providing financial services 
to the poor, but largely failed to reach households in extreme poverty. While this gap 
was widely acknowledged, the response varied considerably. It basically divided into 
two camps along the lines of the “financial systems approach” vs. the “poverty 
lending” approach. 
 
1. Financial systems proponents focus on the appropriateness of microfinance 
for the very poor, arguing the very poor need a more intensive suite of 
services. They note that while microfinance may not reach the very poor, 
there are millions of unbanked households who deserve access to financial 
services.  
2. Poverty lending proponents focus on targeting: if we can make it easier to 
identify the very poor we can encourage them to participate in microfinance 
programs.  
 
The debate between the two schools of thought (camps) is still going on. The 
important issue is how to find out the “ideal area” or common ground between these 
two extreme ideas. This ‘ideal area’ would which find the trade-offs that benefit both 
the poor and the credit providers.  This study does address possible practical 
solutions that benefit both microcredit providers and the poor sector of the 
community. 
2.3.2 Business or Development? / Institutionalists or Welfarists? 
 
Gert M. (2004:17-75) illustrates the issues to be examined when choosing ‘business 
or development’.  First of all, the answer depends on the type of clients the MFI 
wants to serve. If the MFI aims at clients deep in the poverty pyramid, the approach 
of the development school should prevail. The service to be given to these clients is 
much more than simply providing them with loans and collecting repayments. If an 
MFI is looking for clients who could eventually ‘graduate’ to the formal sector, such 
as the downscaling banks, the business school approach is more logical. The 
problem arises when one of the schools claims territory that should be reserved for 
the other. That problem also occurs when donors make no such distinction and 
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expect MFIs to serve the very poor within a business model that is based on 
potential graduates (See Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Businesses or Development? / Institutionalism or Welfarists? 
 
Gert M. (2004:17-75) addresses the dangers for MFIs.  The first danger is that the 
pressure to reach sustainability pushes MFIs up to the higher layers of the pyramid. 
The other danger is that they are under pressure to charge higher interest rates to 
the poor in order to bring sustainability and profitability within reach. Justification for 
that approach is that the major problem of the poor is access to credit, not the level 
of the interest rate. The researcher finds the first half of this statement to be true, 
while the second part is partially true as it holds only in cases where potential clients 
have no alternatives.  
 
In constructing the analysis, Luckshmi S., Brain S., and Kate G. (2012:6) described a 
series of six hypotheses, which form the basis of a double bottom line business 
case. These hypotheses illustrate how operational methodologies targeted at the 
very poor could potentially enhance an MFI’s ability to meet its double bottom line 
goals. Providing tailored products to very poor households could enable the MFIs to:  
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1. Increase the depth of poverty outreach of the MFI. 
2.  Show a greater developmental impact on clients reached in the targeted 
product versus the mainstream product. 
3. Open up new markets to the MFI by expanding the pool of possible clientele.  
4.  Create greater customer loyalty by targeting an under-served customer.  
5. Identify more profitable customers. 
6. Provide a quantifiable financial contribution to the MFI.  
 
Luckshmi et al. (2012:6) elaborate an analysis aimed at ascertaining whether by 
actively targeting a poorer group of clients and customizing products and services 
catered to their needs, an institution was creating a sound business model for 
reaching very poor households, often excluded from traditional microfinance 
programs,  that would have a positive effect on their lives. The first three hypotheses 
address the MFI’s social bottom line, from depth of poverty outreach to expanding 
the number of clients. The last three hypotheses address the financial bottom line, 
from customer retention to the financial sustainability of reaching the poorest 
customers. This range of methodologies provides a broad scope of evidence to 
support whether the MFIs have a double bottom line business case. 
 
The issue of the loan interest rate to be charged to the poor is determined by these 
schools of thought; that is why it remains complicated and continues to be one of the 
sensitive issues in the microcredit arena. This study examines the effect of loan 
interest rates on the poor from a practical rather than theoretical point of view. 
2.3.3 Microfinance and Neo-liberalism 
 
Lucarelli B. (2005:78) clarifies that the emergence of microfinance coincided with the 
advent of neo-liberalism, a new major development paradigm that encompassed 
important ideological notions and policy measures and became a platform for the 
promotion of microfinance as a strategic development tool. Neo-liberalism advocated 
market driven development policies, encouraged private initiative and 
entrepreneurship and promoted the reduction of the state’s role in development 
matters. Furthermore, Brigg M. (2001:233-234) emphasized that instead of being 
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passive aid recipients and subject to states and international policies and will, the 
poor could take responsibility for their poverty and with a little initiative, determination 
and capital they could improve their living conditions and / or escape or mitigate 
poverty.  This had an appeal in light of the failure of large-scale government-led 
programs to foster development and alleviate poverty.  
 
Microfinance embodied all the main ideas of neo-liberalism. It was intended to create 
both incentives and the means for the poor to become active agents in improving 
their well-being by providing them access to credit. This access would thus enable 
them to take up self-employment and income-generating activities; consequently, 
this would increase the income of the poor and help them escape or alleviate 
poverty. As formal lending institutions were not willing to give loans to the poor 
because of their lack of collateral, high transaction costs and low profits, the role of 
microfinance was to fix this “market failure” by supplying credit to the ‘unbankable’ 
poor. Another advantage of microfinance was that it channelled funds directly to the 
poor, circumventing the state whose inefficiency and corruption was partly to blame 
for the failure of the large-scale development programs (Snow D.R. and Buss T.F. 
2001:296). Thus, microfinance materialized the neoliberal notion of a market-led 
approach to development, offsetting the market’s failure to provide credit to the poor 
and the state’s failure to mitigate poverty. 
 
Microfinance, as a neoliberal tool to alleviate poverty, received severe criticism. 
Karnani A. (2008:77-78) attacked the entrepreneurial approach to fight poverty. He 
noted that the neoliberal movement and microfinance assumed that poor people 
were more likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities than their counterparts in 
advanced countries, 90% of whom were employees rather than entrepreneurs. 
“While many poor people own businesses, this seems to be more a survival strategy 
than something they want to do.” Furthermore, Banerjee A.V., and Duflo A. 
(2008:333-334) elaborated that the emphasis on self-reliance and initiative of the 
poor downplayed the role and the responsibility of the state in creating legal, 
regulatory and social mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable people of the 
society.  Brigg M. (2001:233-234) called it an ‘individualization of poverty’ and 
pointed out that putting the responsibility for the improvement of the well being on 
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the poor themselves, depoliticized poverty and understated the importance of sound 
macro policies in alleviation of entrenched poverty. 
 
Additionally, the implementation of neoliberal policies reduced the role of the state in 
the provision of the services of social welfare (Karnani A. 2008:77-78).  In some 
countries, the provision of these services was already substandard because of the 
instability and weakness of the state. Thus, the poor had to rely on microfinance to 
acquire services that state was unable to provide. Also, as microfinance started to 
gain recognition as a poverty alleviation tool, the state governments began to 
contribute to it by subsidizing the loans, which “may imply a transfer of public 
resources from other public spending, leading to cuts in public health, sanitation and 
education expenditure” (Selinger A. 2008:5). Some authors argue that, by supporting 
microfinance, the state opts for the easier and less expensive path to help the poor 
instead of building an accessible social service system and creating employment 
opportunities (Banerjee et al. 2008:333-334). 
 
In addition, Karnani A. (2008:77-78) explains that a libertarian movement that 
emphasizes free markets to reduce poverty has grown strong in recent years. It 
views the poor as resilient and creative entrepreneurs and value-conscious 
consumers. This romanticized view of the poor is far from the truth and harms the 
poor in two ways. First, it results in too little emphasis on legal, regulatory and social 
mechanisms to protect the poor who are vulnerable consumers. Second, it results in 
over-emphasis on microcredit and under-emphasis on fostering modern enterprises 
that would provide employment opportunities for the poor. More importantly, the 
libertarian proposition grossly under-emphasizes the critical role and responsibility of 
the state for poverty reduction 
 
The proponents of microfinance point out that macro policies are important, but it 
takes time for them to have an impact; the poor are facing poverty and destitution at 
the present time. Therefore, tools for immediate action are necessary that would 
“directly attack poverty at the grass-roots level” and microfinance is one of the tools 
to achieve that. Furthermore, in many developing countries the poor are forced to 
take up entrepreneurial activities in the informal economy, as there are few other 
employment opportunities. However, to start or expand income-generating activities, 
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investment is required and the poor often do not have that capacity (Woller G.M. and 
Woodworth W. 2001:270). 
 
Therefore, the role of microfinance is to provide credit that would enable the poor to 
take advantage of these productive activities, increasing the chances of the poor to 
escape or alleviate poverty (Woller G.M. and Woodworth W. 2001:270). In addition, 
the advancement of microfinance was assumed to be contributing to the 
development of the financial sector, which was considered as one of the 
prerequisites for economic development and growth. The expansion of the financial 
systems can be particularly important for the poor as developed financial systems 
help reduce income inequality by distributing it more fairly; the expansion may also 
mitigate poverty by alleviating credit constraints and by insuring against shocks 
(Claessens S. 2006: 209). 
 
 2.4 Microcredit definitions and key principles 
 
2.4.1 Introduction  
 
In various literature, the terms of microcredit and microfinance are often used 
interchangeably; however, it is important to highlight their differences because the 
terms are often confused. There are many terminologies that microcredit and 
microfinance are associated with and are commonly used; these include ‘poor’, 
‘poverty reduction’ and ‘loan interest rate’.   ‘Who are the poor?’, ‘what is poverty 
reduction?’, and ‘how are loan interest rates determined?’ are important questions to 
be addressed to clarity these terms. A proper understanding of the terms used in 
microcredit and microfinance enable us to more clearly differentiate the objectives, 
the type of customers, procedures, and modalities of the microcredit providers. This 
also permits us to identify the areas of complementarity between microfinance and 
microcredit for collective social change. For the purpose of this study, the clarification 
of these terms is very crucial. The following are some of the definitions used in 
literature. 
 
 
 
    
 
  
25 
2.4.2 Definition of microcredit 
 
Some of the definitions of Microcredit, also known as micro lending (see Table 2.2): 
Table 2.2: Definitions of microcredit 
 Definition Author 
1 An extremely small loan given to impoverished people to help 
them to become self-employed through income generating 
activities that will improve the borrowers’ living standard. 
Usually the loan pays high interest rates because of the high 
cost in running micro credit programs. 
 
 
Norhazian N. 
(2010:153) 
2 The delivery to poor families and micro-enterprises of very 
small loans to help them engage in productive activities or 
develop their own tiny business. In contrast to the typical loan 
awarded by a commercial bank, a microcredit loan is basically 
an unsecured loan (where there is no perspective of the legal; 
enforceability of the security element). Microcredit loans are 
considered small in view of the local context and standards. 
 
 
EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
(2008:3-4) 
3 The most common microfinance product is microcredit: ideally 
a small loan that provides people with the means to invest in 
an income-generating activity, and thereby have a chance at 
increasing their financial capital. 
 
Yunus M. 
 (1999:298) 
4 More narrowly, ‘microcredit’ emphasizes the provision of 
credit services to low-income clients, usually in the form of 
small loans for micro enterprise and income generating 
activities. It has been argued that ‘microcredit’ should really be 
called ‘micro debt’.    
 
 
Ledgerwood J. 
(1999:2-34) 
 
Microcredit is not only one of the main products in any microfinance scheme but also 
one of the ‘established’ identities of microfinance. Some pioneer providers still like to 
keep the name microcredit, though they also provide other financial services along 
with savings and credit (UN-HABITAT 2011:47). 
 
Mohammad A.K, Suman D., and Mohammad S.I (2012:33) summarize the major 
objectives of microcredit schemes as follows:  
 
1. To stop the exploitation of the poor caused by expensive informal credit; 
2. To provide small loans to poor people at a relatively lower cost as compared 
to accessible informal loans; 
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3. To finance economically and socially viable projects that cannot be financed 
otherwise; 
4.  To empower women within households as decision makers and in society 
through active economic participation;  
5.  To create maximum employment opportunities;  
6. To create self-sufficient and self-employed people and most importantly;  
7. To reduce poverty, accelerate growth and improve the living standards on a 
sustainable basis. 
2.4.3 Definition of microfinance 
 
Table 2.3: Some definitions of microfinance 
 Definition Author 
1 ‘Banking for the poor.’ Microfinance programmes provide 
loans, savings and other financial services to low-income 
and poor people for use in small business. 
 
Chris Okoye S. 
(2008:9) 
2 A range of financial services (credit, savings mobilization, 
insurance schemes, payment systems, etc.) aiming at 
serving the poor population (normally neglected by the 
formal financial system made up of both micro enterprise 
and poor households) 
 
EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
(2008:3-4) 
3 As the supply of small-scale financial services such as 
credit, savings accounts and insurance to poor and low-
income people.  Microfinance is also called ‘women’s 
finance’ or ‘poor man’s finance’. 
 
United Nations 
(2005:1-2) 
4 A small-scale financial service, primarily credit and 
savings, provided to people who operate small 
enterprises or micro enterprises at the local level of 
developing countries in both rural and urban areas. 
 
Robinson M. 
(2001:29-71) 
5 Programs that extend small loans to poor people for self-
employment projects that will generate income 
Woodworth G.M. 
and Woller W. 
(2001:267-278) 
6 As ‘”small loans offered to poor households to foster self-
employment and income generations” defined by the 
founder and director of the microfinance organization 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). 
 
Abad H. (2000: 2) 
7 A provision of a broad range of financial services such as 
savings, credit, insurance and payment services to the 
poor or low-income group who are excluded from the 
normal banking sectors 
 
Legerwood J. 
(1999: 2-34) 
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Microfinance is a much-researched area of study; however, although there is 
significant literature on microfinance, there is hardly any agreement on a universally 
accepted definition of microfinance. Researchers and microfinance practitioners are 
divided in their opinions when it comes to microfinance, its range and its recipients. 
As Sriram M. and Upadhyaula R.S. (2002:1) said, “it appears that what microfinance 
means is well understood, but not clearly articulated”. 
 
In a narrow sense, microfinance is often referred to as microcredit for the tiny 
informal businesses of micro-entrepreneurs; the services are mainly delivered by 
socially oriented non-governmental organizations (Christen R., Lyman T., and 
Rosenberg R. 2003:1-14).  
 
From the above definitions it can be observed that: 
 
x The definitions of Microfinance and micro credit proposed by some authors 
and organizations are seemingly different from one another. Microfinance is 
seen as comprehensive services while microcredit is not. Microcredit is part of 
microfinance, which includes other services. However, the essence of the 
different definition is basically the same.  
x In all definitions, the most commonly used terms are: “the poor”, “low-income 
people”, “income generating” “un-banked”, “banking for the poor”, “small loan”. 
Therefore, microcredit is a component of microfinance that involves providing 
credit to the poor, but microfinance also involves additional non-credit 
financial services such as savings, insurance, pensions and payment 
services. As Woller G. and Parsons R. (2002:133-136) described it, 
microfinance was the second revolution in credit theory and policy. The first 
revolution was microcredit. 
 
In the field, Gert M. (2004:17-75) noted that MFI practitioners make no sharp 
distinction between microcredit and microfinance. Originally, the concept of 
microcredit was used for small loans to poor individuals to finance ‘income-
generating investments’. When MFIs started to add other financial services such as 
savings (and later insurance), the concept of microfinance was introduced to make it 
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clear that the product range was broader than just credit. There is, however, no 
sharp line dividing the two. MFIs are free to use the label they want. From a 
management point of view, the distinction is relevant, because in the case of larger 
loans and a wider range of financial service, the staffs of the MFI need to have more 
banking skills than in the case of microcredit only. 
 
Even though most literature uses microfinance and microcredit interchangeably, the 
main focus of this study is on microcredit.  
 
2.5  Key principles of micro-credit / finance 
 
As noted above, the interchangeable usage of microfinance and microcredit is still 
reflected in the guiding principles of microfinance postulated below. However, these 
key principles of microfinance can help us to evaluate how microfinance and 
microcredit are consistent in implementing these principles.  
 
Yunus M. (2006:1-4) describe the general features of Grameen credit as follows: 
 
1. It promotes credit as human rights. 
2. Its mission is to help the poor, particularly poor women. 
3. The most descriptive feature of Grameen credit is that it is not based on any 
collateral or legally enforceable contracts. Rather, it is based on ‘trust’, not on 
legal procedures and systems. 
4. It is offered to create self-employment through income–generating activities 
and housing for the poor, as opposed to consumption. 
5. It was initiated as a challenge to conventional banking, which rejected the 
poor by classifying them to be ‘not creditworthy’. As a result, it rejected the 
basic methodology of conventional banking and created its own methodology. 
6. It provides service at the doorstep of the poor, based on the principle that the 
people should not go to the bank, the bank should go to the people. 
7. In order to obtain loans, a borrower must join a group of borrowers. 
8. Loans can be received in a continuous sequence. A new loan becomes 
available to a borrower if her previous loan is repaid. 
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9. All loans are to be paid back in instalments (weekly, or bi-weekly). 
10. A borrower can receive more than one loan simultaneously. 
11. It comes with both obligatory and voluntary savings programmes for the 
borrowers. 
12. Generally, those loans are given through non-profit organizations or through 
institutions owned primarily by the borrowers. If it is done through for-profit 
institutions not owned by the borrowers, efforts are made to keep the interest 
rate at a level, which is close to a level commensurate with sustainability of 
the programme rather than bringing an attractive return for the investors. 
Grameen credit’s rule of thumb is to keep the interest rate as close to the 
market rate prevailing in the commercial banking sector, without sacrificing 
sustainability. In fixing interest rates, the market interest rate is taken as a 
reference rate, rather than the moneylender’s rate. Reaching the poor is its 
non-negotiable mission. Reaching sustainability is a directional goal. 
Grameen credit gives priority to building social capital. 
 
Of the issues delineated above by Yunus M., the most important are the issue of 
fixing the interest rate as ‘market interest rate’ and ‘reaching the poor’ as a non-
negotiable mission’. These two are also the most debated areas in the microfinance 
area in general and microcredit in particular.  
 
 2.6 Microcredit modality  
 
The following are the most widely acknowledged microcredit modalities. 
 
a) Minimalist vs. integrated approach 
 
Wood G.D. and Sharif I.A. (1997:7) demonstrate that, from their point of view, 
microcredit institutions operating on the minimalist model of poverty alleviation are 
concerned with setting up viable, financially sustainable credit delivery 
mechanisms. Thus, the delivery of microcredit enables the programme to meet 
the operational costs of the intervention. Client participation tends to take the form 
of mobilization of client skills and resources to reduce lenders’ transaction and 
    
 
  
30 
information costs.  Wright G.A.N. (1999:41) emphasizes this approach, often used 
exclusively on credit access, which it sees as the ‘missing piece’ for poverty 
alleviation. It assumes that credit access can unlock new economic activity and 
lead to income growth and employment, resulting in empowerment. 
 
Johnson S. and Roglay B. (1997:118), in contrast to the minimalist approach, 
promote the integrated approach, referred to as the ‘credit-plus approach’, which 
is grounded within an empowerment framework and attempts to deal with the 
structural causes of poverty through microcredit delivery.  Furthermore, McKee K. 
(1989:993) noted that it is a comprehensive approach aimed at providing a long-
term integrated support package, in which loans are combined with social 
mobilization, participation, training and education to maximize the income, 
opportunities and empowerment impacts. In other words, it incorporates financial 
and social development issues under its mandate. 
 
b) Individual vs. group credit model 
 
Armendariz B. and Jonathan M. (2000:410-412) mentioned that most individual 
microcredit institutions provide financial services only to entrepreneurs who are 
able to pledge collateral. Collateral, covering both the loan amount and the 
interest payment, signals the borrower’s willingness to fully repay the loan. 
Therefore, it is seen as the main mechanism tackling all typical problems of a loan 
contract including adverse selection, moral hazard, and repayment enforcement. 
Borrowers with satisfactory repayment records may receive access to further 
loans of increasing amount.  
 
Armendariz B. et al (2000:410-412) reveal that one of the most serious 
weaknesses of the individual micro-lending contract is that in a highly competitive 
environment, the incentives created by progressive lending can be a severe 
limitation. They concluded that the greater the likelihood of refinancing by a 
second lender, the weaker will be the incentive to repay the first lender.  
 
Additionally, Armendariz B. et al (2000:410-412) clarify that the group-lending 
model works in such a way that instead of lending directly to individual borrowers, 
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the lenders lend to groups of borrowers, who are jointly liable for a single loan. It 
minimizes administrative and transaction costs for lenders by replacing credit 
checks and collateral processing with self-selection of groups by borrowers. 
Borrowers, who are jointly liable for the loans of their group, had a vested interest 
in choosing trustworthy partners. 
 
Commenting on the advantage of group lending, Joseph E.S. (1990:351-352) 
points out that the theoretical analysis of the group lending mechanism shows that 
the access to further loans as well as the access to higher loans, which is made 
conditional on the repayment of all borrowers in the group, creates an incentive for 
peer monitoring, peer support, peer pressure, and discourages default among the 
borrowers. As a result, the probability of moral hazard behaviour is sufficiently 
reduced because a considerable part of the risk is transferred from the lender to 
the borrowing group. 
 
Regarding joint liability, Kritikos A.S. (1999: 393-394) indicates that if any 
borrower fails to repay (or makes a strategic default) his share of the loan, the 
whole credit group is considered as being in default and all peers lose access to 
subsequent loans. Therefore, the group is motivated either to repay for the 
delinquent partner, or to exert social pressure to make him reconsider his 
repayment decision. As a consequence of this set of incentives, lenders are able 
to achieve the repayment of the loans with high probability of success. 
 
Moreover, according to Kritiko A.S. (1999: 393-394), the main problem of the joint-
liability mechanism is that, at the worst, one defaulting member may cause a 
domino affect when the fellow group members are not able (or willing) to cover 
his/her instalments. This outcome is disadvantageous for the microcredit 
institutions (in particular in comparison to an individual lending scheme) because 
all other group members, except the defaulting borrower, could have repaid their 
loans.  
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c) Subsidized credit vs. market interest rates model 
 
Under the subsidized credit model, credit was subsidized because the poor had 
no capacity to pay a high interest rate. Government and donors subsidize 
microcredit programs with the objective of contributing to poverty alleviation 
programs. The critique to this credit model is that credit was seen as a means to 
increase impoverishment in that it increases their debt and the program often 
does not reach low-income groups (Robinson M. 2001: 29-71). 
 
On the other hand, the market interest rate model refers to a rate that arises from 
the interplay of supply and demand in a defined range of transactions. The market 
rate refers to the rate at which commercial banks and their conventional 
customers conduct deposit and loan transactions (Robinson M. 2001: 29-71). 
 
d) Progressive lending vs. frequent repayment model 
 
Progressive lending refers to the system by which borrowers obtain increasingly 
larger loans if repayment is made promptly. As long as the system is credible and 
alternative sources of finance are less attractive, this type of incentive can 
enhance repayments (Jonathan M. 1999: 1569-1614). 
 
Frequent repayment schedules are also seen to act as an added mechanism to 
secure repayment. As most MCIs collect repayments before investments bear 
fruit, they are, in fact, lending against the borrower’s steady income stream; 
hence they can secure part of the loan repayment even if projects fail (Nissanke 
M. 2002: 5). 
 
Regardless of the borrower’s income and profit from the credit, both progressive 
lending and frequent repayment models treat the repayment modality as a 
mechanism to secure repayment and reduce client’s defaults. The difference 
between the two models is that the progressive lending model handles 
repayment with an incentive mechanism while the frequent repayment model 
focuses only on the repayment mechanism, without any incentive to the 
borrowers.   
    
 
  
33 
e) Consumption smoothing vs. productive use model 
 
When loans are provided to the poorest people, the borrowers may use the loan 
for consumption smoothing and may not be able to use the loan effectively for 
productive purpose (Hulme D., and Mosley 1996:119-221). Consumption 
smoothing could be considered as one of the important impacts of microcredit for 
the poor. The effect of high interest rates on the poor from the perspective of 
Sen’s, A.  (1999:47) in ‘Development as Freedom’, is important.  He notes that 
“when you have nothing to eat till the harvest, you may be willing to pay a lot for a 
loan: yes, the interest will cost you tomorrow, but if you do not eat, there will be 
no tomorrow”. Thus, the impact of microcredit for the poor should go beyond the 
slight improvement of consumption smoothing of the poor households. 
Consumption smoothing is a means not an end of the objective of microcredit 
services. 
 
Weiss and Montgomery (2005:395-396) identified two purposes of microloans. The 
‘protection loan’ allows the borrowers to deal with their immediate needs.  The 
‘promotional loan’ is for investment purposes.  
 
2.7 Financial sustainability, outreach, and impact 
 
Outreach is traditionally conceived as consisting of two dimension, breadth and 
depth. Schreiner M. (2001:1-10) proposes that outreach consists of six dimensions, 
each of which arguably has a component social value. He defines the six dimensions 
as follows: 
 
1. Worth of Outreach: The client’s willingness to pay. “Worth hinges on the terms 
of the financial contract and on the tastes, constraints, and opportunities of 
clients”.  Repeat purchases are the simplest and most straightforward 
measure of worth. Several relatively simple measures of dropout have already 
been proposed. Indices of customer satisfaction are also useful and relatively 
simple indicators of worth. 
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2. Cost of Outreach: “The sum of price costs and transaction costs”.  In other 
words, the interest rate charged on loans and client transaction costs. In lieu 
of actual interest rates, the portfolio yield is a simple and widely available 
proxy. In lieu of actual transaction costs (admittedly very difficult to estimate), 
proxies may be used, such as the average time spent in meetings per week, 
the average time and distance required to travel to conduct financial 
transactions, the average time spent completing the loan application, or the 
average time elapsed between the loan application and loan disbursement. 
3. Scope of Outreach: “The number or types of financial contracts (products and 
services) supplied”. That is, the number of different types of loan, savings, 
insurance, and other products offered broken down by product lines or 
product types. 
4. Length of Outreach: “The time frame of the supply of microfinance”.  This 
includes the financial self-sufficiency or some other indicator of financial 
performance, such as return on equity, profit margin, or return on assets, in 
addition to indicators that suggest institutional sustainability, such as 
operational self-sufficiency, number of years of operation, average yearly 
change in equity (regardless of source), average yearly cash flow, portfolio-at-
risk, loan write-offs, or customer satisfaction indices. Additional indicators 
explicitly recognize that financial self-sufficiency is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for institutional sustainability, and they give other relevant factors 
weight in assessing length of outreach. 
5. Depth of Outreach: “The value that society attaches to a net gain of a given 
client” or the average loan size broken down by size dimensions. Average 
loan size by itself is a blunt and possibly inaccurate measure of depth. 
According to Schreiner M. (2001:1-10), a more useful way to use average 
loan size is to break it down into its seven distinct dimensions, each of which, 
as Schreiner demonstrates, can be measured: dollars disbursed, average 
balance, term to maturity, dollars per instalment, time between instalments, 
number of instalments, and dollar years of borrowed resources. Smaller 
values along each dimension generally mean smaller loans and poorer 
borrowers. Using each of the seven dimensions gives a fuller understanding 
of loan size and depth of outreach, and it avoids the deficiencies of relying 
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solely on average loan size or the average loan size as a percentage GNP 
per capita. 
 
A true measure of depth of outreach also requires that the poor who save but 
do not borrow be counted. At MFIs that offer both loans and voluntary 
savings, the number of savers typically exceeds the number of borrowers by 
large multiples.  
6. Breadth of Outreach: “The number of clients” or the number and percentage 
change of clients served. For a more complete understanding of breadth, the 
number and percentage change of clients served should be broken down by 
major products lines or product types, such as enterprise loans, consumption 
loans, savings, and insurance. 
 
Navajas S., Schreiner M., Meyer R.L., Gonzalez C., and Rodriguez J. (2000:335-
346) similarly indicated that there are six aspects of measuring outreach: depth, 
worth of users, cost to users, breadth, length and scope. Here the depth of outreach 
refers to "the value the society attaches to the net gain from the use of the 
microcredit by a given borrower. This measure is to identify the poor clients because; 
the poor are the ones who fail to get access from formal financial institutions as they 
fail to demonstrate that they can repay their loan. Worth of outreach to users refers 
to "how much a borrower is willing to pay for a loan”. Similarly, cost of outreach to 
users refers to "the cost of a loan to a borrower". These costs to users might consist 
of costs like interest rates and various payments that they have to pay, which could 
be revenue to the lender as well as other loan related transaction costs like 
expenses on documents, transport, food, taxes, etc.  
 
Furthermore, Navajas S., et al. (2000:335-346) elaborate that social value is 
determined by the interaction of each of the six aspects of outreach. No single 
aspect or combination of aspects can be considered in isolation from the others, thus 
rendering as moot the dichotomous trade-offs implied by the outreach-versus-
sustainability debate. Three simple examples will illustrate this point. 
 
1) An MFI adopts a poverty-targeting tool that increases administrative costs. 
Depth of outreach increases, but breadth of outreach decreases, because the 
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marginally poor and non-poor are now excluded from access to loans. If the 
costs to administer the tools are passed on to customers, cost of outreach 
increases, but if they are not, operating margins fall, and length of outreach 
may fall. If the MFI goes down market with appropriate products and services 
and with appropriate terms, worth and scope of outreach increase, as does 
length. If not, then length, worth, and scope of outreach all decrease. 
2) An MFI charges a high rate of interest that covers operational, funding, and 
imputed funding costs. Breadth and depth of outreach fall (assuming 
reasonable price elasticity), cost and length of outreach increase, and worth of 
outreach falls, all else being equal. Scope of outreach is unchanged. 
3) An MFI offers savings with flexible terms. Scope and worth of outreach 
increase. Breadth and depth of outreach also increase, because people who 
do not operate businesses or are otherwise too poor to borrow can still save. 
Length of outreach increases, because savings are a more stable source of 
long-term funds than donations. Relative to donated funds, the cost of 
outreach increases, but relative to commercially borrowed funds, cost of 
outreach falls. 
 
There are different arguments concerning how to evaluate the performance of 
microfinance institutions. Meyer R.L. (2002:2-5), Citing from Zeller 2002:3 indicated 
that there is what is called "Critical Micro-Finance Triangle" that we need to look at to 
evaluate Micro-finance institutions based on their objective. The triangle can be 
depicted as below (Meyer R.L. 2002: 2-5). 
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Figure 2.2: Critical microfinance triangles 
Source: Meyer R.L 2002:2-5  
 
Meyer R.L (2002: 2-5) explains that the corners of the triangle represent outreach to 
the poor, financial sustainability and welfare impact. Further, “performance criteria 
are required for each objective and all three must be measured thoroughly to 
evaluate micro-finance performance".  Meyer also explains that "the inner circle in 
the Figure represents MFI innovations in technology, policies, organization, and 
management that affect how well each objective is met. The outer circle represents 
the environment within which micro finance operates that also affects performance. 
This environment broadly includes the human and social capital possessed by the 
poor, the economic policies of the country, and the quality of the financial 
infrastructure that supports financial transactions. Improvements in the environment 
make it easier for MFIs to reach the three objectives". 
 
It is argued that the length of a loan matters, because if the microfinance institutions 
support the poor only in the short run, it will hamper the social welfare of the society 
in the long run. For example, if the client of the microfinance institution knows that 
he/she will not receive an additional loan in the future they would have no incentive 
to repay their loan and a short-term loan would worsen the welfare of the poor 
(Navajas S., et al. 2000:335-346). 
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Meyer R.L. (2002:2-5) also stated that the financial unsustainability in the MFI arises 
due to a low repayment rate or if funds promised by donors or governments do not 
materialize. He also mentioned that there are two kind of sustainability that we could 
observe in assessing MFIs performance: operational self-sustainability and financial 
self-sustainability. 
 
Arguing that some trade-offs exists between financial self-sufficiency and depth of 
outreach, Gary W., and Mark S. (2002:13-22) concluded that the two are not 
mutually exclusive, arguing instead that they are or can be complementary.  This 
does not imply that there are no trade-offs between the two however. For example: 
 
x A poverty lender that follows a best practice convention and charges an 
interest rate exceeding its operating costs, funding costs, and imputed 
funding costs while in the process of achieving financial self-sufficiency, it will 
necessarily price certain market segments, including presumably segments of 
the poor, out of the market for loans, assuming a reasonably elastic demand 
curve. Thus, even though the MFI might achieve a reasonable depth of 
outreach, its depth of outreach will still be lower than it would have been had 
it charged a lower interest rate or had it been willing to accept donated or 
below-market funding. 
x In contrast, another poverty lender might be so focused on reaching poor 
borrowers that it overlooks legitimate market opportunities to serve a 
somewhat better off clientele as well. By thus failing to take advantage of 
potential benefits of cross-subsidization, the MFI jeopardizes its long-term 
financial viability. To compensate, it charges a higher interest rate, thereby 
pricing certain poor clients out of the market. 
x Finally, consider a poverty lender that has achieved admirable financial self-
sufficiency and depth of outreach as a result of offering a narrow set of 
standardized products coupled with highly inflexible loan terms. Its ‘success’, 
however, may be accompanied by a high rate of client desertion, because the 
range and quality of products offered do not meet clients’ needs or create 
value commensurate with the products’ high price. As a result, short-term 
success threatens long-term viability. 
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Based on the above examples, Gary W., and Mark S. (2002:13-22) demonstrate that 
the relationship between depth of outreach and financial self-sufficiency is 
multidimensional. The two do not stand in stark contrast to each other, locked in a 
duel for supremacy, but each relates to the other indirectly through a myriad of 
intervening factors. Viewed in this way, their end or ultimate relationship in a given 
situation may go in either direction. In this, a critical conceptual flaw emerges in 
microfinance, which has significant implications for poverty lenders. 
 
Supporting the opinion of Gary W., and Mark S. (2002:13-22), Meyer R.L (2002:2-5) 
clarifies that outreach and financial sustainability are complementary; as the number 
of clients increases, MFIs enjoy economies of scale and hence reduce costs that 
helps them to achieve financial sustainability. On the other hand, Hulme D., and 
Mosely P. (1996:119-221) argued that there is an inverse relationship between 
outreach and financial sustainability. Here the argument is that higher numbers in 
outreach mean higher transaction costs in order to get information about 
creditworthiness of clients and hence make MFI financially unsustainable. 
 
2.8 Combining outreach and sustainability 
 
Figure 2.4 is a matrix, which is split into four sectors signifying the integration of 
conflicting goals of sustainability with outreach in the microcredit industry. 
 
1. This is the ideal position for achieving the twin goals of sustainability and 
outreach to clients. It would resemble microfinance banks that are able to 
combine the best practice of their formal banking experience in terms of 
sustainability along with the development non-governmental organizations’ 
(NGOs) goal of reaching numerous low income people. A good example of 
this financial lending approach would be BRI (Bank Rakyata Indonesia). 
2. This portrays the official traditional banking segment that is equipped to 
address sustainability but has little exposure to poorer clients. 
3. This is the worst possible situation and relates to institutions, probably NGOs, 
that are unsustainable and are not reaching their poor clients. 
4. This is representative of many NGOs that are attempting to provide credit to 
their clients but since they are heavily subsidized there is little illustration of 
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sustainability. An example would be Grameen Bank (Fisher T., and Sirma 
M.S. 2002:20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Outreach and Sustainability Matrix 
Source: Fisher T., and Siram M.S. 2002:20 
 
There is no consensus around which is the better approach. Schreiner M. (2001:1-
10) pointed out that the outreach approach helps to serve a greater number of the 
poorest people, but it offers only short-term solutions, while the sustainability 
approach strives to provide financial services to the less poor and stands for a long-
term solution. He further noted that the objective of sustainability provides more 
incentives and motivation for innovations and improvement of efficiency.  
 
In support of the outreach approach, Conning J. (1999:55-57) argued that striving for 
self-sufficiency would exclude the poorest borrowers from the target group, since 
they induce the highest costs. This would also divert the attention from important 
social goals such as empowerment. The pursuance of financial objectives also 
requires strict policies toward the collection of loan instalments, high interest rates to 
cover the administration and operational expenses and less flexibility, which could 
adversely affect the clients’ possibilities to continue the banking relationship. 
 
The empirical examination showed that it is possible to achieve trade-offs between 
sustainability and outreach and to successfully become self-sufficient while 
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accomplishing the goal of serving the poor. However, if trade-offs can be attained in 
one environment it does not necessarily follow that it can be achieved in all 
environments. The external factors like regulatory mechanism, infrastructure, client’s 
education level etc., as well as internal factors such as staff incentives, 
management, the range and quality of services and products provided etc. differ 
from one country to another; thus, one experience cannot be easily replicated and 
implanted in another environment (Jonathan M. 1999:1569-1614). 
 
Further, in a report prepared for the 2011 Micro Credit Submit, Waterfield (2011, no 
page number) argues that ‘the pricing of microloan products forms a critical 
component in achieving the delicate balance between being financially sustainable 
and socially responsible’. He calls for ‘responsible commercialization’ in the sector, 
which is related to three intertwined factors; the delivery costs of the microfinance 
institution, the product prices that institutions charge, and the prices that clients can 
afford. 
 
2.9  Microcredit and the poor  
 
2.9.1 Microcredit and serving the poor 
 
Yunus M. established the Grameen Bank, which is the most well-known microcredit 
organization, after he concluded that “people are poor because they have no 
money”. Redefining poverty as the victimization of the poor placed the fault on 
societal structures and institutions rather than on the poor themselves. This paved 
the way for Yunus’ M. Grameen Bank to offer financial services to the poor. Because 
the poor simply do not have money, Yunus M. set out to prove that they are not risky 
borrowers or prone to default on loans. Rather, when provided with funds, he 
predicted they would invest in income-generating projects to improve their standard 
of living. Yunus’ M. new perspective on poverty has forced the financial world to 
consider the social good and even the profitability of lending to the poor (McMillan 
C., and Hanley M. 2003:2). 
 
Sunita P. (2003:9-21) describes that one of the misconceptions amongst 
practitioners is that an MFI targets the poorest of the poor, the landless, those 
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without assets, and the destitute. However, the study has demonstrated that for an 
MFI such a client profile will not ensure returns and increase profits. It is precisely 
such a beneficiary profile that is unattractive and and thus the client is unlikely to 
become a potential borrower. The changing policy environment puts more pressure 
on and competition for the scarce resources between the poorest of the poor and the 
‘not-so-poor’. 
 
Yunus M. (2007:69-96), the founder of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the 
originator of the concept of microfinance, believes that 5% of Grameen Bank’s 
clients exit poverty each year. However, there are surprisingly few credible estimates 
of the extent to which microcredit actually reduces poverty.  A recent study 
concluded by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and the World Bank 
in Bangladesh provides a strong indication that Microcredit does help the poor in 
consumption smoothing as well as in asset building. Thus, the continuing intense 
debate about the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction is not surprising (Anis 
C. 2009:1-6). 
 
Jonathan M., and Haley D. (2002:31) argue that microfinance has proven to be an 
effective and powerful tool for poverty reduction. Like many other development tools, 
however, it has insufficiently penetrated the poorest strata of society. The poorest 
emerge from the vast majority of those without access to primary health care and 
basic education; similarly, they are the majority of those without access to 
microfinance. This shows that, for the poorest, losing access to microfinance is 
highly related to the exclusion of all types of basic social services.  
 
Related to exclusion of the poor, Hasan M., and Iglebaek M. (2004:3-7) point out that 
many NGOs think it is impossible to reach the hard-core poor. Using the Grameen 
and other conventional models, only a few NGOs are trying to evolve different 
methodologies for reaching the poorest of the poor. While the group and 
standardized financial services system were introduced to bring the poor people, 
including the poorest, together in the same platform, the reality was that the extreme 
poor were being left out and this exclusion increased over time.   
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Others like Hulme D., and Mosley P. (1996:119-221) give limited evidence that 
microfinance increases income. Nevertheless, they also show that the impact highly 
depends on the level of income. Specifically, the poorest borrowers seem not to 
benefit from a sufficient income increase. To the contrary, Khandker R. (2005:265-
266) found that access to microfinance contributes significantly to poverty reduction 
and that this is especially true for poor women. Not only participants seem to benefit, 
but the whole local community. 
 
Navajas S., et al. 2000:335-346 stated that a growing body of evidence suggests 
that very poor households are excluded from accessing microfinance programmes. 
According to these authors, increasingly extremely poor people are seen to be 
dropping out of credit programmes after having failed to keep up with repayment 
instalments. Some critics also question the efficacy of microcredit in reaching 
extremely poor people. They argue that, while micro-credit has contributed positively 
to the wellbeing of poor people in general, it has failed to reach the poorest of the 
poor. Most microfinance institutions tend to serve not the poorest of the poor, but 
rather those near the poverty line. 
 
Other researchers see ‘targeting’ by microfinance programmes as being effective in 
reaching the poorest of the poor. Even a well-designed microfinance programme is 
unlikely to have a positive impact on the poorest unless it specifically seeks to reach 
them through appropriate product design and targeting (Wright G.1999: 41). 
Experience has shown that unless there is a targeting tool, the poorest will either be 
missed or they will tend to exclude themselves because they do not see the 
programmes as being for them, do not have the correct clothes, etc., (Navajas S., et 
al. 2000:335-346).  
 
Zoom (2004:1) describes three different ways that the issue is being approached. 
 
1. Those who think that microfinance cannot really reach the poorest in a 
sustainable way; 
2. In contrast, those who believe that such a thing is possible and can be 
accomplished at a large scale; 
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3. Finally, those who admit that it is not an easy task, but underline that research 
on innovative measures to consolidate microfinance services for the poorest 
must be maintained. 
 
The first group denies that there is a demand while the second approach offers the 
opposite perspective: there is a strong demand for microcredits from the poorest. 
The intermediary approach considers that the poorest can profit from microfinance 
services as long as innovative models to facilitate their access continue to be 
developed. The approach also believes that subsidies play an essential role in 
developing sustainable mechanisms to reach the poorest (Zoom, 2004:1). 
 
Related to reaching the ultra-poor, Fazle H.A (2000: 8-13) stated that it is a lesson 
learnt through experience that all the poor do not benefit from microfinance 
programmes. A question is very often raised: “if the microcredit programmes have 
not reached the poorest of the poor, how effective are they for poverty alleviation?” 
 
Fazle H.A (2000: 8-13) explains that two decades of microfinance experience have 
generated the learning that NGOs are not unable to bring all poor in their fold, but 
that microfinance with its present structure and components is not necessarily the 
way out for the poorest. Experience also suggests that normal microfinance 
programmes cannot attract the extreme poor. Special programmes with start-up 
support, training in marketable skills, credit, and essential health care can be a 
useful development package for this group. It has also been observed that if safety 
nets and wage employments are provided, the ultra-poor could be attracted toward 
credit facilities.  
 
Moreover, Fazle H.A (2000: 8-13) stated that there are many complex reasons why 
poor and low-income customers do not seek or are not offered more access to 
microcredit services. In some cases, there is a latent demand that innovative 
financial service providers can bring out. In other cases, the financial products or 
delivery methodologies currently being offered cannot satisfy the demand. In all 
cases, poor and low-income people want financial services that match their needs to 
better manage their households and businesses. Their requirements are practical 
    
 
  
45 
and convenient, affordable, flexible, permanently available, reliable and safe financial 
services.  
 
Thus, analysing the effects and impacts of microcredit in general and the loan 
interest rate ‘only’ in particular is not easy. It calls for further empirical, 
comprehensive, and contextual studies, a major interest of this study. 
 
2.9.2 Microcredit and the poverty pyramid   
 
In line with the microfinance background, poverty is defined as: “a condition in which 
people lack satisfactory material resources (food, shelter, clothing, housing), are 
unable to access basic services (health, education, water, sanitation), and are 
constrained in their ability to exercise rights, share power and lend their voices to the 
institutions and processes which affect the social, economic and political 
environments in which they live and work” (Vandenberg P. 2006:14). 
 
To address the diverse needs of different clientele in the microfinance sector, the 
microfinance network divided the microfinance sector into six different layers, 
according to its target borrowers or ‘market’. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Microcredit and poverty pyramid   
Source: (Pakistan Microfinance Review 2010:9) 
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The ‘extremely poor’ represents those individuals who suffer from several 
dimensions of poverty. These individuals suffer from food deficiencies; they are 
unable to fulfil the basic needs of all family members, or they are unable to give 
basic education to their children and, in the case of unemployment, one of the family 
members may beg to support the family. These conditions can only be alleviated by 
government and other donor subsidies/grants which provide food, employment and 
other basic requirements (Robinson M. 2001:29-71).  
 
Hulme D., and Mosley P. (1996:119-221) suggested that when loans are provided to 
the extremely poor, they may not be able to use it effectively because of lack of self-
employment opportunities; that is why these extremely poor remain outside of the 
conventional microfinance programmes. Moreover, it can put them into 
indebtedness. 
 
Yet another category of poor who experience intense poverty is the ‘chronic poor’. 
This consists of people who experience poverty for long periods of time or 
throughout their lives. Over half of the poor are these individuals or households, a 
varied group who commonly live in remote rural areas, suffer from disabilities, lack 
social networks and/or experience social discrimination in its many and diverse 
forms (Hulme D. 2003:399). 
 
However, those in some of the upper categories of the pyramid in Figure 2.4, such 
as ‘transitory poor’ and ‘transitory vulnerable’, are part of microcredit as well as 
microfinance programmes. Transitory or ‘transient poverty’ can be defined as the 
temporary state of poverty which lasts for a short period of time; however, they are 
highly vulnerable people who can slip into the chronic or extremely poor category 
with a slight adverse shock in their life, such as the death of a sole earner etc. 
Microfinance services can help these groups of people to overcome poverty (Jalan 
J., and Ravallion M. 2000:82). 
 
Microfinance banks offer services to the poor who are ‘economically active’ and 
generally speaking, NGOs will serve the poorest of the poor or chronic poor whose 
needs are different. ‘Economically active’ refers to those who have some form of 
work and do not suffer severe food shortage (Robinson M. 2001:29-71).  
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2.9.3 Targeting tool of microcredit and the poor 
 
The mission and target of an MFI strongly depends on its institutional form. NGOs, 
as donor-financed structures mostly directed toward social and economic welfare, 
chiefly target the poorest, lending very small amounts with a higher risk of default. 
However, given their limited resources, their overall outreach is not as great as that 
of the banks, which explains the following comment from Dichter T. (1999:2-3): 
“Commercial banks serve more underserved poor clients than do NGOs.” Moreover, 
the author notes another difference in targeting: “NGOs tend to offer small and short-
term loans in the service, small manufacturing and commercial sectors, while banks 
and credit unions are more likely to provide funds for agriculture, housing and 
consumption as well”. 
 
Ledgerwood J. (1999:2-34) also clarifies that targeting the poor clients depends on 
the objectives of the microfinance service provider and the perceived demand for 
financial services. These objectives include: to reduce poverty, to empower women 
or other disadvantaged population groups, to create employment, to help existing 
businesses grow or diversify their activities, to encourage the development of new 
businesses etc. 
 
Ledgerwood J. (1999:2-34) classified targeting the poor into direct or indirect. Direct 
targeting refers to the allocation of a specific amount of funds to provide credit to a 
particular sector of the economy or population like poorest of the poor, women, the 
indigenous population or the economically active poor whereas indirect targeting is 
when the service is designed to exclude the non-poor through relatively high interest 
rates, small loan sizes, group guarantees and the holding of compulsory regular 
meetings to qualify for loans and to make repayments. 
 
Why target?  Julie V.D. (2007:9) notes that governments may seek to target 
resources to poor communities and households for a variety of reasons: 
 
1. To increase overall economic growth rates as persistent inequalities can 
be a drag on economic growth; 
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2. To promote more balanced growth and development between regions via 
targeted infrastructure and service development in underserved areas; 
3. To optimize resource expenditures in the face of budget constraints. Public 
funds are limited and leakage of budget resources outside of the intended 
beneficiary group has opportunity costs and inefficiencies; 
4. To redistribute wealth via public resources transferred to poor households 
in order to pursue societal equity objectives; 
5. To maximize impact on key development indicators. To meet the 
Millennium Development Goals, like substantial reductions in infant and 
maternal mortality, Governments may get the biggest bang for their buck 
by targeting investments where service coverage or welfare rates are 
lowest. 
6. To solidify nation-building, reduce conflict and/or ease regional or 
interethnic tensions, for example by ensuring that investments reach 
minority groups or hinterland areas; and 
7. To address crisis and vulnerability, Government’s may develop targeted 
programs to respond to natural disasters that affect a certain portion of the 
population, like earthquakes, drought or locust invasions, or more 
generalized risks and shocks such as malaria or malnutrition against which 
a certain segment of households are particularly vulnerable. 
8. To support political objectives, particularly in democratic settings where 
delivering services to the poor and underserved regions are typically a 
strong part of electoral promises. 
 
Further, Julie V.D. (2007:9) describes that there is no ‘one size fits all’ targeting 
strategy. The best targeting mechanism will reflect the local context, including 
institutional frameworks, information availability, degree of inequality, governance 
factors, and the demographic profile, including presence of ethnic minorities. Design 
of targeting mechanisms should be explicitly linked to a program’s objectives. 
 
Discussions on the role of microfinance in poverty eradication lead us to question 
whether microfinance effectively caters to its target groups and Brau J., and Woller 
G.M (2004:3-5) outline two main issues in client targeting. These are gender 
targeting and poverty targeting. 
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In addressing approaches for targeting the poor, Par Verónica G.A (1999:4) makes 
clear that MFIs have developed a range of strategies to identify the poor. These 
poverty-targeting strategies include several complementary components:  
 
x Ways of identifying the poor; 
x Ways of attracting the poor; 
x Ways of excluding the non-poor; and 
x Ways of discouraging the non-poor. 
For effective targeting, all these components have to be included in a 
complementary way.  
Hulme D., and Mosley P (1996: 119-221) reveal that while targeting the poorest is 
critical to our ultimate goal of poverty reduction, if a program is not able to undertake 
this activity in a cost-effective manner, the potential to achieve IFS (Institutional 
financial self-sufficiency) might be greatly reduced or even eliminated, jeopardizing 
the long-term viability of a program.  
 
Hulme D., and Mosley P. (1996: 119-221) raise the concern that “targeting on the 
poor of credit imposes costs of research (finding out who is eligible), communication 
with the eligible and monitoring to prevent access by the ineligible, which may, if 
pushed too far, outweigh the benefits of poverty reduction”. Fortunately, proven, 
cost-effective strategies have been developed and refined which enable programs to 
identify the poorest while also maintaining the quality measures necessary to ensure 
that only the poor and poorest are admitted to the program (David S.G and Jennifer 
W.M. 2000:25-26). 
 
Regarding targeting failure, Jonathann M., and Haley D. (2002:31) reveal that there 
are a few microcredit institutions that have specific aims to target the poorest; 
however, even with high levels of commitment to the goal of targeting there is 
evidence that the focus on the poorest has to be constantly re-evaluated as mission 
creep can lead to a tendency to focus on better off clients. 
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Related to methods of exclusion, Simanowitz A., and Walter A. (2002:40-41) note 
that microcredit institutions exclude the very poor in a number of ways. These 
exclusions take several distinct forms; some are deliberate while others are 
inadvertent. The forms of exclusion of the poorest clients include: 
 
1.  Formal exclusion by the institution.  The institution has eligibility criteria that 
will formally exclude certain individuals. For example, borrowers may need to 
have an existing micro-enterprise to qualify for a loan. 
2. Informal exclusion by clients. A lack of confidence could result in poor persons 
excluding themselves from applying for a loan on the assumption that the 
credit services offered by the institution are not for them. Where group-based 
lending is in operation, groups can exclude the poorest in society due to 
stereotypical reasons such as perceived laziness or uselessness; thus, with 
group liability some are excluded due to being perceived as too great of a risk. 
3. Client exit. If the institution is not implementing pro-poorest policies, a client 
may choose not to take out subsequent loans after their first, and therefore 
exit the organization, often without fanfare. 
4. Informal exclusions by the institutions. Cultural or methodological biases may 
exclude very poor clients who should not formally be excluded. For example, 
loan officers’ perceptions of the poorest may lead them to deem the client too 
much work to warrant inclusion in the program. Also, the terms of a loan such 
as compulsory savings, mandatory loan size increments and group liability 
rules may further informally exclude potential customers. 
 
On how to effectively target the poor, Alison M. (2001:6) reveals the following ways: 
 
1. Ways of identifying the poor - All the groups had a geographic focus, which 
specifically targeted communities with certain income characteristics. Various 
techniques, from surveys to census, were used to identify which communities 
qualified. Within these communities, attempts were also made to rank the 
wealth of various individuals and develop ways to identify the poor and 
exclude those who should be outside of a program. 
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Means tests are used in some cases, housing indexes in others. Targeting women 
has often been used since research has shown that women are more likely to 
channel resources for the benefit of the family and are in the lowest income 
categories. 
2. Ways of reaching the poor - Most of the programs had active promotion of the 
microfinance services within the targeted area by field workers, including 
house-to-house visits, community meetings, and promotion to existing groups. 
 
3. Ways of attracting the poor - The techniques for delivering savings and credit 
programs need to be done in a manner which recognizes the specific needs 
and constraints of the poor. The poor have limited access to formal financial 
services partly because of the manner in which they are delivered. A 
spectrum of techniques is used by MFIs which overcome these hurdles 
including: developing innovative methods to deliver services; replacing 
collateral requirements with group guarantees; having a simple application 
process; and having low savings and loan limits. 
 
4. Ways of excluding or discouraging the non-poor - Two primary vehicles are 
used to exclude or discourage the non-poor in the targeted communities from 
participating. The first is self-exclusion. Many features of MFI programs are 
not attractive to the non-poor. For example, high interest rates, small loan 
sizes, and frequent group meetings partly discourage the participation of the 
non-poor who see these as high costs for accessing the services. The second 
technique is establishing eligibility criteria that focus on factors such as 
minimum levels of income, observable housing characteristics, or other 
assets. 
 
It is unrealistic to expect all microcredit institutions to target the poorest. However, it 
is important that they are all mindful of the mechanisms of exclusion outlined above 
when they develop their policies. Honest and transparent representation of the 
institution’s targeted population allows other institutions to develop strategies for 
those not targeted, which this study is looking for. 
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2.9.4 Cost-effective targeting 
 
David S.G., and Jennifer M.W (2000:25-36) explain that instead of using the style of 
the house, PWR relies upon the knowledge of the villagers themselves to identify the 
poor and poorest among them, eliminating the initial interview process. Villagers are 
called upon to map the village and to rank households into groups by poverty status; 
only then do field staffs interview those who have been identified as eligible. On 
average, both methodologies take about five minutes per poor and poorest 
household.  
 
Finally, David S.G et al (2000:25-36) recommend that the key is increasing cost-
effectiveness so that the appropriate interest rate to the poor and the poorest can be 
minimized. Furthermore, the authors elaborate the key steps to increasing 
institutional efficiency as:  
 
1. Cost-effective targeting;  
2. Maximizing both institutional and field staff efficiency through management 
information systems, formal business planning, maintenance of loan 
portfolio quality with client incentives, and staff incentives; and  
3. Customizing financial products. For mainstreaming to occur in some of the 
poorest countries, key policy changes will have to take place. First, interest 
rate caps on loans to the poor and poorest must be removed where they 
still exist. Second, a suitable legal identity for providing microfinance to the 
poor and poorest (perhaps exclusively, to minimize leakage to the non-
poor) has to be created and provided with a regulatory system supportive to 
the overriding objective of reducing poverty through the provision of 
microfinance to the poor and poorest. 
 
Moreover, to maximize their benefits to the poor and poorest, David S.G et al 
(2000:25-36) emphasize the MFIs could be sold (franchised) to their clients once 
they attain institutional financial self-sufficiency (IFS). The Grameen bank, which is 
majority owned by its clients shows that this is possible.  In this way, the poor and 
the poorest would be able to enjoy some of the profits of providing them with 
financial services. Also, this should remove any remaining concern about charging 
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them ‘high’ interest rates. Finally, it would free the franchiser to get on with 
establishing more franchises to reach and benefit more of the poor and poorest 
households, although it would have to ensure that quality was maintained in the 
franchises according to the franchise agreement. In this way, truly large numbers 
could be reached and assisted out of poverty. 
2.9.5 Exclusive Focus on the Poor and Poorest 
 
Christen R.P., Elisabeth R., Robert C., Vogel, and Cressida M. (1995:24) pointed out 
that by focusing their efforts exclusively on the poor and the poorest, MFIs can use 
funds allocated for their use most effectively and efficiently. As these funds are 
normally limited in supply, it is vital to ensure they get into the hands of the intended 
beneficiaries. Leakage to the non-poor should be minimized. 
 
However, Christen R.P. et al (1995:24) share a counter argument: “It is scale, not 
exclusive focus that determines whether significant outreach to the poor is 
achieved”. Programs serving several strata of clients, not just the poor and the 
poorest, may be able to expand faster and to reach larger numbers. If they do, large 
numbers of the poor and the poorest may benefit. Moreover, such programs have 
the possibility of cross-subsidizing lending to the poorest from their more profitable 
lending to the non-poor due to larger initial average loan size, and thus could 
achieve institutional financial self-sufficiency (IFS) more rapidly. 
 
2.9.6 Who are the poor and why they need microcredit?  
 
Poverty is sometimes difficult to define. Sometimes using an absolute standard of 
welfare (e.g. amount of income, consumption, life expectancy, housing conditions), 
one can be described as poor. As against this absolute measure of poverty, there is 
also the relative measure, which identifies the poor by relating their position to 
another individual or an international average. Sometimes we identify the poor by 
certain characteristics. Usually, the extreme poor (also sometimes referred to as the 
‘hard-core poor’) are more likely to be underweight, susceptible to illness, and have 
higher mortality rates; they are the least likely to own assets (e.g. land) and have 
severe fluctuations in their employment status. Their immediate challenge is to 
obtain adequate food/nutrition in order to survive. If their income increased, they 
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would spend proportionately more on food than anything else (Nii K. Sowa C., and 
Accra, D. 2002:8). 
 
Strengthening the above definition, Gert M. (2004:17-75) notes that “poverty cannot 
be captured in terms of money and income alone”. If poverty is seen as a lack of 
opportunity to acquire lasting control of resources in order to strengthen one’s 
capacity to acquire the basic necessities of life, it’s important to note that microcredit 
focuses only on one aspect: access to credit. That focus is of vital importance but as 
such, it is not sufficient to solve all the other deficiencies. 
 
In recent years, it became increasingly more difficult to distinguish ‘poor’ and other 
forms of ‘poor’ on the basis of distinctive characteristics. Most of the MFIs serve a 
wide range of clients, which fall below and above the poverty line (Sebstad G., and 
Cohen T. 2000:19.21). In literature, different terms have come into usage to classify 
those who experience different form of poverty. Among the most common are 
‘chronic poor’ (Hulme D. 2003:399), ‘moderately poor’ (Sebstad G., and Cohen T. 
2000:19-21), ‘ultra-poor’ and ‘transitory poor’.  
 
According to Martin I., Hulme D., Rutherford S. (2002:273-276) “the poor are not a 
homogeneous group, such as small farmers or landless people, but have many 
different characteristics and thus will need different forms of assistance”. At the heart 
of their discussion is the notion that the poor are heterogeneous and need different 
form of financial and non-financial services; that is why different levels of poverty 
require different levels of state subsidy as well as varied instruments. 
 
The ‘extremely poor’ represent those individuals who suffer from several dimensions 
of poverty. These individuals suffer from food deficiencies, unable to fulfil the basic 
needs of all family members, or they are unable to give basic education to their 
children and, in the case of unemployment, it may be that one of the family members 
begs to support the family. These conditions can only be alleviated by government 
and other donor subsidies/grants that provide food, employment and other basic 
requirements (Robinson M. 2001:29-71). 
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Yet another category of the poor who experience intense poverty is the ‘chronic 
poor’. It consists of people who experience poverty for long periods of time or 
throughout their lives. Over half of those classified as ‘poor’ fit into this group and 
their other characteristics vary: they commonly live in remote rural areas, suffer from 
disabilities, lack social networks and/or experience social discrimination in its many 
and diverse forms (Hulme D. 2003: 399). The above different categories of poor will 
influence the targeting strategy of different microcredit service providers, which will 
apparently affect their level of addressing the ‘poor’ stratum. 
 
Weiss and Montgomery H. (2005:395-396) stated that any microcredit program 
would prefer to see the loans used for productive purpose. The flexibility in the 
purpose of the loan also play a role as to why most of the poor are engaged in loan 
activity – ‘free loan market’. Many microcredit schemes are not rigid with regard to 
the purpose of loan because the poor need all kinds of loan.  The success of a 
microcredit program is very much dependent on its clients starting a new business or 
expanding their existing business. For the poor, it is obvious that they have to try 
hard to meet their need in any way possible, including involvement in different 
economic activities through mainly credit fund sources.  
 
The above literature finds that there is a trade-off between servicing the poor with 
low cost loans and securing MCIs operational self-sufficiency. Thus, microcredit has 
insufficiently penetrated the poorest strata of society, which was the main objective 
with which microcredit was entrusted.  
 
2.10 Microcredit loan interest rates and the poor  
 
Subrata K.M. (2009:87-88) stated that poverty alleviation is a primary obligation of 
microfinance; reaching out to the poor is the social mission of microfinance, which 
differentiates it from formal financial systems. Microfinance has travelled a long 
journey and has provided microfinance loans exceeding several billions of dollars. 
However, profiteering concepts are replacing the original idea of service to the poor. 
Yunus M. himself has expressed his dissatisfaction around the growing 
commercialization of microfinance. In an interview with CNN Money.Com, Yunus 
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criticized those involved with for-profit microfinance by saying that “poor people 
should not be considered an opportunity to make a profit.” He believes that the profit 
maximization motive of commercial microfinance is a distortion and microfinance 
should avoid capital markets to retain its non-profit ideology. An MFI, to remain 
viable, may charge the cost of borrowing plus a small percentage just to cover 
operating expenses. Those who charge more than 15% over the cost of funds have 
“just left the micro-credit area and joined the loan-shark area”. 
 
Subrata K.M (2009:87-88) cited from (Nimal A. 2006:2-7, and Dehejia et al 2005:5), 
the following arguments are generally put forth in support of high interest rates. 
 
1. Interest rates charged by moneylenders are overwhelmingly higher than 
MFI rates. 
2. Poor borrowers/entrepreneurs can generate greater benefit from additional 
units of capital than a highly capitalized business can.  
3. For a poor micro entrepreneur, the cost of a microcredit loan represents a 
small portion of her total business cost.  
4. MFIs charging very high interest rates almost always find that demand for 
loans outstrips their ability to supply them. Many poor people take 
repeated loans. This demonstrates that loans allow them to earn more 
than the interest they have to pay. 
5. Range of investment opportunities available to the rural poor is endless. A 
large corporate house cannot pay as high an interest rate as a poor micro 
entrepreneur, because they already have a lot of capital and have already 
“used up” most of the profitable investment options available to it. A micro 
entrepreneur on the other hand can derive greater relative benefit from 
additional units of capital, simply because she has so little capital. So she 
can pay a higher interest rate and still come out ahead. 
6. The access to finance for the poor is a much more important issue than 
the cost of finance.  
7. When the poor are willing to pay high interest rates to MFI loan, why talk 
about high interest rates? Any cap on interest rates is likely to be 
detrimental for the growth of MFI and neither will it be in the interest of the 
poor. 
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A recent systematic review that looked at the evidence of the impact of microfinance 
on the poor in sub-Saharan Africa (Stewart, R., van Rooyen C., Dickson K., Majoro 
M., and de Wet) concluded that high interest rates were among a number of reasons 
why microcredit can sometimes fail to increase the well being of poor people. The 
report stated that: “some people are made poorer, and not richer, by microfinance, 
particularly microcredit clients.” This seems to be because they consume more 
instead of investing in their futures; their business fail to produce enough profit to pay 
high interest rates; their investment in other longer-term aspect of their futures is not 
sufficient to give a return on their investment; and because the context in which 
microfinance clients live is, by definition, fragile’. 
 
Dehejia R., Montgomery H, and Jonathan M. (2005:5) argue that it is widely thought 
that micro loan customers are not very sensitive to interest rate charges. If true, this 
would reduce competition’s downward effects on rates, profits, and, costs. But two 
recent studies have found considerable price sensitivity among customers of a 
Bangladesh micro lender and South African consumer finance provider.  
 
This study examines the reasons of the demand for credit and ‘willingness’ to accept 
almost any price of the poor on the one hand and the concern of the poor on access 
to credit in relation to the level of the interest rate on the other hand. Furthermore, 
this study intends to investigate the reasons of ‘willingness’ to accept microcredit at 
any price and the knowledge of the poor on the difference between a fair, high or 
very high price of credit from a theoretical and/or practical point of view. 
 
2.10.1 Perspectives on microcredit loan interest rate  
 
Perspectives on microcredit loan interest rates are highly related to the schools of 
thoughts and perceptions of microfinance missions and objectives. 
 a) Definition of microcredit loan interest rates 
 
Edwin A., Acquan K., and Asmah E. (2003:10-17) defined interest rates as “the 
premium received by the lender after a stated period of time”. From the borrower’s 
point of view, it is the cost of capital at the time of obtaining a loan. There are several 
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schools of thought regarding the interest rates. According to the Classical school, the 
rate of interest is the main determinant of savings and investment. The Neo-
Classical school maintains that the interest rate is determined by supply (savings) 
and demand (marginal efficiency of capital). Furthermore, Hoff, K., and Joseph E.S. 
(1990:235) explained that the modern view of interest rates is based on an imperfect 
information paradigm.  
 b) Microcredit loan interest rate settings  
 
During the early phases of the ‘microcredit movement’, one of the arguments for 
establishing special microcredit delivery institutions, aimed at addressing the needs 
of the poorest of the poor, was the issue of interest rates. It was argued that market 
interest rates were too high for the rural poor, especially the poor micro-
entrepreneurs, female petty traders and vendors. Thus it was considered to be one 
of the issues hindering satisfactory access and increased outreach to the poor 
clients (Sunita P. 2003:9-21). 
 
This recognition, and the continued interest in fighting poverty effectively, resulted in 
applying subsidies, or slightly lower interest rates than those in the market, which 
would make microcredit affordable but not entirely free. Since then, new evidence 
shows that subsidized interest rates are actually detrimental to the competitiveness 
and growth of the poor clients and would make them further dependant on ‘free 
hand-outs’. The resulting outcome from these two consecutive evolutions has been 
that most MFIs charge market interest rates. In addition, further administrative and 
risk premiums are also charged, which result in MFI loans being more expensive 
than commercial loans (Sunita P. 2003:9-21). 
 
The debate on interest rates is one of the major controversies of the rural 
microfinance world. During recent years, the supporters for an interest rate that 
would respect market rules have clearly progressed in a field affected by 
globalization and liberalization. Subsidizing interest rates appears more and more as 
an archaism supported by some ‘development experts’. Still, this practice existed 
and still exists in a lesser measure in favour of farmers in developed countries. 
Therefore, it seemed appropriate to take stock of this question, while at the same 
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time reminding ourselves what an interest rate means and highlighting the 
arguments used by both the experts and the users (Zoom 2003:1-7). 
 
Most MFIs operate in environments where their only competitors are local 
moneylenders, who charge rates significantly above market, often between 5% and 
10% per month, to their clients, including the poorest. MFIs thus have significant 
liberty in setting interest rates before they are out-priced by local supply. Because 
MFIs’ effective interest rates are set not by the free market forces of supply and 
demand, but rather by monopolistic or oligopolistic institutions, there is a grave 
danger that inefficiencies and delinquencies can flourish but remain hidden under 
‘appropriate interest rates,’ and that innovation can be stifled. While there is no doubt 
that the poorest should pay full cost for their financial services, they should not be 
asked to bear the burden of incompetent MFI management and inefficient operations 
(David S.G., and Jennifer M.W. 2000:25-36). 
 
High micro loan interest rates have been criticized since the beginning of the modern 
microfinance movement in the late 1970s. But the criticism has intensified in the past 
few years, and legislated interest rate caps are being discussed in a growing number 
of countries. Part of the reason for the increased concern about rates is simply that 
microfinance is drawing ever more public attention, including political attention. 
Another factor is that quite a few MFIs are now being transformed into private 
commercial corporations and charging high loan interest rates that impact the ability 
of the poor to get a loan (Rosenberg G., and Susham N. 2009:3-5). 
 
Furthermore, Rosenberg G., and Susham (2009:3-5) point out that there are four 
main components reflected in MFIs interest rates: cost of funds, loan loss expenses, 
operating expenses, and profits. MFIs use their interest rate to cover costs and the 
difference between income and costs is profit (or loss). A simplified version of the 
relevant formula is: income from loans = cost of funds + loan loss expense + 
operating expenses + profit.  Lowering interest rates would require lowering one of 
the four components on the right side of the equation.  If we want to judge whether 
interest rates are reasonable, the most direct approach is to look at the relative 
importance of each of those elements after income tax.  
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Alan D. (2008:3) points out that all interest charges by MFIs are not justifiable. 
Sometimes MFIs, especially ones that are founded by donors, are not aggressive 
enough in containing transaction costs. The result is that they pass on unnecessary 
high transaction costs to their borrowers. Sustainability should be informed by cutting 
costs as much as possible, not just by raising interest rates to whatever the market 
will bear. Competition among suppliers of financial services will assist in the 
downward pressure on costs. 
According to Yunus M., and Adrian G (2010:1), the interest rate charged on 
microcredit is one of the most discussed issues in microfinance, capturing the 
attention of both the media and industry analysts alike. As the financial crisis brings 
global attention back to lending and credit risks, and microfinance is scrutinized as a 
tool for providing credit in developing countries, interest rates have once again 
captured public interest, and alternative models for looking at interest rates and 
operating costs have received renewed attention. At the heart of this discussion is 
the question of how microfinance institutions (MFIs) can fulfil their social missions 
while charging their clients interest rates that are higher than those offered by non-
microfinance financial institutions, such as traditional commercial banks. 
On the distribution of the costs, Rosenberg G., et al (2009:3-5) further notes that 
worldwide, operating expenses consume more than half of the income, followed by 
funding costs, profit, and loan losses. The majority of MFIs’ interest income goes to 
pay operating costs (salaries and administrative costs), which are about 60 per cent 
of total MFI costs. Some express disappointment that the growth in size of MFIs has 
not improved efficiency as much as they expected. 
 
David S.G., and Jennifer M.W. (2000:25-36) hold that an ‘appropriate’ interest rate is 
one that will allow MFIs to cover all adjusted operating costs from its adjusted 
operating income within a reasonable period of time. Four to five years is thought to 
be the maximum time available as the patience of donors/investors providing grants 
and other subsidized funding is not likely to extend beyond that.  
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Generally, healthy MFIs have administrative expense rates between 10-25%, 
targeted capitalization rates between 5-15% and loan loss rates between 1-2% (UN 
Department of State 2009:8-9). 
 
Yunus M. (2007:69-96) proposed a new methodology for the evaluation of 
microcredit interest rates. The proposed methodology is based on an interest rate 
premium, defined as the difference between the interest rate charged by the MFI and 
the cost of funds at the market rate paid by the MFI. In particular, this methodology 
defines three zones: 
 
1. Green Zone: (Interest Rate–Cost of Funds) ≤ 10 percentage points. 
According to Professor Yunus, these are the “poverty-focused” 
microcredit programs. 
2. Yellow Zone: (Interest Rate–Cost of Funds) ≤ 15 percentage points. 
3. Red Zone: (Interest Rate–Cost of Funds) > 15 percentage points. 
Professor Yunus labels institutions operating in this zone as ‘profit-
maximizing’ MFIs, adding that these programs are “commercial 
enterprises whose main objective appears to be earning large profits 
for shareholders or other investors.“ He also refers to this zone as the 
zone of moneylenders and loan sharks. 
 
Zoom (2003:1-7) stated that differentiated interest rates should be applied based on 
the use of the loan. Short-term activities (shops, crop year) can normally sustain 
higher rates as compared to medium-term or long-term investment loans. A lower 
interest rate for medium-term loans is also justified in economic terms. Management 
expenses are usually lower and there can be material guarantees, for instance, 
through the promotion of instalment plans. 
 
2.10.2 Amount of profits and effects of loan interest rates  
 
It is one thing to earn profits, and quite another to earn profits that are high enough 
to attract investors who have no concern with social missions. To them, below 
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average profit rates would be a ‘non-event’ and fail to bring competitors into the 
sector (Cull, R., Demirguc-Kunt A., and Jonathan M., 2008:184-186). 
 
Out of the four components of microcredit interest rates, profit is the one most 
obviously subject to management control. It is also the most controversial. Some 
observers are uncomfortable with the notion of private parties making any profit from 
micro lending, which they view as a service to poor people, and not as a business 
opportunity. Others accept the idea of private profits in micro lending, but are 
concerned that MFIs will exploit the weak bargaining position of their borrowers to 
extract abusive levels of profit. Still others think that high profits in the early stages 
are a positive good, because high returns will attract more investment and more 
rapid outreach of services to people who need them, and because they are confident 
that competition will eventually moderate those profits (Rosenberg G., and Sushma 
N. 2009:15-18).  
 
Furthermore, there have been concerns about the effects of the seemingly high 
interest rates typically charged by MFIs lending money to poor people. It has been 
argued that high interest rates can erode surpluses generated by borrowers, leaving 
them with little net gain. There is also concern that high rates reduce the demand for 
and uptake of financial services (Claire M. 2013:1-3).  
 
Moreover, in India’s Andhra Pradesh State, a controversy around high-interest rates, 
unethical collection methods and allegations that the suicides of 10 women in the 
Krishna district was linked to their inability to repay their MFI loans spurred 
government officials to close 50 branches across two MFIs. The influx of commercial 
capital ignited further debate around profits, interest rates and commercial 
approaches to microfinance. With the demand for microfinance far outweighing the 
number of clients served, proponents argue that commercial funding enables the 
industry to grow faster and provides needed services to those still waiting. 
Opponents worry about the rapid flood of commercial funding and the ability to 
effectively serve the double bottom line, balancing positive social impact and 
financial sustainability with pressures for high returns for investors (Elyse R. 2010:1-
2). 
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2.10.3 Determinants of microcredit loan interest rates  
 
David L.W., and Dewan A.H. (2004:3-5) show how much variation there can be in 
the lending rates charged by NGO-MFIs related to the four determinants of interest 
rate on microcredit; further, they show that any lender has costs comprising these 
four basic components which should determine the interest rate charged: 
 
1. Cost of funds. The cost of funds is usually a composite Figure, as any lender 
is likely to be utilizing funds from a variety of sources that have been 
obtained at different rates. For example, from donor capital that has been 
provided in the form of a grant and some surplus income or equity from his or 
her own operations. Whilst there is no interest as such to be charged on 
these two sources of equity, account should be taken of the rate of inflation in 
order to maintain its ‘real’ value. In some cases, an MFI will have funds from 
a foundation or trust which has provided ‘patient capital’.  Other capital will be 
the savings collected from members or customers on which different rates of 
interest are being paid if, as is often the case, there is a mixture of savings 
products offered to customers. Finally, there will be loans from lending 
institutions, notably the commercial banks. The average cost of funds 
depends therefore both on what proportion of an MFI’s resources comes 
from all these different sources, as well as what rates of interest are being 
paid (or should be charged) on each source.  
2. Operating or processing costs. Operating costs are relatively straightforward. 
They include the costs of: staff identifying clients, checking their 
creditworthiness, processing loan applications, disbursing loans, monitoring 
and collecting repayments, and following up non-repayments. In addition, 
there is also all the overhead in running any operation. However, the 
percentage cost of lending will vary enormously depending on a number of 
factors, notably: (i) the size of the actual loans; (ii) pay structure, notably of 
the loan officers; (iii) the efficiency of the organization, the number of 
borrowers/loan officers often being taken as a good indicator; and (iv) its 
scale of operations. 
3. Cost of risk or loan losses. The cost of risk or loan losses may also vary 
considerably. Almost all lending institutions make a standard provision for 
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loan losses at the time of disbursement.  A well-managed institution, which 
carefully selects and then closely monitors repayments by its customers, will 
have to write off only a small proportion of its loans, say 1-2%. One which is 
poorly managed and/or lending to customers who either do not have the 
resources to repay their loans, or who refuse to do so, possibly for political 
reasons, will suffer much higher loan losses, say 10-30% per annum. 
4. Net income, surplus or profit. Finally, there is the net income or surplus, often 
misunderstood, especially if the word ‘profit’ is used. Generating some 
surplus income is essential for a number of reasons. These include a) when 
an MFI is looking to expand or improve its systems as well as b) the need for 
financial organizations to have reserves against unforeseen contingencies 
and demands. Additionally, c) many NGO-MFIs in Bangladesh look to 
finance, at least in part, their social programmes, notably health and primary 
education. Finally, d) If sufficient net surplus can be generated from their 
microfinance operations, then this reduces their dependency on donor or 
government funds, which has obvious benefits.  
 
David L.W., and Dewan A.H. (2004:3-5) gave one example of the sort of Figures for 
(a), (b) (c) and (d) that might be seen in South Asia, a comprehensive analysis that 
has been carried out by CASHPOR (Credit and Savings for the Hard-core Poor), a 
Network of Asian MFIs. That provided estimates of appropriate microfinance interest 
rates. It claims that the typical ranges for MFIs in Asia of the four standard 
components of the interest rate calculation are: 
 
Table 2.4: The four standard components of the interest rate calculation 
 
Description Percentage 
(a) Average Cost of Funds  12-15% 
(b) Administrative Expenses 15-25% of average loan portfolio 
outstanding 
(c) Loan losses  2% 
(d) Desired Capitalization Rate 6-8% 
(e) Annual Effective Interest Rate 35-50% 
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Finally, David L.W., et al (2004:3-5) concluded that the variation of lending rates 
charged by NGO-MFIs relate to the four components discussed above. 
2.10.4 Comparison of microcredit loan interest rates 
 
It is generally very difficult to compare interest rate levels. The social and economic 
environment of lenders, customs, taxes, currencies, or laws can easily differ. 
Nevertheless, as Homer S., and Sylla R. (2005:9) argue, “We should not refuse to 
compare effects because causes have changed”. 
 
MFI's main objective is to provide poor and low-income households with an 
affordable source of financial services. Interest charged on loans is the main source 
of income for these institutions and, because they incur huge costs, the rates are 
correspondingly high. However, microcredit interest rates are often compared with 
those charged by both commercial banks and excessively subsidized lending 
organizations. Such comparisons are inappropriate (Nimal A. 2006:2-7). 
 
Gert M. (2004:17-75) argues that, in the opinion of the ‘development school’ the 
benchmark should not be the moneylender around the corner; rather, as a matter of 
principle, what the bankable neighbour is charged for the same loan by a normal 
bank. It is not wrong if an MFI charges, for example, 26% or 28% if the market rate 
for a bankable household is 22%. Some surcharge is justified in view of the much 
higher costs. As a matter of principle, MFIs should never compare themselves with 
loan sharks, but with normal banks. This is particularly true if the MFI is funded at a 
very low cost by agencies that want to enable the poor to stay out of the grip of loan 
sharks. 
 
Zoom (2003: 1-7) raised a question: how do you define a rate that complies with the 
market? How can we compare the interest rate applied by a decentralized financial 
system (DFS)? They are often compared to those of the informal sector (usurers), 
usually between 10 and 20% per month. Such a comparison is of course favourable 
to the DFS and puts an end to any discussion, except if we refuse to consider the 
informal rate as an acceptable reference. 
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Further, Zoom (2003: 1-7) stated that the comparison with formal bank rates is often 
unfavourable. However, the banks are not interested in the same customers as 
those of the DFS. So, there’s no real competition between the former and the latter 
for the same target group of customers. 
 
Moreover, Zoom (2003: 1-7) acknowledged that another reference could be applied. 
The interest rate should rather be seen from the perspective of the return obtained 
from the operation. It is generally considered that the average financial cost 
represents 10% of the return. However, this estimation is not systematically valid.  
 
It is, however, possible to highlight some points to put an end to the vain debate 
between development experts defending low rates without taking into account 
financing mechanisms and microfinance experts essentially motivated by 
performance and sustainability related to bank criteria. It should also be noted that 
the discussion on rate levels has also progressed within the world of microfinance 
between those who favour real rates and others who think that the DFS should 
benefit from structural subsidies because of their specific role in the fight against 
poverty (Zoom, 2003: 1-7). 
 
 The funding situation of MFIs is associated with their degree of commercialization. 
Cull, R., Demirguc-Kunt A., and Jonathan M., (2009:190-192) found that 
microfinance banks rely predominantly on commercial funding and deposits. NGOs 
rely mainly on donations and non-commercial borrowing. Credit unions, as member 
based financial institutions, rely predominantly on deposits provided by their own 
members. 
Table 2.5: Shares of funding by institutional type (2005-2007) 
 Donations Non-commercial 
borrowing 
Equity Commercial 
borrowing 
Deposits 
Banks 2% 1% 13% 13% 17% 
Credit unions 11% 3% 16% 6% 64% 
Nonbank financial 
institution 
23% 11% 18% 28% 21% 
NGO financial 
institutions 
39% 16% 8% 26% 10% 
Total 26% 11% 13% 23% 27% 
Source: Cull et al (2009b: 190-192) 
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The literature cited above shows that interest rates determined by the MCIs including 
all costs and risks to the poor substantially influence all loan performances. There is 
a trade-off between the social mission of MCIs and the profit seeking of MCIs. Thus, 
microcredit has charged higher loan interest rates, which affect the economic benefit 
of the poor from the micro loans.  
 
2.11 Criticisms of microfinance/microcredit 
 
The fact that microfinance programs are expanding both coverage and range of 
services offered can be seen as prima facie evidence of their success and thereby 
argues for them for an even broader role. However, microfinance has also been 
dogged by many criticisms, including those concerning microfinance’s (i) financial 
viability, (ii) ability to reach the extreme poor, (iii) propensity to charge high interest 
rate, (iv) limited macroeconomic impact, (v) difficulty in scaling up of operations, etc. 
(Jonathan M. 1999: 1569-1614). 
 
Furthermore, high micro loan interest rates have been criticized since the beginning 
of the modern microfinance movement in the late 1970s. The criticism has intensified 
in the past few years, and legislated interest rate caps are being discussed in a 
growing number of countries. Part of the reason for the increased concern about 
rates is simply that microfinance is drawing ever more public attention, including 
political attention. Another factor is that quite a few MFIs are now being transformed 
into private commercial corporations (Rosenberg G., and Sushma N. 2009:3-5).  
 
Additionally, Dambisa M. (2009:129-130) notes that microfinance is not without its 
naysayers. Lending to the poor is criticized as loan-sharking (charging punitive and 
exorbitant rates), as fuelling Ponzi schemes (borrowing from one lender to pay off 
another) and as simply supporting reckless consumption. However, with ever-
increasing numbers of micro-lenders, and growing participation in this type of 
lending, the interest rates charged inevitably become lower and, in this sense, more 
competitive. As to the Ponzi scheme criticism, the objection merely points to the 
need for more information concerning borrowers, who is a good risk and who is a 
bad risk. This, by the way, is exactly the information asymmetry that the Grameen 
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model mitigates. And the issue of consumption versus investment applies to any 
loan, anytime, anywhere.  
 
The criticisms also often contradict each other. For example, it is difficult to complain 
about microfinance’s inability to reach the extreme poor while at the same time 
insisting that it remains financially solvent. Similarly, it is not very reasonable to 
demand that microfinance remains financially solvent and yet complain about high 
interest rates. In the same vein, it is contradictory to urge microfinance to reach the 
extreme poor while at the same time demanding that it scale up the size of its loans, 
allowing the borrowers to engage in (relatively) large scale production and marketing 
operations (Nazrul, I. 2009:15-17).  
 
Researchers have traditionally followed the division of MFIs, evaluating 
microfinance’s effectiveness from either a purely economic or social standpoint. 
Analysis using an economic framework treats MFIs as a derivative of formal financial 
institutions (FFIs) and focuses narrowly on the institutions’ ability to maintain fiscal 
sustainability. Analysis that uses a public policy framework sets aside the fiscal 
solvency aspect, focusing shallowly on MFIs as social welfare programs. The 
drawback of these perspectives is that one can select a specific type of MFI to 
validate any theory (Woller G., and Woodworth W. 2001:8-270), rather than using a 
unified approach to evaluate all MFIs. 
2.12 Global trends of the microfinance market 
 
Although there has been remarkable progress worldwide, in terms of growth in the 
number of MFIs and their outreach, there is still a lot to do. As MFI outreach to the 
poorest families is only 38% in Asia, 8.5% in Africa and the Middle East, 11.6% in 
Latin America and the Caribbean and 1.7% in Europe and the NIS, there are millions 
of poor people in different regions who can be and should be reached with 
microfinance to help them overcome poverty (Latifee H.I. 2006:11). 
 
“The microfinance revolution is a commercial revolution”, explains Robinson M. 
(2001:29-71). Simply opposing the claims that “the win-win rhetoric promising 
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poverty alleviation with profits has moved far ahead of the evidence” challenges the 
original objective of microfinance (Jonathan M. 1999:1569-1614). 
 
Microfinance will no doubt continue to expand and become a greater part of the 
financial mainstream. Experience so far, though, suggests that the profile of 
commercial banks that offer microfinance in low-income communities looks different 
from that of non-profit microfinance institutions run by nongovernmental 
organizations. Commercial microfinance banks are more likely to have a for-profit 
status and to involve an individual lending method, larger loans, fewer women 
customers, lower costs per dollar lent, higher costs per borrowers, and greater 
profitability. Nongovernmental microfinance organizations are more likely to be a 
non-profit employing a group lending method, giving smaller loans, serving more 
women, employing subsidies more heavily, facing higher costs per dollar lent, and 
being less profitable (Cull, R., et al 2009:190-192). 
 
Jansson T. (2001:1) points out “the early success of non-profit grassroots 
organizations in serving this sector has led to two important developments”. First, 
commercial banks, realizing that there might be a profit to be made in microfinance, 
are starting to pay serious attention to how they can serve this segment of the 
market. Second, between grassroots non-profit organizations and profit-driven 
commercial banks, there is an emerging breed of professional financial institutions 
that specialize in microfinance. These are former non-profit organizations that have 
requested and received a license to operate as regulated and supervised finance 
companies or banks. 
 
UN, Department of State (2009:8-9) suggested two trends. On the one hand, some 
MFIs are raising their interest rate so high that they are not only becoming financially 
viable but also as highly profitable to attract private sectors. Some other MFIs are 
also venturing into purely commercial enterprises in order to diversify their services 
or to generate a higher benefit, which can be ploughed back into microfinance 
operations. Such expansion into commercial operations may therefore help a MFI to 
be financially solvent as a whole, even if its microfinance part is not. On the other 
hand, in a move in the opposite direction, some MFIs are taking initiatives to reach 
the poorest of the poor. Thus, some MFIs have devised a special type of loan 
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suitable for the purpose. Others are combining various programs of microfinance and 
programs of welfare benefits (in cash and in kind) and training that can help MFIs to 
reach even the ultra-poor. The world of microfinance is changing, and it will be 
interesting to see where these changes lead microfinance in the coming year. 
 
2.13 Relevance of the theories to the study 
 
After examining many relevant ideas in the theoretical review, the researcher has 
summarised and utilized them as the basis for the development of the conceptual 
framework of this study; this framework helps to apply, present, and understand the 
theories easily.  
A conceptual framework is a collection of inter-related ideas that are broadly based 
on theories. That is, a set of propositions derived from and supported by data or 
evidence taken from fields of inquiry that are relevant (Masese P.B. 2011:5).  
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Source: The researcher 
 
 
This conceptual framework/model is not static. The factors indicated are subject to 
constant change that induce or reduce the effect of loan interest rates on the poor. 
As it takes time to examine if and how the changes on the side of demand, supply, 
and/or environment within which the microcredit operates affect the client’s 
affordability of loan interest rates, the study  deals with the above framework and the 
factors of loan interest rates that affect the poor. 
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2.14 Conclusion 
The main thrust of this chapter was to review relevant literature and present the 
theoretical framework of this study for analysis of the impact of loan interest rates on 
the poor. The chapter used the term ‘theoretical’ to describe a result which has been 
predicted by theory but has not been adequately tested. In order to obtain a clearer 
idea about the impact of loan interest rates on the poor, it is important to consider the 
results of empirical studies that have been conducted in the field. The next chapter 
will be devoted to this. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Empirical literature on microfinance is still anaemic and most studies focus on 
evaluating the impact of the industry on the poor community. What explains 
microfinance lending interest rates is a poorly understood phenomenon and it can be 
attributed to the youthfulness of the industry and low level of research in Sub-
Saharan African (Tijssen R. 2007:209). 
 
The theoretical literature mentioned above will be checked against global, regional, 
national, and local empirical studies showing the extent of participation of the poor in 
microcredit services, reasons for not participating or inadequate participation, and 
the economic benefit to the poor from microcredit services.  
 
3.2 Historical Journey of Microfinance across the Globe 
 
Sanjeev K. (2011:20-21) summarizes the historical journey of microfinance across 
the globe as follows, 
 
Table 3.1: Historical journey of microfinance  
 
Period 
 
Events 
Early 
1700s 
x Irish Loan Fund system started by Jonathan Swift (300 funds 
by 1840)  
1800s x Various larger and formal savings and credit institutions 
began to emerge in Europe. These institutions were known 
as People's Banks, Credit Unions, and Savings and Credit 
Co-operatives  
1900 x Increase in commercialization in rural banking, especially Latin 
America 
 
1950s to 
1970s 
x Governments and donors focused on providing agricultural 
credit to small and marginal farmers  
x Supply-led government interventions in the form of targeted 
credit through state-owned development finance institutions, 
or farmers' cooperatives  
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1980s 
x Experimental programs in Bangladesh, Brazil, and a few 
other countries extended tiny loans to solidarity groups of 
poor women to invest in micro-businesses in which every 
member of a group guaranteed the repayment of all 
members  
Late 
1990s 
x Global microcredit summit organized in Washington DC. 
Grameen Bank showcased its work of the past two decades 
and was acknowledged as an effective methodology to grant 
small loans to the poor. The high profile support from the 
then first lady Hilary Clinton and the Queen of Spain drew the 
attention of several interested parties.  
2000s x International Year of Microcredit (2005) declared by the UN 
x Noble Peace prize conferred to Yunus M. and Grameen 
Bank, Bangladesh  
 
Citing from mixed market data, Chitra K., and Sangeetha S. (2013:40-48) describe 
how the growth and performance of the microfinance sector from a global 
perspective during the recent years has shown distinct differences among regions 
like Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia (see Table 3.2 
below). 
 
Based on Table 3.2, Chitra K., and Sangeetha S. (2013:40-48) said that:   
 
“The number of MFIs has gone up for LAC, MENA, and SA regions, 
while in the other regions, it is observed to have larger increase of MFIs 
from 2007 onwards. Furthermore, the decline in active borrowers has 
been reflected in the reduction in deposit too. The huge decline in 
number depositors’ (sum) statistics shows an alarming picture 
throughout the world. Moreover, the loan loss rate is found to be very 
high in MENA compared to other regions which accounts for 6.38% of 
the loan portfolio during the year 2011. In spite of having a large loan 
portfolio, LAC has only 1.83% extent of loan loss rate, which promotes 
additional portfolio growth”. 
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Table 3.2: Number of active borrowers, depositors, and deposits (Sum) 
 
 
 
Year 
Number of 
active 
borrowers and 
depositors 
 
 
Africa 
 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Eastern 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
Latin America 
& the 
Caribbean 
(LAC) 
Middle East 
& North 
Africa 
(MENA) 
 
South Asia 
 
(SA) 
 
 
2003 
Number of MFIs 183 95 157 166 31 132 
Borrowers 2,496,988 4,493,322 690,076 3,464,294 507,120 1,312,280 
Depositors 4,448,059 1,304,673 890,716 943,675 6,886 13,403,380 
Deposit 260,607,065 3,307,549,344 131,088,591 757,481,525 69,147 173,593,793 
Loan loss rate 0.34 0.45 0.27 0.85 0.04 0.0 
 
 
2004 
Number of MFIs 183 119 189 218 38 197 
Borrowers 3,324,066 5,408,477 972,016 4,742,094 803,425 17,882,185 
Depositors 5,705,409 1,542,817 1,186,099 3,210,057 5,539 15,941,327 
Deposit 520,564,877 105,719,602 35,398,226 2,218,487,228 172,475 223844342 
Loan loss rate 0.54 0.13 0.07 0.65 0.06 0.0 
 
 
2005 
Number of MFIs 241 131 237 280 42 214 
Borrowers 4,281,183 9,468,511 1,289,100 7,805,509 1,241,019 24,383,439 
Depositors 7,554,102 2,097,382 1,587,235 6,350,983 13,589 19,136,200 
Deposit 859,701,224 3,966,765,831 1,248,003,627 5,044,425,869 248,514 659,507,361 
Loan loss rate 1.11 0.07 0.00 0.62 0.06 0.0 
 
 
2006 
Number of MFIs 255 159 256 304 49 207 
Borrowers 5,279,867 10,725,120 1,845,936 9,443,992 1,736,626 29,960,927 
Depositors 9,191,585 6,593,152 2,714,996 7,640,896 87,664 26,438,711 
Deposit 1,342,872,904 5,347,192,014 2,240,602,281 6,799,566,116 1,251,398 897,861,876 
Loan loss rate 0.50 0.00 0.04 0.56 0.07 0.0 
 
 
2007 
Number of MFIs 284 183 323 370 59 196 
Borrowers 6,187,181 8,783,244 2,447,050 12,053,183 2,255,182 36,393,712 
Depositors 11,696,536 3,255,613 3,911,986 9,710,388 81,397 30,171,105 
Deposit 3,257,611,106 6,010,140,130 5,040,390,748 8,718,352,564 62,938,252 1,189,312,415 
Loan loss rate 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.58 0.21 0.0 
 
 
2008 
Number of MFIs 280 182 314 392 68 222 
Borrowers 7,099,295 15,456,165 3,062,732 13,058,610 2,484,605 42,461,106 
Depositors 17,137,730 4,614,980 5,244,592 13,564,741 97,489 32,018,765 
Deposit 4,002,407,301 6,159,925,688 6,164,505,179 10,009,971,646 75,047,789 1,998,511,287 
Loan loss rate 0.31 0.07 0.00 0.95 0.02 0.0 
 
 
2009 
Number of MFIs 266 149 255 386 70 219 
Borrowers 8,208,512 13,911,940 2,787,687 14,305,288 2,500,362 49,996,298 
Depositors 20,572,668 4,899,512 2,799,959 17,168,351 63,748 32,306,744 
Deposit 5,282,132,767 8,442,068,436 5,235,699,452 13,352,583,689 118,854,318 2,545,011,110 
Loan loss rate 0.23 0.06 0.06 1.05 0.03 0.0 
 
 
2010 
Number of MFIs 196 123 213 369 64 208 
Borrowers 5,122,529 15,794,001 2,773,436 15,724,890 2,215,603 58,594,977 
Depositors 17,060,833 5,830,700 2,832,014 15,449,440 89,552 26,769,982 
Deposit 4,882,793,790 11,775,131,989 6,422,831,882 15,263,926,637 121,964,001 3,299,839,062 
Loan loss rate 0.26 0.33 0.19 1.19 0.02 0.0 
 
 
2011 
Number of MFIs NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Borrowers 33,867 629,458 287,611 4,029,773 28,450 0 
Depositors 57,975 634,999 10,114 4,119,481 0 0 
Deposit 9,420,885 36,435,971 28,064,933 7,251,412,544 0 0 
Loan loss rate 0.31 0.41 - 1.83 6.38 0.0 
 
Source: Compiled Chitra K., and Sangeetha S. (2013:40-48) 
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Furthermore, Chitra K., et al (2013:40-48) conclude that the global scenario is not 
promising for the MFI industry as such. Though some economies had booked loans, 
they are struggling hard to manage their expenses. State of the Microcredit Summit 
Campaign Report 2012 said that a number of initiatives like values of responsibility, 
corporate ethics and social performance management have emerged to address the 
field’ challenges. MFIs have to adopt new strategies to bring back their customers 
and as well reduce their operating and administrative expenses. 
 
Supporting the conclusion of Chitra K., et al and (2013:40-48), Micro Rate (2009:1-3) 
describes that the rapid growth of microfinance investment seen in years past took a 
significant hit in 2008 as the financial crisis started ramping up and investors became 
cautious and more prudent, questioning the resilience of microfinance against the 
global financial market.   
 
Moreover, Micro Rate (2009:1-3) also concludes that investment in microfinance was 
previously characterized by an exuberance fed from its success and social mission 
of helping poor entrepreneurs. Growth of MIVs (Microfinance Investment Vehicles) 
far exceeded MFI growth and concerns were beginning to arise regarding how long 
this could continue without jeopardizing asset equity. From this point of view, the 
slowdown in 2008 may have been a blessing in disguise.  
 
3.3 Microcredit service in Africa 
3.3.1 Overview of microfinance in Africa 
 
Over 50 per cent of Africans live on less than $2 a day. Moreover, all of the 21 
countries listed in the United Nations’ low human development ranking are in sub-
Saharan Africa. There are several positive signs: more than 35 per cent of Africans 
live in economies that have seen sustained growth of more than 4 per cent a year for 
the last 10 years, setting the stage for many Africans to enjoy a better life. However, 
the continent is still under-served by financial services. The cost of bringing micro 
finance services to Africa is higher than in other regions of the world because Africa 
has many vast and sparsely populated rural areas, higher rates of illiteracy and 
HIV/AIDS, and a widespread lack of identity documents (The World Bank 2008:54). 
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Furthermore, the World Bank (2008:54) mentioned that Africa is on the move. Total 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the region is currently growing at 5.7 per cent, 
although the country-by-country distribution of this growth is quite uneven. 
Governance is improving, food security is a growing priority of policymakers, and 
commitments to universal primary education have increased dramatically. The stage 
is set for many Africans to enjoy a better life. But without access to basic financial 
services – savings, credit, insurance – Africans will remain at the margins of 
economic opportunity with little hope of realizing their tremendous creative potential. 
Beginning in the 1970s, a microfinance revolution swept through Asia and Latin 
America, helping countless millions of poor people get the economic boost they 
needed to start small businesses and work their way out of poverty. Somehow, the 
revolution bypassed Africa. 
 
There is good news on the access to finance front. Worldwide, the global cellular 
market is growing the fastest in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with more than 65 per 
cent of the population living within reach of wireless voice networks. Kenya is the 
shining example globally for how this technology can be leveraged to offer financial 
services at greater scale and lower cost. Investor interest is increasing, albeit from a 
low base, and is spurring the growth of new institutions. Policy makers are engaged 
and making reforms to improve the rules and regulations for markets. More 
institutions are for-profit, paving the way for more efficiency, sufficient capital for 
scale, and innovations. Uptake of deposit services is broad, even greater than for 
credit services (CGAP and MIX 2010:2-18). 
 
Yet, serious challenges persist and threaten this positive momentum. Many of these 
challenges are not new. Operating expenses remain among the highest in the world. 
Returns are falling. Portfolio quality has been stubbornly poor, and, in some markets, 
it has gotten worse over the course of the year. Supervision is very weak. And the 
successes remain far too concentrated in certain markets and specific institutions, 
with the overall penetration still very slow and progress toward reaching scale 
sluggish (CGAP and MIX 2010:2-18). 
 
A large number of MFIs have set up networks in many African countries, taking 
advantage of increased pressure on governments to deregulate the economy and 
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the financial sector, encourage competition in all sectors, and create a conducive 
environment for increased production. Thus, micro-finance delivery has become an 
attractive business over the last decade in Africa. Such MFIs operate in a niche 
market because they address the needs of those clients who are considered ‘high-
risk’ by bigger banks (Sunita P. 2003:9-21).    
 
Moreover, Sunita P. (2003:9-21) shares that field observations show that most MFIs 
in Malawi and Ethiopia can be categorised as profit oriented, with a clear business 
approach, with a good network into the rural areas, and with minimum expenditures 
on training or group mobilisation, allowing for high repayment rates with minimum 
risk exposure. Discussions with different stakeholders revealed an underlying 
assumption that simply the existence or operations of an MFI in an area will 
automatically address poverty. MFIs, on the other hand argue that they are not 
required to and do not always have the responsibility for justifying whether their 
activities reduce poverty. Some MFIs have, however, undertaken impact analysis 
studies on a need-basis, which reveals that income has been increased amongst 
their clients. Nevertheless, this is very much anecdotal and limited to some cases 
and cannot be proven or established as a long-term trend. 
3.3.2 Scope of financial services offerings in Africa 
 
Table 3.3 lists the top 10 countries by penetration rates of borrowers as well as savers. 
Incidentally, these 10 countries had the greatest penetration rates for both groups. Five of 
them are from West Africa, indicating that microfinance is likely already meeting more of the 
demand here than in the other regions. Despite having three countries in this list, East Africa 
continues to exhibit rapid growth; the market here is not yet saturated.  
Table 3.3: Top ten countries in borrowers and savers by penetration rates  
 
Country 
Sub 
region 
Penetration 
(Thousands) 
Borrowers 
(Thousands) 
Penetration 
Rate 
Savers 
(Thousands) 
Penetration 
Rate 
Kenya East 34,000 877 2.6% 3,172 9% 
Togo West 6,000 90 1.5% 344 6% 
Senegal West 12,000 221 1.8% 654 5% 
Mali West 14,000 216 1.5% 409 3% 
Ghana West 22,000 315 1.4% 902 4% 
Burkina Faso West 13,000 129 1.0% 523 4% 
Cameron Central 16,000 135 0.8% 400 3% 
S. Africa Southern 47,000 632 1.3% 783 2% 
Uganda East 29,000 216 0.7% 482 2% 
Ethiopia East 71,000 1,427 2.0% 732 1% 
Source: CGAP and MIX-2008, p.3-9 
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The central region was the only region to experience a decrease in the number of 
borrowers, exhibiting a drop of 3 per cent. The eastern region continued to exhibit 
the highest numbers across all volume Figures. Despite their size, these large scale 
MFIs still managed to meet Africa-wide growth rates of 25 per cent, adding over half 
a million borrowers. The southern region demonstrated the largest percentage 
growth in borrowers with nearly a 48 per cent increase over the previous year.  This 
region also exhibited the greatest increase in average loan size as well as loan 
balance over GNI per capita, which grew by 27 per cent from 2006 to 2007 (see 
Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4: Borrowers and depositors, by Sub-region and charter type (thousands) 
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Bank 10 109 955 6,506 903 1,801 127 722 1,892 9,139 
Cooperatives 188 655 16 205 50 248 610 3,917 865 5,056 
NBFI 108 154 3,161 4,671 70 57 184 773 3,522 5,654 
NGO 65 85 386 424 98 65 835 1,159 1,388 1,732 
Total 374 1,033 4,519 11,806 1,121 2,171 1,757 6,571 7,771 21,582 
Source: CGAP and MIX-2010 
 
The market structure across SSA has been changing over the past few years. 
Though there are still more non-profit financial service providers than for-profit 
providers, the landscape is clearly evolving. Fifty-seven per cent of new institutions, 
the majority of which are NBFIs, are for-profit, compared to 43 per cent for young, 
and mature financial service providers. Despite being fewer in number, for-profit 
providers accounted for over 70 per cent of the total gross loan portfolio and 71 per 
cent of total deposits in SSA in 2009, with banks alone accounting for 53 per cent of 
loan portfolio and 60 per cent of deposits. Credit unions/financial cooperatives and 
NBFIs accounted for 20 per cent of gross loan portfolio, and 25 per cent and 10 per 
cent of deposits, respectively. Commercial microfinance is taking hold (CGAP and 
MIX 2010:2-18). 
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Table 3.5: Fastest growing financial services providers (borrower growth) 
 
Rank 
Financial 
service provider 
 
Country 
 
Charter 
2009 
borrows 
Absolute 
growth 
Percentage 
growth 
1 Equity Bank Kenya Bank 715,969 173,720 32% 
2 Capitec Bank S.Africa Bank 801,809 163,193 26% 
3 KWFT Kenya NBFI 334,188 126,178 61& 
4 OCSSCO Ethiopia NBFI 458,762 94,178 26% 
5 SEAP Nigeria NGO 116,808 71,087 155% 
6 OMO Ethiopia NBFI 280,232 61,628 28% 
7 SMEP Kenya NBFI 85,678 49,029 134% 
8 BRAC—UGA Uganda NGO 103,489 40,880 65% 
9 Camccul Cameron Credit union 66,153 27,457 71% 
10 DECSI Ethiopia NBFI 488,922 24,300 5% 
11 BRAC—TZA Tanzania NGO 89,818 20,316 29% 
Source: CGAP and MIX-2010 
 
Regarding financial structure, CGAP and MIX (2010:2-18) explain that deposits are 
the largest source of funding for financial service providers in SSA. Even with the 
slowdown in depositor growth, deposits, as a percentage of the overall funding 
structure of providers, remained stable in 2009 at nearly 60 per cent. This focus on 
deposits is one factor that contributes to SSA having the lowest financial expense 
ratio of all regions globally at 2.8 per cent. 
 
The institutional types, with deposits as the lion’s share of their funding structure, 
have the lowest financial expense ratios. Credit unions/financial cooperatives have 
the lowest financial expense ratio of all charter types in SSA at just 1.3 per cent. 
NBFIs and NGOs, many of which cannot legally mobilize deposits, have the highest 
financial expense ratios at 3.6 and 3.7 per cent, respectively. 
 
Table 3.6: Funding Structure Trends Data by Sub-region (USD mil) 
  Savings Commercial borrowing Other Debt Equity 
Africa 2006 1,148 243 376 557 
2007 1,839 343 680 912 
% Increase 60% 41% 81% 64% 
Central 2006 135 5 21 19 
2007 232 9 23 38 
% Increase 72% 81% 12% 103% 
East 2006 472 116 196 183 
2007 799 183 413 436 
% Increase 69% 58% 111% 138% 
Southern 2006 144 30 35 198 
2007 254 36 54 228 
% Increase 76% 20% 54% 15% 
West 2006 196 93 124 557 
2007 533 114 190 912 
% Increase 40% 24% 53% 64% 
Source: CGAP and MIX-2008: 
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When looking at savings vs. credit, CGAP and MIX (2010:2-18) display that 
depositors in SSA outnumber borrowers three to one, with 21.6 million depositors 
and 7.8 million borrowers. The number of depositors has almost doubled in the past 
three years. SSA is one of three regions in the world where depositors outnumber 
borrowers; this is partly explained by the historical weight of cooperatives in 
providing financial services in the region. Additionally, SSA is the only region where 
grants are used as widely as debt.  
 
SSA continued to have by far the highest operational expenses worldwide due to 
operating expenses of 19 per cent, compared to the global levels of 14 per cent. 
High operating expenses are due to high staff expenses common in markets with 
scarce skilled labour, high transaction costs of reaching rural areas, and high costs 
of managing savings. Additionally, the consistently high and increasing risk may lead 
to high operating costs as staffs spend additional time following up on outstanding 
loans (CGAP and MIX 2010:2-18). 
 
In contrast to operating expenses, financial expenses are some of the lowest 
globally. SSA’s median financial expense ratio in 2009 was 2.8 per cent compared 
with the global median of 5 per cent. Two factors contribute to this trend: the 
predominance of deposits as a source of funding and the widespread availability of 
concessional loans with interest rates lower than market rates for a relatively large 
portion of financial service providers in SSA (CGAP and MIX 2010:2-18). 
 
Non-deposit liabilities (NDLs) and equity are the two other sources of funding for 
financial service providers. Borrowings account for just over 20 per cent of funding, 
while equity accounts for just fewer than 20 per cent (Ibid). 
 
Table 3.7: Five countries with largest NDLs (USD amounts), with local and cross-
border breakout 
Country Local NDL 
(USD Mil) 
Cross-border NDL  
(USD Mil) 
Total NDL 
(USD Mil) 
Kenya 57 175 232 
Mali 20 122 141 
Benin 35 21 56 
Uganda 11 44 56 
Ethiopia 45 9 54 
Source: CGAP and MIX-2010 
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 Sunita P. (2003:9-21) indicted one of the most important outcomes of the analysis. 
While most MFI programmes aim to reduce poverty and empower women through 
their programme, there is usually no clear implementation mechanism to fulfil these 
aims; they continue to be programmes with the same requirements and 
characteristics. Perhaps the second most important constraint is the insufficient 
empirical evidence from Africa. The microcredit model most commonly replicated 
and known internationally was to a great extent born in South East Asia and 
Bangladesh, particularly. Thus, much of the research and studies on successes, 
failures, weaknesses, and opportunities of microcredit are measured with this 
framework and context in mind. This is a mismatch, which is most likely to brand the 
African experience to be ‘inadequate’. 
 
Furthermore, Sunita P. (2003:9-21) notes that microcredit programs have 
progressively increased over the last decades in Africa. In comparison, there is 
nearly no convincing and/or comprehensive evidence to show that poverty has been 
reduced sustainably amongst a certain group of clients. Indicators such as 
repayment rates and ‘demand’ for credit do not result in poverty reduction; they 
simply mean that there is a ‘need’, as always, for more resources. Furthermore, a 
repayment being made simply indicates that the clients are in a position to pay back 
their loans; where and how they get funds for that repayment is not scrutinized. 
 
3.4 Microcredit services in Ethiopia 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
 
Despite five years of rapid growth, Ethiopia is among the world’s poorest countries with a 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of USD 130 (2006). Recently, high inflation (May 
2007: 17.2%, NBE) has become a threat to economic development. Among the 77 million 
Ethiopians, about two million are clients of MFIs and SACCOs, in addition to the urban 
savers of the banking sector. The remaining population has no access to formal financial 
services. Apart from these micro loans, small loans for productive and other purposes are 
hardly available. 
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3.4.2 Ethiopia’s main social indicators 
 
Table 3.8: Ethiopian main social indicator 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) 2010/2011 
 
According to the Ethiopia Mini demographic and Health Survey, the national 
household headship was 77.0% male and 23.0% female (CSA 2014:14).  Further, a 
glance at the demographic structure of Ethiopia (total est. population of 96,633,458) 
revealed that 42.2 per cent of the population are less than 15 years old and 2.8 per 
cent are above 65 years old (CSA 2014 projection). The total national dependency 
ratio is 83.5 per cent, which is 77.2 per cent for youth, and 6.3 per cent for the 
elderly. 
  
Indicators 
Base line 
2009/10 
2010/2011 Target for 
2014/15 Planned Actual 
1 Macro Economics and Public Finance 
Indicators      
1.1 Macro Economy      
 Real GDP growth rate (%)  10.6 11.0 11.4 11.4 
 Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices (USD)  377  392 482/523 
 Total Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) as % of 
GDP  
98.4 92.6 91.2 85.0 
 Gross Domestic Capital Formation as % of DGP  22.3 25.3 25.5 28.2 
 Gross Domestic Saving as % of GDP  5.2 7.4 8.8 15.0 
1.2 Poverty & Welfare      
 Total poverty Head Count (%)  38.7 (2004/05) 27.7 29.6 22.2 
 Food Poverty Head Count (%)  38 (2004/05) 26.6 33.6 21.2 
2 Economic Sectors      
2.1 Agriculture and allied activities      
 Growth rate of agriculture value added  7.6 8.5 9.0 8.7 
 Number of extension service beneficiaries 
(thousands)  
5090 8521 9044 14640 
 No. of beneficiaries benefited productive safety 
net (million)  
7.1 5.1 7.7 1.3 
2.2 Industry      
 Growth rate of industrial value added  10.6 14.0 15.0 23.7 
3 Social development      
3.2 Education      
 Primary school Net enrolment ratio  82.1 89.7 85.3 100 
 Adult education enrolment rate (%)  36 47.8 37.5 95.0 
 Adult literacy rate (%)  36 47.8 37.5 95 
3.2 Health      
 Primary Health Services Coverage (%)  89.6 100 96 100 
 Under Five Mortality Rate (per 1000)  123 (2005 EDHS) - 88 68 
 Infant mortality rate (per 1000)  77 - 59 31 
 Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000)  673 (2005 EDHS) 503 676 (2011 EDHS) 267 
 Transmission of HIV/AIDS (%)  2.4 - 2.3 2.4 
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3.4.3 Evolution of Microcredit in Ethiopia 
 
Before the 1980s, the Ethiopian experience in microfinance was limited to Self Help 
Groups, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Cooperative Unions, Community 
Savings Collectors and Local Money Lenders. They were all informal and largely 
unregulated. They were mainly microcredit savings mechanisms. Their strengths 
were associated with good repayment records due to peer pressure and other 
cultural mechanisms. However, their weaknesses lay in low-level access to capital 
and limited range due to informal non-structured frameworks.  
In Ethiopia only about 1% of rural households maintain bank accounts. Thus, the 
informal financial sector is one of the most important sources of rural finance and 
accounts for about 78% of total agricultural credit. The major sources of finance in 
this sector are relatives and friends (66%), and moneylenders (15%). In Ethiopia, 
there are a number of commonly found community based indigenous savings and 
credit groups, which are also widely used by women (Dejene A. 1996:6). 
 
One of the Community Based Organisations (CBOs), known as Ikub is an informal, 
ad-hoc association organized by members for the purpose of pooling their savings in 
accordance with rules established by the group. Members agree to deposit monthly 
or weekly contributions of a fixed sum with an elected treasurer or, where accessible, 
in a bank. Lots are drawn weekly or monthly by turns and members in need can 
purchase the winner’s lot by paying a premium (Sunita P. 2003:19-21). 
 
The other common CBO is an Iddir, which is an informal association whereby 
savings are made primarily for the purpose of covering the cost of funerals or 
weddings. Mehaber is an informal, religious association that draws its members from 
the church to raise money for medical and burial expenses. In this sense, 
moneylenders are well positioned, with terms and conditions that are quick, simple, 
convenient and flexible, for the most accessible source of funds for the rural poor 
outside of family and friends, albeit at an annual rate of interest as high as 245% or 
more. Therefore, CBOs play a significant role in savings and beneficiary 
mobilization, and are considered to be effective ways of targeting clients as some of 
the CBOs are uniquely controlled and owned by women (Sunita P. 2003:19-21). 
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Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) are almost entirely urban based with 
membership largely drawn from salaried employees and generally people who share 
a common purpose and locality. Currently there are about 670 urban SACCOs with 
approximately 150,000 members. Reportedly, these SACCOs have consistently 
performed quite well, largely due to their political and financial independence. Most 
of the SACCO members are men. Members are required to save 3% to 5% of their 
salaries on a monthly basis. Borrowers are charged 1.5% per month and savers paid 
the regular bank savings rate, which is currently around 6% per annum. All 
cooperative societies, including SACCOs, are governed and supervised by the 
Regional Cooperative Promotion Bureaus (Sunita P. 2003:19-21).  
 
The loan products among MFIs in Ethiopia generally follow the Grameen model with 
some slight variations. Most of the MFIs have two types of loan products, namely 
loans for on-farm activities, which are due in four to twelve months, and off-farm 
investments with more flexible repayments on a weekly or monthly basis (IFAD 
2001:19). On average, 60% of the MFI portfolio represents loans for on-farm 
investments while income generating activities and petty trading accounted for about 
40%. There are two types of savings offered by MFIs, namely compulsory, which 
acts as collateral and will be withheld by the MFI in case of default, and voluntary 
savings which the individual can withdraw at any time. Compulsory savings are the 
most common and the interest rate on savings is about 6% per annum (Dejene A. 
1999:6).  
 
In comparison to Malawi, the interest rates on loans in Ethiopia can be said to be at 
acceptable levels; this is mainly because of the highly controlled nature of the 
Ethiopian economy and the inflation rate. Interest rates vary among MFIs, ranging 
from 12.5% to 15% per annum, in addition to a loan application fee of about 2% 
(Sunita P. 2003:19-21). Furthermore, Sunita P. 2003:19-21 mentioned that in 
Ethiopia the MFIs are themselves limited to a specific region by government 
regulation. In the case of Ethiopia, this gives a particular MFI the advantage of a in 
the region and exclusive operation rights. This has a negative impact on operations 
efficiency, competitiveness, and service quality for the end user clients. 
 
    
 
  
86 
 Discussions from Malawi revealed that about five to eight years ago, differences in 
microcredit delivery strategies resulted in social inequalities and disruption. Some 
programmes pursued subsidised interest rates with a grace period, while others 
followed market interest rates and immediate repayments. This affected the social 
cohesion in the communities because some households benefited from the cheaper 
loans while others had to pay more expensive charges. Although coordination in 
microcredit delivery has improved since then, field evidence reinforces the argument 
that MFIs in particular are not in a position to actually reduce poverty; rather they are 
in the business of providing finance to those who qualify. 
 
Adeno K. (2007:11-12) points out that the demand for microcredit in Ethiopia is 
indeed increasing. However, the actual capacity of the existing regulated 
microfinance institutions is limited. Moreover, he points out that there are 27 MFIs 
operating with two in the pipeline to join the industry, and still the market is largely 
untapped given that half of the institutions are working in Addis Ababa. Furthermore, 
Adeno K. (2007:11-12) estimated that Ethiopia needs at least 300 MFIs to satisfy the 
growing demand for microfinance services. Amha W. (2007:9-13) also concludes 
that twenty-seven MFIs meet only less than 15 per cent of the demands for financial 
service of the active poor.  
 
Pfister M.W., Gesesse D., Amha W., Mommartz R., Duflos W., and Steel E. (2008:1) 
said that Ethiopian microfinance has made remarkable progress over the past 
decade, reaching almost two million clients in a country of 77 million people. 
Nevertheless, financial services for the low-income population, poor farmers and 
small and medium enterprises are still characterized by limited outreach, high 
transaction costs for clients, a generally weak institutional base, weak governance 
and a nominal ownership structure as well as dependence on government and 
NGOs. 
 
The available evidence suggests that the operational modalities of existing micro-
finance institutions need a thorough examination vis-à-vis their contribution towards 
alleviating the financial needs of the poor. Observations made in some of the 
regional states have pointed to a number of weaknesses in the operations of the 
existing MFIs. Some of these include inflexible repayment periods, overemphasis on 
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the need of the group collateral, problems with group membership, and lack of 
effective loan screening mechanisms. In addition, there is a need to examine the 
managerial capacity of the microfinance institutions so that they can provide more 
efficient services to their clients (MoFED 2008/2009:73-74). Regarding saving 
mobilization patterns, Amha W. and Anteneh (2011.16-19) mentioned that voluntary 
savings grew at a rate of 38% in 2009 versus prior years and represented 29% of the 
sector gross loan portfolio.  
 
Table 3.9: Ethiopia microfinance outreach indicators 
 
 
MFIs 
No. of 
active 
borrowers 
(A) 
Per cent of 
women 
borrowers 
(B) 
Gross Loan 
portfolio 
 
(C) 
Average Loan 
balanced Per 
borrowers 
(D) 
Voluntary 
savings 
 
(E) 
Compulsory 
savings 
 
(F) 
Peer Group-
Small MFIs 
      
Degaf 1,249 78% 1,224,132 980 74,277 452,973 
Letta 433 90% 3,529,387 1,132 16,440 7,678 
Meket 3,356 74% 3,320,865 990 157,207 131,622 
Shashemene 2,800 46% 9,439,225 3,371 289,135 1,307,545 
Lefyeda 211 75% 455,244 1,158 37,845 91,985 
Dynamic 319 27% 1,972,899 6,185 992,592 376,309 
Total 8,369  19,942,079 13,995 1,567,496 2,368,112 
Average 1,395 65% 2,414,936 2,332 258,621 394,685 
Peer Group-
Medium MFIs 
      
Aggar 3,707 28% 10,543,553 2,305 1,347,090 1,474,187 
AVFS 11,306 74% 11,215,745 992 984,662 3,108,015 
Gasha 12,851 23% 14,503,934 1,129 287,525 4,445,283 
Harbu 12,541 70% 11,362,231 906 3,145,703 2,485,373 
Meklit 12,980 39% 20,659,910 1,498 2,016,721 5,648,573 
Metemamen 14,154 77% 10,157,104 718 0 2,635,316 
Total 67,539  76,442,478 7,547 7,781,701 19,796,747 
Average 11,257 52% 12,740,413 1,258 1,296,950 3,299,458 
Peer group-
Large MFIs 
      
ACSI 687,586 63% 1,656,863,562 2,410 678,505,638 309,602,588 
ADCSI 152,260 45% 321,197,819 2,110 32,575,541 53,513,483 
Banshangule 28,649 17% 42,484,447 1,483 6,676,803 2,645,743 
BussaGonofa 42,146 72% 48,928,779 1,161 0 8,647,584 
DECSI 407,780 38% 1,359,117,217 3,333 477,379,679 51,053,122 
OCSSCO 364,584 39% 734,540,219 2,015 97,992,729 260,958,337 
Omo 296,638 32% 462,403,284 1,559 93,160,933 69,392,023 
PEACE 18,174 81% 42,511,836 2,339 6,205,076 4,839,433 
SEPI 29,044 53% 33,984,970 1,170 2,400,708 13,687,835 
Wassa 42,276 46% 64,066,939 1,515 10,641,953 10,365,369 
Wisdom 56,302 66% 95,822,168 1,702 8,469,013 13,151,823 
Total 2,125,439  4,861,921,240 20,796 14,008,073 797,857,340 
Average 193,222 50% 441,992,840 1,891 128,546,188 72,532,485 
All MFIs       
Total 2,201,423  4,958,319,098 40,266 1,423,246,733 819,498,645 
Average 95,714 55% 215,341,449 1,712 61,880,293 35,630,376 
Average Africa 11,322 60% N/A 5,028 N/A N/A 
 Source: Amha W., and Anteneh-2011,  
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The study observed from Table 3.9 that the total of all MFIs mobilized 28.7% 
(E*100/C) and 16.5% (F*100/C) from voluntary savings and compulsory savings 
respectively of the sector gross loan portfolio. Based on this data, the total MFIs 
mobilized 45.2% from both voluntary and compulsory savings of the total sector 
grass loan portfolio.   
 
Furthermore, Table 3.9 shows that DECSI, one of the market leaders, accumulated 
90% of its total savings from voluntary deposits followed by Dynamic (73%) and 
Benshangul (72%). However, Metemamen and Buusa have not collected voluntary 
savings. MFIs mobilized Birr 819,498,645 million in compulsory savings, which 
represents 37% of total savings and 17% of the sector gross loan portfolio. 
 
In addition, Table 3.9 also shows that DECSI accumulated 35% and 3.8% from 
voluntary savings and compulsory savings respectively of the sector gross loan 
portfolio.  Additionally, DECSI mobilized 38.8% from both voluntary and compulsory 
savings of the total sector grass loan portfolio.   
3.4.4 Financial structure average for MFIs peer-groups 
 
 
Table 3.10 shows that deposits to loan of all MFIs comprises 33% of the financial 
structure, which represents 29%, 36%, and 34% from small, medium, and large 
Ethiopian MFIs.  This indicates that a significant share of the financial structure of 
Ethiopian MFIs is generated from deposits.  
 
 
Table 3.10: financial structure average for MFIs peer-groups 
 
Indicator 
Ethiopia MBB 
Small Medium Large All MFIs All African 
Capital Asset Ratio 60% 45% 37% 45% 24% 
Debt Equity Ratio 0.80 1.60 2.40 1.80 2.40 
Deposits to loan 29% 36% 34% 33% 56% 
Portfolio 83% 75% 78% 77% 63% 
Source: Welday and Anteneh-2011,  
 
The above empirical evidence indicates that the significant contribution of deposits to 
loans of all Ethiopian MFIs financial structures could not affect the loan and saving 
interest rate determination of the Ethiopian MFIs.  
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3.4.5 Ethiopian microcredit ownership structure 
 
The ownership structure of Ethiopian microfinance institutions is the direct effect of 
regulatory provisions (Degefe 2009:11). According to the Proclamation No. 40/1996 
of the Business of Micro Financing Institutions, microfinance institutions should be 
owned fully by Ethiopian nationals and/or organizations wholly owned by Ethiopian 
Nationals and registered under the laws of, and having its head office in, Ethiopia. 
This legislation excluded international NGOs and other overseas agencies from 
owning and running microfinance institutions in Ethiopia. 
 
Furthermore, Degefe (2009:11) said that today there are 31 MFIs registered with the 
National Bank of Ethiopia and serving clients. The Ethiopian microfinance market is 
dominated by a few large MFIs, all of which are linked to regional state government 
ownership. The three largest institutions account for 65% of the market share in 
terms of borrowing clients, and 74% in terms of loan provision. These are Amhara 
(ACSI), Dedebit (DECSI) and Oromia (OCSSCO) Credit and Savings Institutions. 
 
Table 3:11 shows that the ownership structure of Ethiopian MFIs varies and is highly 
linked with the regional government directly, or through government led associations. 
This enables the regional governments to regulate the MFIs. Except DECSI, all 
Ethiopian MFIs are regionally based MFIs, which affects the cross regional 
competition of the MFIs.   
 
Furthermore, Table 3:11 shows that the ownership structure of a significant number 
of Ethiopian MFIs are linked to individuals, which indicates that the Ethiopian MFI 
industry attracts private investments for profit. The effect of this type of ownership 
structure matters as it is can potentially enhance competition that could lower the 
loan interest rates, not yet realized. Most of the privately owned MFIs are urban 
based and the level of competition among MFIs is still anaemic. That is why the 
lending interest rate is determined on a market basis that doesn’t consider the social 
objectives of MFIs.  
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Table 3.11: Year of Establishment and Ownership Structure of MFIs in Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
Microfinance Institutions 
 
Year of 
Establishment 
 
Ownership Structure (Percent of Equity Capital) 
Regional 
Government 
Associations 
and NGO’s 
 
Individuals 
Total 
1 Amhara Credit & Savings Institution S.C. 1995 25 75 - 100 
2 Dedebit Credit & Savings Institution S.C. 1994 25 75 - 100 
3 Oromia Credit & Savings Institution S.C. 1997 25 70 5 100 
4 Omo Microfinance Institution S.C. 1997 80 19.5 0.5 100 
5 Specialized Financial & Promotional Institution 
S.C. 
1997 - 80 20 100 
6 Gasha Micro-Financing S.C 1998 - 61.9 38.1 100 
7 Wisdom Micro-Financing Institutions S.C 1998 - - 100 100 
8 Sidama Micro-Financing S.C 1994 - 70 30 100 
9 Asser Micro-Financing S.C 1998 - 97 3 100 
10 Africa Village Financial Services S.C 1198 - - 100 100 
11 BuussaGonofa Microfinance S.C 1999 - 19.6 80.4 100 
12 Meeket Microfinance Institution S.C 1999 - - 100 100 
13 PEACE Microfinance Institution S.C 2000 - 16 84 100 
14 Addis Credit and Savings Institution S.C 2000 96.7 3.3 - 100 
15 Meklit Microfinance Institution S.C 2000 - 91 9 100 
16 Ehet Microfinance Institution S.C 2000 - 20 80 100 
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia, 1999 
 
3.4.6 Cooperatives in Ethiopia 
 
3.4.6.1 Introduction 
 
A cooperative is an association of persons who have voluntarily joined together to a 
common end through the formation of a democratically controlled organization, 
making equitable contribution to the capital required and accepting a fair share of the 
risks and benefits of the undertaking, in which the members actively participate 
(Bezabih E. 2012.3). Similarly, Veerakumaran G. (2007:5) defines a cooperative as 
an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and 
democratically controlled enterprise.  
 
Stirling S. (2004:20-25) reveals that cooperatives have a number of important roles 
to play in securing the rights and livelihoods of the poor. He said, “Cooperatives are 
schools for democracy, providing services the state cannot, or services captured by 
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elites, business co-operation, and capital accumulation. They are important for 
disadvantaged groups who do not have access to credit”. 
 
3.4.6.2 Historical overview of cooperatives in Ethiopia 
 
Bezabih E. (2012.3) explains that cooperation among people of Ethiopia has existed 
since time immemorial.  Strengthening Bezabih’s idea, Veerakumaran G. (2007:5) 
notes that the people of Ethiopia have a very long social history of working together 
to fulfil their socio-economic needs. 
 
In Ethiopia there are three well-known traditional cooperatives or self-help groups: 
 
1. Edir: - Edir is one of the traditional forms of cooperatives still operating in 
almost in all parts of Ethiopia, urban and rural. It is similar to burial 
cooperatives or organizations that perform burial ceremonies, offer 
condolence, as well as assisting family members of the deceased with 
financial and labour assistance, helping them to overcome the difficulties that 
arise due to the occurrence of death in the member’s family.  
2. Ekub: Ekub is other form of traditional cooperative or traditional self-help 
group in Ethiopia. Ekub is a financial form of a traditional cooperative formed 
voluntarily. It is a rotating saving and credit type association whose members 
make regular contributions to a revolving loan fund. The formation of “Ekub “is 
based on classes of people who have identical (similar) earning or income. 
Unlike saving and credit cooperatives, it does not bear interest on the money 
saved (collected). 
3. Debo/Wenfal/Lefenty: This form of traditional cooperative or mutual help 
group is an important form of traditional cooperatives in Ethiopia. This is 
mainly a cooperative formed in the rural areas in different parts of the country 
where most of the people are farmers. Debo is a system of farmer’s 
cooperation during the time of farming, weeding, harvesting, trashing, and 
house construction etc. Debo/Wenfale/Lefenty does not have a system of 
administration like the other form of associations; it is based on each farmer’s 
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equivalent contribution of labour or material (oxen). It is a mechanism by 
which all farmers are helping each other on a rotating basis. 
 
3.4.6.3 Cooperatives by year 
 
Table 3:12 below shows that the number of primary cooperatives and cooperative 
unions increased every year proportionally. However, the number of primary 
cooperatives and cooperative unions is not satisfactory compared with the Ethiopian 
population in general and the disadvantaged group in particular. Not just the 
numbers but also the overall capacity of cooperatives should be strengthened, 
because these are the reliable and sustainable community based institutions that 
can support the marginalized groups in all social aspects, including fair credit 
services.  
 
Table 3.12: Number of cooperative unions in Ethiopia by year 
 
Cooperatives 
Year 
1974 1974-1991 1991 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of 
primary 
cooperatives 
 
149 
 
10,524 
 
7,366 
 
20,437 
 
22,275 
 
24,935 
 
26,672 
 
35,527 
 
37,247 
Number of 
cooperative 
unions 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
112 
 
145 
 
162 
 
174 
 
212 
 
245 
Source: Federal Cooperatives Agency, 2012 
 
3.4.6.3 Cooperatives by regions 
 
Table 3.13 shows that the not only unequal distribution of the number of unions 
between the regions but also the absence of unions and primaries in all pastoralist 
regions, such as; Afar, Somalia, and Gambella. Tailored unions and primary 
formation for the pastoralist is very crucial.  
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       Table 3.13:  Number of cooperative unions in Ethiopia by region 
 
 
Regions 
No of 
Unions 
No of 
primaries 
Membership Capital in 
Mill. Birr Male Female Total 
Tigray 20 160 86,514 30,159 116,673 5.11 
Benshangul 1 8 21,157 273 2,430 0.13 
Addis Ababa 3 165 - - 8,012 1.74 
Oromia 43 1163 462,807 50,854 513,661 37.73 
SNNP 13 273 183,163 14,243 197,406 15.35 
Amhara 26 483 430,726 45,435 476,161 24.22 
Total 106 2252 1,165,367 140,964 1,314,341 84.28 
Percentage   89 11 100  
       Source: Federal Cooperatives Agency, 2012 
 
Furthermore, Table 3.13 shows that the participation of males and females in the 
unions and primaries is not healthy. Establishment of female-based unions and 
primaries should be encouraged.  
  
3.5 Microcredit studies in Tigray 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
Tigray National Regional State is one of the regional states within the structure of the 
Federal Democratic  Republic of Ethiopia, located at the northern tip of the country.  
 
3.5.2 Tigray’s main socio-economic indicators 
 
Tigray is highly vulnerable to recurrent droughts and a trend of reduced natural 
resources. Though the region has potential resources that can minimize poverty and 
improve the socioeconomic situation of the region, there are still financial access 
issues, poverty, drought, and unemployment, which are among the major 
development challenges of the region. 
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Table 3.14: Tigray’s main socio-economic indicators 
  
Description 
Year  
Average 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
1 Population        
1.1 Total population  4,314,456     
1.2 Male   49.2%     
1.3 Female  50.2%     
1.4 Urban  19.5%     
1.5 Rural  80.5     
1.6 Population growth  2.5%     
2 Regional GDP growth by 
economic sector 
      
2.1 Total regional GDP 11.2 11.3 11.8 10.2 10.5 11.0 
2.2 Agricultural sector 9.6 9.2 11.4 7.9 9.6 9.5 
2.3 Industrial sector 10 9.5 9.0 9.4 10.1 9.5 
2.4 Services sector 14.0 14.4 13.7 13.0 11.6 13.2 
3 Sectorial share to Regional 
GDP (in percentage) 
      
3.1 Agriculture 40.9 40.1 39.9 39.1 38.7 39.4 
3.2 Industry 20.4 20.1 19.6 19.4 19.4 19.6 
3.3 Services 38.7 39.8 40.5 41.5 41.9 41.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4 Real per capita income (In USD) 168     232  
5 Poverty        
5.1 Regional poverty rate 48.5%    41%  
6 Unemployment       
6.1 Regional     19.0%  
6.2 Male     11.2%  
6.3 Female     16.2%  
7 Infrastructure       
7.1 Electrification coverage     12%  
7.2 Health coverage-Regional 75%    83%  
7.3 Infant mortality rate (per 100 000) 870    673  
7.4 Under five mortality rate (per 
100000) 
169    
73 
 
7.5 HIV/AIDS prevalence       
 Urban     2.9%  
 Rural     1.3%  
7.5 PoTable water coverage       
 Urban 50%    72%  
 Rural 41%    60%  
Source: Tigray Bureau f planning and Finance (2010/11-2009/2015) Regional GTP 
 
 
Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) is the only licensed microfinance 
institution in Tigray. The history of microfinance in Tigray is linked to the evolution of 
Relief Society of Tigray (REST) (Borchgrevink A., Valle J.H., and Woldehanna T. 
2003:1). 
 
Amha W. (2007:9-13) reports that as of September 2006, the main funding sources 
of DESCI included: 
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Table 3.15: Funding sources of DECSI 
Funding Sources Percentage 
Loan from Bank 48.2 
Savings Mobilization 31.1 
Grant/donation 8.3 
Loan from Rural Intermediation Program (RUFIP) 7.2 
Net income from lending 4.4 
Paid up equity 0.8 
Source: Amha W., 2007 
 
Table 3.15 clarifies that the major funding sources of DECSI are loans from the bank 
followed by savings mobilization, which indicates the main funding sources of DECSI 
are acquiring funds from the bank with a lower loan interest rate (9% per annum) and 
loaning this money out with high loan interest rates (18% per annum) on the one 
hand, and savings mobilization with 9% savings interest rates per annum and resale 
for 18% loan interest rates. Buying public funds at a low less interest rate and selling 
them with a high loan interest rate, is an urgent issue that needs corrective 
measures for the sake of establishing a fair loan interest rate that benefits the poor of 
the community.   
 
Furthermore, Table 3.15 shows that grants/donations is the third funding source of 
DECSI. Understanding the objective and how DECSI manages the grants/donations funding 
source matters. Such types of funding sources are supposed to enhance the social 
contribution of DECSI through a pro-poor microcredit modality, including loan interest rates. 
Thus, the utilization of the grants/donations funding should be audited against its effect on 
the poor. Generally, this type of funding source is more important and effective for small 
MCIs than a large MFI like DECSI. 
 
Table 3:16 shows that the growth rate in percentage of DECSI was decreasing and even 
negative for the year 2006.  This can be a result of dropouts, exclusion of the poor, high 
amounts of loan for small numbers of clients, among other reasons. 
 
Table 3.16: The growth rate percentage of DECSI   
Year Growth rate in percentage 
2004 49 
2005 25 
2006 -6.3 
2007 7.4 
2008 12.7 
         Source: Amha W.  
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Apart from DECSI, the Alliance of Civil Society Organizations of Tigray (ACSOT) 
reports that there are about 51 registered members of the alliance, which are 
operating in different parts of Tigray with different legal status, capacities, target 
groups, methodologies and operational procedures, but commonly working for the 
wellbeing of the disadvantaged sector of the community (Gemechu H. 2010:74-75).  
 
The Women’s Association of Tigray, Ethiopian Red Cross Society, Ethiopian 
Catholic Social and Development Secretariat, Save the Generation of Tigray, and 
Youth Association of Tigray are among the members of ACSOT, which are 
prohibited by the proclamation of the National Bank of Ethiopia to be involved in 
microcredit service. The prohibition is mainly due to low interest rates that could 
distort the microcredit market and its financial sustainability. However, these 
unregulated microcredit providers are still operating microcredit services (Gemechu 
H. 2010: 74-75). 
 
Recognizing the existence and positive contribution of ERCS (unregulated 
microcredit provider), Amha W.  (2011:18) stated that the experience of externally 
funded projects or programs reveals that “when loans are financed by an early 
injection of external funds from donors/NGOs or government, these projects appear 
to fail so consistently that this model of microfinance support is never a prudent 
gamble” (CGAP 2006). Furthermore, he mentioned that contrary to the experiences 
in many countries, the performance of the microcredit program of ERCS, in terms of 
repayment and loan collection has been very impressive in the last years. The 
repayment rate of the microcredit program has been 100%. Even for a beneficiary 
who passed away, his family repaid the loan. 
 
The unregulated microcredit providers are targeting specific sectors of the 
community, which are highly linked with the specific objectives of the institutions and 
are following a poverty lending approach. Some of these are noted in Table 3.17. 
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Table 3.17: Outreach performance of some unregulated microcredit providers 
 
S/n 
Name of 
Organization 
 
IGA activities 
 
Beneficiaries 
 
Remarks 
1 Women’s 
Association of 
Tigray (WAT) 
 
x Rural  
(Agriculture activities; 
Cattle fattening, Poultry, 
Sheep & goat rearing 
x Urban 
(mini-business activities, 
Urban agriculture) 
 
More than 10,000 
total beneficiaries in 
the Region 
 
Individual and group 
IGAs, But more focus on 
individual IGA 
2 Save the 
Generation 
Association Tigray 
x In 15 sub -branches  
x Urban & Rural IGAs 
 
x 100% HIV/AIDS 
Victims  
x 680 beneficiaries in 
2012 budget year  
x All types of IGA 
projects are Grant 
Type, There is no 
revolving fund program 
3 Women 
Association of 
Tigray (WAT) 
x On a formation 
process, very 
soon will be 
recognized as 
microfinance, 
which will be 
independent, but 
under the 
supervision of 
the Tigray 
Women’s 
Association 
board of 
directors. 
 
x The Main objective for 
formation of the micro 
finance is to regulate the 
money that has been 
dispensed for many years by 
the WAT in collaboration of 
different donors. 
x It is believed to be more than 
60 million birr revolving in 
the 11 thousand 
beneficiaries of WAT IGA 
different projects, so, the 
above money will be the 
initial capital for the under 
formation Micro Finance. 
x 11000 
beneficiaries of 
WAT from different 
IGA projects in 
different  
x 70 % will be poor 
women who can 
have access to 
credit starting from 
birr 500 – 10,000 
x 30 % will be other 
beneficiaries  
x Saving service will 
be provided for all 
x Interest rate will be 
12.5% decline 
method 
x Micro Credit service 
on commission on 
behalf of the 
organizations who 
wants to engage in 
micro credit schemes 
for poor house- hold 
families.  
Source: Compiled from quarterly report of ACSOT, 2013 
 
One important issue is why the existing regulation cannot prohibit the unregulated 
microfinance services funded by donors, including the Ethiopian Government. This study 
will address this issue.  
 
The above literature review clearly indicates that there are theoretical and empirical 
gaps. Agreement could not be reached between a wide range of academicians and 
development experts regarding the effect of loan interest rate on the poor, its extent 
and manifestations. This reveals that the issue of loan interest rate still requires 
further study and discussion. As a result, this study will present empirical evidence 
on the issues related to the loan interest rate and its implications, contributing to the 
knowledge gap within the theories and practices. 
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 3.6 Empirical reviews of some other countries 
 
This section presents some empirical reviews of other countries in the area of the 
impact of loan interest rates within microfinance for the poor.  
 
Table 3.18: Summary of empirical reviews of some other countries 
  
Title 
 
Author 
 
Year 
Microcredit 
modality 
 
Outcomes 
 
 
1 
 
Impact of Interest Rate on Loan 
Repayment of MFIs in Tanzania. 
(International Journal of 
Business and Economics 
Research) 
 
 
Othman 
A. and 
Hon Z.  
 
 
2016 
Multiple loans with 
high interest rate 
Loan default has 
significant 
relationship with 
interest rate 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Measuring the Impact of 
Microfinance: Looking to the 
future. 
(Study of eight countries: 
Morocco, Mexico, Uganda, Peru, 
Philippines, Pakistan, Kenya, 
and India) 
(Grameen Foundation 
Publication) 
 
 
 
Kathleen 
E. 
 
 
 
2015 
Credit,  savings, 
and insurance - 
credit  packages 
Business expansion 
but not necessarily to 
greater business 
profit and little 
evidences of 
sustained increases 
in income or 
consumption. 
 
 
 
3 
Effects of interest rates on loan 
performance of MFIs in Naivash 
sub-city, Kenya. 
(International Journal of 
Economics, Commerce and 
Management) 
 
Kariuki M 
and 
Ngahu S. 
 
 
 
2016 
High loan interest 
rate to enhance 
MFIs financial 
performances and 
reduce liquidity 
risks 
Low loan 
performance, 
repayment failure 
and MFIs faced 
liquidity risks. 
 
4 
The impact of microfinance on 
welfare and poverty alleviation in 
Southern Nigeria (PhD thesis) 
 
Taiwo J.N 
 
 
 
2012 
Loan demands 
determined by type 
of business the 
clients engaged in 
Loan demand is 
interest rate 
insensitivity. 
 
 
 
5 
Empirical study of the impact of 
Microfinance Bank on small and 
medium growth in Nigeria. 
(International Journal of 
Academic Research in 
Economics and management 
Sciences) 
 
 
Olowe 
F.T., 
Moradeyo 
O.A, and 
Babalola 
O.A 
 
 
2013 
Collateral, high 
interest rate, and 
short loan duration 
Crippled the 
expansion of Small 
and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) 
in Nigeria 
 
 
6 
What influences Microfinance 
Lending Interest Rates in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) (292 MFIs 
drawn from 34 SSA countries ) 
(Executive Business Centre, 
Boumemouth University, UK) 
 
 
 
Sydney 
C.  
 
 
 
 
2012 
Finance costs, 
operating 
expenses, return on 
assets and inflation 
largely drive MF 
lending interest 
rates in SSA. 
MF clients suffer 
from hgh interest 
rates, the exorbitant 
rates viewed as a 
poverty penalty. 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Even though the impact of lending interest rates on the poor is not yet adequately 
studied, Table 3.17 a summary of globally dispersed countries revealed that loan 
interest rates is a global problem that challenges the performance of the microcredit 
industry, which strengthens the importance of the empirical review of Ethiopia.  
 
3.7 Closing remarks  
 
Microcredit programs have progressively increased over the last decades in all parts 
the world. Like any development tool, there is still ongoing debate within the 
microfinance field.  Indicators such as repayment rates, ‘demand’ for credit and the 
rise of MFIs results on poverty reduction are still debatable. The ‘demand’ simply 
means that there is a ‘need’, as always, for more resources. The critical issue is how 
the demand of the poor for microcredit service can be addressed, and to what extent 
loan interest rates affect the demand and benefits from microcredit services, a 
question with which this study deals. 
 
The Institutionalist and Welfarist approaches to microfinance disagree on almost all 
the core issues of microcredit/finance. Since this study seeks to utilize their 
respective theories without undermining them, this study evaluates the relative 
achievement and complementarities of both types of microcredit/finance in giving 
loans to previously economically excluded actors and thus raising their standard of 
living. This approach will be used instead of focusing on what each school purports 
to be the most important aspect of micro-credit/finance (social change or fiscal 
solvency). Furthermore, the study assesses which loan interest rates modality 
actually affects their clients’ standard of living. These effects may occur at the 
individual level, raising or stabilizing income, or at the social level, reconfiguring the 
market system to provide more mutually beneficial transactions between members of 
the informal sector, and providing loans large enough to allow clients to increase 
their finances in a manner that protects clients from macroeconomic shocks. 
 
The chapter contributed to understanding the global, regional, national and local 
historical journey, outreach, financial structure, growth and trends of microfinance 
services.  From the Ethiopian and some other globally dispersed countries empirical 
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reviews, it can be observed and learnt that lending interest rates is a global MCI 
problem that should be studied properly. Impact analysis of MCIs on the poor should 
not exclude lending interest rates.   
 
The next chapter is devoted to the research methodology and research techniques 
that will assist in executing the research. These methodologies and techniques aid in 
specifying  the location of the sample population and area and informing the 
management of the whole process of the data collection. Further, they assist in the  
analysis of the information and help study how best to assess the impact of a 
microcredit loan interest rate on the poor in Tigray region. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explains how the study was designed and carried out. The section also 
describes the methodology used in collecting data to answer the research questions 
and address ethical concerns. The scope and limitation subsection discusses 
necessary cautions observed in interpreting the findings of this study. 
 
4.2 Study area 
 
The section deals with the rationale for the study area selection; the profile, the 
geographical location and administration divisions as well as the demographic 
pattern of the study area. 
 
4.2.1 Selection of the study area 
 
The study area selection carefully considered based on the socio-economic situation 
of the area, geographical representation of both urban and rural populations, the 
relatively long history of microcredit involvement in the community, engagement of 
different microcredit actors with different program modalities, and distance for 
logistical reasons. This was also the rationale for the selection of the Eastern 
Administrative zone out of the six zones in Tigray Regional State and subsequently 
the selection of districts and villages from the selected zone.  
 
4.2.2 Profile of the study area 
 
The Eastern Administrative zone of Tigray is one of the most severely impacted by 
recurrent drought. Additionally, the Eastern zone was the war front of Ethio-Eritrea 
conflict. As a result, various devastating social problems have occurred (Eastern 
Administrative zone of Tigray five years’ strategic plan, 2008). Because of its socio-
economic and geo-political situation, this zone, with all its districts and villages, has 
been the target of microcredit services for more than a decade. Examining different 
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microcredit actors following diverse microcredit modalities and loan interest rates 
was very important for this study. Therefore, this area was ideal for the study. 
 
Table 4.1: Basic socioeconomic indicators of the study area 
 
   
Type of residence 
 
Migrants 
Unemployment 
rate (Age 10+) 
 
Total Orphanage Homeless Percent   
1 Regional        
 Both sex 4,316,988 839 1,124 19.9 5.8  
 Male 2,126,465 409 967 19.0 5.0  
 Female 2,190,523 430 157 20.8 6.7  
1.1 Urban       
 Both sex 844,040 690 916 52.7 22.6  
 Male 398,795 331 833 51.6 16.8  
 Female 445,245 359 83 53.8 29.0  
1.2 Rural       
 Both sex 3,472,948 149 208 11.9 2.5  
 Male 1,727,670 78 134 11.5 2.7  
 Female 1,745,278 71 74 12.4 2.2  
2 Eastern zone       
 Both sex 755,343 187 152  26.6  
 Male 359,638 118 80  17.9  
 Female 395,705 69 72  34.2  
2.1 Urban       
 Both sex 146,064 68 80    
 Male 66,321 54 69    
 Female 79,743 14 11    
2.2 Rural       
 Both sex 609,279 119 72    
 Male 293,317 64 11    
 Female 315,962 55 61    
Source: Compiled from population and Housing Census, 2007 
4.2.3 Demographic and geographical location of the study area 
 
The study was carried out in the Eastern Administrative zone of Tigray, which is one 
of the six administrative zones of Tigray Regional State, consisting of nine woredas 
with a total population of 840,196 of which 399,508 (48%) and 440,688 (52%) are 
male and female respectively (CSA 2011). 
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Figure 4:1 Map of study area 
 
4.3 Selection of microcredit providers 
 
For a meaningful analysis, the stratification of microcredit providers based on their 
type and legal status was very important. In Tigray, there are very few microcredit 
providers; however, these differ based on different legal status, which was one of the 
basis for the selection of the microcredit providers.   
 
As noted above, the Eastern Administrative Zone has different types of microcredit 
service providers. Accordingly, microcredit providers were stratified according to 
regulated and unregulated microcredit actors. Thus, five microcredit providers (four 
from regulated, and the other from unregulated) were selected purposively taking 
into account those that have been serving for a minimum of four years. These 
included Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI), Sasun Credit and saving 
Tigray 
Gulomekeda 
Ganta Afeshum 
Adigrate 
Zallambesa 
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Cooperatives (SCSC), Lideta Micro Finance Institution (LMFI), and Adeday Micro 
Finance Institution Share Company (AMFISC) from the regulated microcredit 
providers, and the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) from the unregulated 
microcredit providers.  
 
Since mid 2013, DECSI was the only MFI and SCSC was one of the credit and 
savings cooperatives in Tigray, which provided financial services to the poor and low 
income population. ERCS and Ethiopian Catholic Social and Development 
Coordination (ECSDC) were two of the humanitarian NGOs involved in microcredit 
activities applying microcredit modalities that differ from the formal microcredit 
providers.  Over time, ECSDC transformed to a formal MFI called Lideta Micro 
Finance Institution (LMFI) in April 2012, and another new MFI called Adeday Micro 
Finance Institution Share Company (AMFISC) was established in April 2013.  As a 
result of these changes, the number of licensed microfinance service institutions in 
Tigray increased from one to three MFIs.  
 
4.4 Sampling of the study 
 
“How large does the sample size have to be?”  Claire B., et al (2008: 43-133) 
suggested that the best answer is, “it depends”. It depends on the kind of data 
analysis the researcher plans, on how accurate the sample has to be for the 
researcher’s purposes, and on population characteristics. Generally speaking, a 
large number is more representative but very costly. A small sample, on the other 
hand, is much less accurate but more convenient. However, a large sample size 
alone does not guarantee a representative sample. A large sample without random 
sampling or with a poor sampling frame is less representative than a smaller one 
with random sampling and an excellent sampling frame. 
 
Moreover, regarding the size of a sample, Bless T., and Higson-Smith, C. (2000:93); 
Mitchell M., and Jolley J., (2001:496) advocate that the larger the population, the 
smaller the percentage of that population the sample needs to have. If the population 
itself is relatively small, the sample should comprise a reasonably large percentage 
of the population. Larger samples enable researchers to draw more representative 
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and more accurate conclusions, and to make more accurate predictions than in 
smaller samples, although this is costlier.    
 
The sample construction for this study considered three initial requirements that 
were used to create sample distribution among the microcredit providers shown 
below.   
 
4.5 Sampling of microcredit providers  
 
The study was supposed to engage four microcredit providers, two from regulated 
and another two from unregulated microcredit providers.   However, due to their 
transformation from unregulated to regulated and newly established MFIs, the 
number of regulated sampled MFIs increased from two to three (DECSI, LMFI, and 
AMFISC) while the number of unregulated microcredit provider decreased from two 
to one (ERCS).  
While there is variation in the legal status and years of microcredit service provision 
of the sampled microcredit providers, the number of microcredit providers operating 
in the study area was few in number. Thus, for the best interest of the study, all 
operating microcredit providers were included in the study. Furthermore, in order to 
secure fair representation of each sampled microcredit provider, the distribution of 
the sample respondents among the sampled microcredit was fair.  
a) Sampling of the geographical location (study area)  
 
The study was carried out in two weredas (Gantaafeshum and Gullomekeda) of the 
Eastern Administrative zone of the Regional State of Tigray, one urban area from 
each wereda (Adigrate and zallambessa) and one rural area from each weredas 
where both types (regulated and un-regulated) of microcredit providers are still 
operating. The same principle of fair representation of each microcredit provider and 
respondents among the actors was followed. 
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b) Sampling of respondents  
 
The sample of respondents consisted of two main groups and four sub-groups. The 
first main group consisted of clients that came from old and new MFIs and the other 
main group consisted of non-clients including ex-clients, and non-clients who had 
never participated. The sample was divided proportionally between rural and urban 
areas.  
 
The first means of ensuring representative samples was the use of a complete and 
correct sampling frame. Given these requirements, this study established the 
following sample distributions. This was the sampling list of all units from which the 
samples were drawn.  
 
c) Sampling stages and distribution of target population 
 
This study addressed different target populations of different microcredit providers, 
clients, ex-clients, and non-clients.  Due to the heterogeneous nature of the target 
populations and microcredit providers of this study, multiple and series of sampling 
procedures were crucial.  
 
Therefore, in order to define the target population of this research, multi-stage 
sampling methods were used as follows; 
 
x First stage - the selection of sample micro credit providers. For meaningful 
analysis, stratification of micro credit providers based on their type and legal 
status was important. In Tigray Regional State there are different types of 
microcredit providers enjoying different legal status. These are categorized 
into regulated and unregulated microcredit providers. Regulated microcredit 
providers include Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI), which is the 
only strong and old institution operating in both urban and rural areas, Lideta 
microfinance institution (LMFI), Adeday Microfinance Institution Share 
Company (AMFISC), established one year ago and operating mainly in 
limited urban areas, and a few savings and credit cooperatives (like SCSC) 
operating in the rural areas. On the other hand, there are a few unregulated 
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microcredit providers comprised of NGOs (like ERCS), and Community 
Based Associations operating on a project-by-project funding system, mainly 
in urban and some rural areas.  
 
For the best interest of this study, microcredit providers were stratified based 
on their status of being regulated or unregulated microcredit providers. Thus, 
five microcredit providers (four from regulated, and the other from 
unregulated) were selected purposively. Those that have operated for a 
minimum of four years include DECSI, LMFI, AMFISC, and SCSC from 
regulated microcredit providers, and ERCS from unregulated microcredit 
providers.  
 
x Second stage - the selection of study areas where the sampled micro credit 
actors operate. Two weredas, one urban and one rural, were selected 
purposively, namely Adigrate and Zalambesa towns (urban), and 
Gantaafeshum and Gulomekedda (Rural) from the area where the sampled 
microcredit providers operated for a minimum of 4 years.  
 
x Third stage - the selection of total sample population among the two 
categories.  Clients and non-clients were selected through a random and 
non-probability sampling technique respectively. The selection of the client 
respondents was from the available data (lists) of the microcredit providers 
while the non-respondents sampling technique was non-probability where the 
selection of sampling was quite arbitrary. This was the convenient sampling 
for the study where non-respondent data was not available. The 
representation of non-clients was about 21% of the total sample population. 
The reason for the relatively high sample population from non-clients was 
because of the high number of households, which have no microcredit 
access; this was based on the observation by Amha W. (2010:33-35) that 
currently only 6% of smallholder farmers in Ethiopia have access to financial 
services.  So, as a result of significant number of smallholder farmers who do 
have not access to financial services, adequate sample representation of 
non-clients for this study was very crucial. This helped to explore crucial 
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elements of the research questions adequately including ‘how and to what 
extent does loan interest rate exclude the poor from microcredit financial 
services?’ and ‘why do some people participate in microcredit services while 
others do not?’. 
 
x Fourth stage - the disproportional distribution of client respondents among the 
sampled regulated and un-regulated microcredit actors. This kept the balance 
of representation of clients among microcredit actors by taking a small 
sample size from a large population and vice versa. This was based on the 
size sampling principle suggested by Bless T., and Higson-Smith, C. 
(2000:93); Mitchell M., and Jolley J., (2001:496), which was relevant for this 
study. This helped to avoid minimizing representation bias. The other 
assumption was the high possibility of some clients who may be clients of 
more than one of the sampled microcredit actors. Thus, taking the loan 
history of the sampled respondents was considered important in order to 
evaluate why they engaged with more than one microcredit service provider 
and why they changed their membership from one microcredit service 
provider to another.  
 
x Fifth stage - the distribution of non-clients among old clients (who were clients 
of any one of the sampled actors) and those who have never been a member 
of any one of the sampled microcredit service providers. For this, purposive 
sampling was appropriate, thus inviting those who are not currently a member 
of any microcredit service for interviews. 
 
x Sixth stage - the geographical distribution of all sampled respondents.   This 
was proportionally distributed among the sampled urban and rural areas. This 
helped to deal with the proposed research questions in urban and rural areas, 
which have different features.  
 
In order to be consistent with the research questions and to avoid both confusion 
and unfair comparisons, all sample client respondents were microcredit service 
beneficiaries. In the case of DECSI, which provides both microfinance and 
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microcredit services using different modalities; the selection from this institution was 
only from its microcredit clients. The remaining sampled actors are entirely operating 
on micro credit services. 
 
 
 Figure 4.2: Sampling stages and distribution of target population 
 
4.6 Background of the research strategy and design 
 
The research methodology and design were intended to address the purpose and 
objectives of the study. The overall aim of the study was to understand the impact of 
loan interest rates on the poor in the Tigray region and thereby develop a 
comprehensive framework upon which future work can be based. The study used a 
two-phase, with sequential mixed methods approach that helped to obtain statistical, 
quantitative results from a sample of household respondents and then followed up 
with in-depth interviews of a few individuals to probe those results in more depth.   
  
The two-phase, sequential mixed methods approach helped to investigate the extent 
to which loan interest rates affect the poor, to assess the pull and push factors of 
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microcredit on the credit clients and microcredit institutions, and other research 
questions of this study in Tigray. The credit supply aspect intended to address the 
factors that affect the ability of poor clients to obtain effective and efficient loan 
microcredit services and covered the following specific issues as stated on section 
1.5: - 
 
1. What motivates micro-credit institutions to give loans in Tigray? 
2. Why are loan interest rates determined by different micro credit providers?  
3. How and to what extent does loan interest rate exclude the poor from micro 
credit financial services? 
4. Does loan interest rate influence social mission (performance) of microcredit 
providers? And if so, how and to what extent? 
5. What is the effect of the ownership structure of microcredit on loan interest 
rates? And why? 
 
The second theme addresses the issue of demand factors that affect the ability of 
the poor to obtain credit from lending institutions and specifically covered the 
following questions. 
 
1. What attracts poor clients to get loans from microcredit institutions? 
2. How do loan interest rate attributes affect access to credit of the poor?   
3. Why do some poor people participate in a microcredit service while others do 
not? 
4. How, why and to what extent do non-clients of microcredit have access to the 
informal credit market?  
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Figure 4.3: Flow chart of the research design and methods of the study 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem discovery and 
identification 
STEP-ONE 
 
Problem discovery  
(Literature review, Survey, Pilot 
study, and case study) 
 
 
Problem identification  
(Statement of research objectives) 
STEP-TWO 
 
Research design 
Selection of basic research 
design 
(Field experiment, Survey 
interview, Observation, and 
Secondary data) 
STEP- THREE 
Research methodology 
- Quantitative method 
- Qualitative method 
- Mixed method 
Sampling  
(Selection sample design- 
Probability and non-probability) 
Data gathering 
(Collecting of data- Fieldwork) 
Data processing and analysis 
- Editing and coding data 
- Data processing 
- Interpretation of findings 
 
- - 
STEP-FOUR Conclusion 
 
Interpretation of findings 
STEP-FIVE Final report Writing up report 
    
 
  
112 
 4.7 Research methodology  
 
Research methodology describes how the researcher plans to control the process of 
data collection, and then manages the data to produce information and knowledge 
relevant to the research problem.  
 
 This study employed multiple types of research methodologies including descriptive, 
both quantitative and qualitative, as well as applied types of research methods. This 
was because; the study intended to examine specific problem related with the loan 
interest rate effects on clients and non-clients in terms of their participation and 
changes to their socioeconomic situations. This necessitated using both descriptive 
and analytical methods.  
 
This study used mixed methods to address the research questions adequately. The 
mixed methods employed a sequential explanatory design, which is one of the major 
six mixed approaches and consists of two distinct phases: quantitative methods 
followed by qualitative methods.  It is not enough to simply collect and analyse 
quantitative and qualitative data; they need to be ‘mixed’ so that together they can 
form a more complete picture of the problem that the study is examining. 
 
The details of the quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods of this study are 
elaborated below.  
4.7.1 Quantitative research methods of the study 
 
This study used survey research, which is one of the common approaches of 
quantitative research. This survey research also addressed sampling, questionnaire 
design, questionnaire administration and data analysis.  
 
The type of survey research of this study was household interviews that took place at 
the respondent’s home. The household interview instrument was first tested by the 
researcher and ultimately used to conduct research by trained enumerators. This 
quantitative research method helped find answers to some of the research questions 
of this study. 
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Quantitative research methods of this study included a predetermined instrument 
based on close-ended questions that helped to measure attitude, performance, 
rating behaviours, and others for statistical analysis. 
 4.7.2 Quantitative research sampling procedure of the study 
 
The quantitative research of this study involved random/probability sampling. This 
was chosen because it is imperative that each person in the population should have 
an equal and independent chance of being selected in this sample.  The following 
was the application of random sampling of this study. 
 
This study used a systematic sampling procedure in drawing a sample from DECSI, 
LMFI, AMFISC, SCSC, and ERCS microcredit clients.  Additionally, this study used a 
snowball sampling procedure in drawing a sample from eligible non-clients 
consisting of both dropout clients, and non-clients who had never participated.  
4.7.3 Quantitative research sample size of the study 
 
For the interest of this study the sample size was determined based on an un-
proportional way of random sampling method. Accordingly, a smaller percentage 
sample was drawn from microcredit providers with large clients (population) (DECSI) 
while a relatively high percentage sample was drawn from microcredit providers with 
small clients (LMFI, AMFISC, SCSC, and ERCS). This satisfied the fair sample 
representation from both regulated and unregulated microcredit providers.  
 
Due to the fact that the target populations of this study had different characteristics, 
this study required different target populations of microcredit providers, clients, ex-
clients, and non-clients. As a result, multiple and series of sampling procedures were 
used. In order to define and distribute the target population of this research among 
microcredit providers and urban/rural areas, multi-stage sampling methods were used.  
 
These are: 
x The first stage was the selection of a total of 471 sample population 
(respondents) from the two categories noted below. These were 371 (79 per 
cent) from clients and 100 (21 per cent) from non-clients who were selected 
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randomly and non-randomly. For the interest of this study, an adequate sample 
representation of non-clients was crucial for comparison.  
 
x The second stage was the un-proportional distribution of 371 sample client 
respondents among the sampled microcredit providers.  This kept the balance 
of representation of clients among microcredit providers by taking small sample 
size (percentage) from a large population (DECSI) and a reasonably large 
sample size from microcredit providers with small population (LMFI, AMFISC, 
SCSC, and ERCS). Accordingly, the researcher decided to get samples of 163 
(3%), 50 (5.5%), 46 (5.2%), 51 (10%), and 61 (9.6%) from the sampling frame 
of DECSI, LMFI, AMFISC, SCSC, and ERCS respectively. On the other hand, 
the samples from DECSI, LMFI, AMFISC, SCSC, and ERCS constituted 44%, 
14%, 12%, 14% and 16% respectively if one examined them in terms of the 
total sample. Based on this distribution, 310 (84%) and 61 (16%) were sample 
clients from regulated and unregulated microcredit providers respectively. 
 
x The third stage was the distribution of 100 non-clients among defaulters (who 
have been clients of any one of the sampled micro-credit providers) and those 
who never were members. The distribution was 50 from each group. Non-
clients were used as a control group (comparison) to compare the effect of loan 
interest rate on participants, non-participants, and dropouts. Furthermore, the 
researcher explored the reasons for joining, discontinuing, and not joining the 
credit service. 
 
x The last stage was the geographical distribution of all sampled respondents 
among urban and rural areas, which was done proportionally. This helped to 
deal with the proposed research questions in urban and rural areas, which 
have distinct features.  
 
In order to answer the research questions of this study and to avoid confusion and 
unfair comparisons, the sample household respondents of this study were entirely 
from micro credit service providers. As a result, the researcher deliberately excluded 
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microfinance clients of DECSI because the amount, purpose of loan and client’s type 
of micro credit and micro finance are different.  
 
Sample distribution of quantitative research of this study was drawn as follows; 
 
Table 4.2: Sample distribution of quantitative research 
  
Micro credit 
providers  
(Sample 
elements) 
No of micro 
credit clients of 
sampled 
microcredit 
providers in 
the study areas 
(wereda) 
Proportion of 
respondents to the 
total micro credit 
clients of sampled 
microcredit 
providers 
(percentage) 
 
Sample size 
 
Clients 
 
Ex-clients and Non-clients  
 
Urban Rural Total 
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
 
Total 
1 Regulated   
50 
 
50 
 
100     DECSI 5307 3 74 89 163 
    LMFI 902 5.5 50 0 50 
   AMFISC 890 5.2 46 0 46 
   SCSC 499 10 0 51 51 
Sub total 7598 4.1 170 140 310 
2 Unregulated  
    ERCS 250 9.6  61 0 61 
 Sub total 250 9.6 61 0 61 
3 Grand total 7848 4.7 231 140 371 50 50 100 
 
For simplicity, DECSI`s urban and rural clients sample distributions were 
proportionally drawn. Furthermore, LMFI, AMFISC, and ERCS were operating entirely 
in urban while SCSC was operating in the rural area. That is why the rural sample 
clients of LMFI, AMFISC, and ERCS and ECSDC and the urban sample clients of 
SCSC are zero. 
 
The reality of the microfinance service in general and the microcredit service in 
particular at national, regional, and zone level is homogeneous in terms of their credit 
methodologies and procedures. Thus, in order to study the confined area, the national 
and regional microcredit providers and their clients are deliberately excluded from this 
study by the researcher.   
 
4.7.4 Quantitative data collection of the study 
 
Ilan K. (2006:1); Kothari C.R. (2004:1-95); and Scott M. (2010:37-39) describe that 
there are two types of data source, primary and secondary data sources (secondary 
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information). The primary data are those, which are collected fresh and for the first 
time, and thus original in character.  Primary data is data collected for the 
researcher’s current research project. Primary data is often collected from a 
respondent, an individual who provides information either passively through the 
observation of his or her behaviour, or actively through verbal response.  On the other 
hand, the second data has already been collected by someone else or agencies for 
purposes other than the problem at hand, which have already been passed through a 
statistical process.  
 
Furthermore, Scott M. (2010:37-39) points out that secondary data falls into two 
categories, data that is available within the company (internal data) and that which 
must be obtained from outside sources (external data). The key, of course was to 
know where data were held and how to access them. In addition, Ilan K. (2006:1) 
describes three basic types of secondary data, two external and one internal to the 
program: 
 
x Administrative data produced by organizations and agencies outside the 
program for their own purposes, but which can be harnessed by the 
evaluation. 
 
x Research or survey data collected by governments through other agencies, 
census panel studies etc. for their own purposes.  
 
x Management information produced by the program itself for accountability 
purposes in the form of progress reports, process data, financial data etc. 
 
The study employed both primary and secondary data sources. The primary data 
was collected from the empirical fieldwork while the secondary data was mainly 
quantitative statistical information to complement the primary data. Regarding 
secondary data, this study took up the three basic types of secondary data sources, 
which enabled some triangulation of data for better accuracy. 
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On the one hand, structured and semi-structured interviews of this study were held 
with a total of 471 respondents as per details stated above.  During the unstructured 
interviews, respondents were requested to share their experiences as freely as 
possible. There was minimal intervention from the researcher except for occasional 
guidance to keep the interview on track.  
 
By far the most ideal way to examine the effect of microcredit loan interest rates on 
the poor was an experimental and/or comparison between clients of regulated and 
unregulated microcredit providers on the one side and clients and non-clients of 
micro credit on the other side.  
 
The most frequent methodology used among the quantitative approaches was the 
quasi-experimental method. This methodology compares the results achieved on 
selected variables or indicators with questions of why some people participate in 
microcredit service while others not, push and pull factors of microcredit services to 
the clients and the microcredit providers, and effects of loan interest rates on profit, 
repayment and repetitive loans of poor clients. The quasi-experimental method of 
this study was mainly carried out through a comparison between statistically relevant 
groups of different microcredit providers.  
 
At the same time, one of the most common methods of carrying out the quasi-
experimental approach on the effect of loan interest rates is to create a sample 
comparing clients of different microcredit providers (regulated and unregulated) (with 
respect to the different loan interest rate settings of the sampled microcredit 
providers). This compares clients of different microcredit providers with eligible non-
clients. This method provided additional detailed and significant results in terms of 
the effects of the loan interest rate for this study. 
 
A second method of the quasi-experimental approach compared active clients of 
different microcredit providers (regulated and unregulated). This method was 
relatively simpler in terms of data collection as it drew exclusively upon the 
microcredit database of clients of the participant microcredit providers, thereby 
diminishing costs and potential bias in the selection of non-clients. This last point 
was particularly important, as the characteristics between clients and non-clients are 
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often significant and have a greater influence on poverty levels, perceptions on loan 
interest rates, and other subjective and objective factors than participation in a 
microfinance program.  
 
This quantitative study employed both primary and secondary data sources. The 
primary data was collected from the empirical fieldwork while the secondary date 
was mainly quantitative statistical information (reports, journals, internet sites, and 
other publications) to complement the primary data. Here are the details: 
 
a) Empirical field survey  
 
Vos A., Strydom, H., Fouche, CB, and Delport. CSL (2002:198-209) classified 
questionnaires into mailed questionnaires, telephonic questionnaires, personal 
questionnaires, questionnaires delivered by hand, and group administered 
questionnaires. The selection of the type of questionnaire depends on factors such 
as time limitations, financial aspects, manpower issues, political situation, social 
environments, and the experiences of respondents.  As a matter of fact, due to 
inadequate experience and the illiteracy of respondents, expecting them to complete 
questionnaires by themselves was unrealistic. Thus, this study employed a personal 
questionnaire.   
 
In order to address the objectives of the study, primary data was collected through 
in-depth interviews with microcredit clients of sampled microcredit providers on the 
one hand and ex-clients and non-clients on the other hand. This helped to collect 
primary data from microcredit clients and loan officers (qualitatively) about their 
experiences and perceptions regarding the impacts of loan interest rates on the 
clients, ex-clients, and non-clients as well as how different loan modalities of the 
sample microcredit providers influence the credit access and benefits of the poor. 
Furthermore, it enabled the researcher to understand perceptions related to the loan 
interest rates of respondents (clients and providers) that have not yet been 
significantly studied. 
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b) Secondary data  
 
The study collected necessary secondary data from different sources that included 
the following:  
 
x MX Market Inc. website (www.themixmarket.com). The Mix Market is a not –for-
profit initiative that disseminates information among the MFIs. 
x Reports  
x Publications 
x Other 
 
4.7.4.1 Quantitative data analysis of this study 
 
The survey data generated from the questionnaires was analysed using both 
exploratory and confirmatory statistical techniques. A data entry capture template 
was designed in the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS), used for data 
entry. After data entry and clean up, exploratory statistical data analysis was 
conducted using frequency distribution Tables to summarize and display the 
respondents’ views on the questions of this study. 
 
The outputs are presented using tabulation and cross tabulation of relevant variables 
with averages and percentage values in descriptive and statistical analysis as stated 
in the next chapter. 
 
x A correlation analysis of loan interest rates versus impact on microcredit 
participation was employed. This helped to examine the relationship of 
loan interest rates and being a client or not. 
x This study also analysed the difference between clients, ex-clients, and 
non-clients on one side and clients of different sampled microcredit 
providers on the other side. This helped to examine the economic 
benefits of the clients of different microcredit providers who are using 
different loan interest rate settings. 
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 Additionally, the study tried to analyse the household’s level of poverty of the clients 
of the sampled microcredit providers using direct and indirect economic indicators, 
the accepted local wealth ranking system of the rural and urban community of the 
research area, and the national poverty index.  This enabled the researcher to 
evaluate the influence of socioeconomic characteristics of the sampled respondents 
as clients, dropouts, economic benefits, and others. 
4.7.4 Qualitative research methods of the study 
 
Martin B., Kevine D., and Desmond P. (2006:21-462) suggested that qualitative 
research makes sense in situations in which it is difficult to say what the variables 
are, which ones are important, or how to measure them? In such cases, engaging in 
the kind of open-ended, inductive exploration made possible by qualitative research 
is indicated. 
 
Kumar R. (2005:57-58) describes that in qualitative research the issue of sampling 
has little significance, as the main aim of most qualitative inquiries is either to explore 
or describe the diversity in situations, phenomenon or issue. You can, thus, select 
even one individual as your sample and describe the aim of your inquiry.  Qualitative 
research methods helped to find answers to the research questions of this study 
such as ‘how do loan interest rates exclude the poor from microcredit services’?, 
‘how and why are loan interest rates determined by different microcredit providers?’, 
‘what influence do loan interest rates have on the microcredit social mission’?, ‘what 
is the correlation between loan interest rates and financial sustainability’?, etc. 
4.7.4.1 Qualitative sampling design of this study 
 
Sampling utilized in qualitative research, is less structured, less quantitative and less 
strictly applied than in the case of quantitative research (Sarantakos S. 2000:156). 
Furthermore, Rubin A., and Babbie E. (2001: 399) rightly stated that field researchers’ 
attempt to observe everything within their field of study; thus, in that sense they do 
not sample at all. In order to satisfy the qualitative data collection and investigation of 
observation and deep interviewing, this study employed non-probability sampling 
design almost without exception. 
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4.7.4.2 Qualitative sampling procedure of this study 
 
Sarantakos S. (2000:156) clearly described that sampling in qualitative research was 
relatively limited, based on saturation, not representative, the size not statistically 
determined, involving low cost and not being time consuming. It can thus be inferred 
that in qualitative investigations non-probability sampling is used almost without 
exception. Sarantakos S. (2000:156) adds that in qualitative studies non-probability 
sampling methods are generally utilized and, in particular, theoretical or purposive 
sampling techniques rather than random sampling are used. 
 
The qualitative data of this study involved non-probability sampling techniques, which 
are mentioned below.  
a) Purposive sampling 
 
This study employed purposive sampling procedures, which is one of the non-
probability techniques in qualitative research in drawing a sample from DECSI, LMFI, 
AMFISC, SCSC, and ERCS micro credit officers.   
b) Snowball sampling 
 
Babbie E. (2001:180) points out that snowball sampling has particular application 
value in qualitative research since it is directed at the identification of hard-to-reach 
individuals. Furthermore, he described that in snowball sampling, the researcher 
collects data on the few members of the target population he can locate, then seeks 
information from those individuals that enables him to locate other members of that 
population. This study used snowball sampling mainly to collect data from non-clients 
who applied for microcredit services, because it was difficult to reach them. 
4.7.4.3 Qualitative data collection of this study 
 
Cathermin T. (2000:35-36) points out that there are two types of qualitative research: 
the depth interview and the group interview. The depth key Informant interview is 
unstructured (there is an interview guide but no questionnaire), of variable length (but 
may take up to five hours), and may be extended into repeat interviews at later dates 
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(for example, to find out how individuals’ perspectives change in response to some 
experience or event in their lives). The second method is the focus group, which 
consists of a group discussion or group interview between four and 12 people (eight 
being optimal) to discuss the topic of concern for one to two hours with the guidance 
of a moderator. 
 
In order to address the objectives of this study, in-depth interviews collected primary 
data from clients about their experiences regarding the effect of loan interest rates on 
the supply and demand of the microcredit scheme. As recommended by different 
scholars, in-depth interviews for this study were carried out using unstructured and 
semi-structured interview approaches. Unstructured or in-depth interviews are a 
flexible way of encouraging respondents to share their thoughts on a particular issue. 
The researcher’s role was to be as unobtrusive as possible, to introduce a theme or 
topic and then let the respondent develop his or her own ideas. Moreover, in-depth 
interviews afford participants an opportunity to express themselves fully on issues 
that they would not openly reveal in focus group interviews 
 
This dissertation employed both types of qualitative research, which are the depth 
interview using key informant interviews, and group interviews through focus group 
discussion. The details of each are below. 
a)  Key informants 
 
Kumar R. (2005:57-58) points out that the choice of the entire sample rests upon the 
choice of individuals at the first stage. If they belong to a particular faction or have 
strong biases, the study may be biased. It is also difficult to use this technique when 
the sample becomes fairly large. 
 
Consequently, this study employed 7 key informants from the sampled microcredit 
providers who are directly involved in the microcredit services and knowledgeable 
about the research topic. Furthermore, the key informants of this study were selected 
using purposeful sampling. Sample distribution of key informants of this study was as 
follows: 
 
    
 
  
123 
Table 4.3: Sample distribution of key informants 
 Sample 
elements 
Key   
Informant 
Remark 
1 Regulated   
     DECSI 2 One each from wereda coordinators 
    LMFI 1  
     AMFISC 2 One each from wereda coordinators 
     SCSC 1  
2 Unregulated   
     ERCS 1  
 Total 7  
 
For the best interest of this study, the key informant’s depth interview employed in-
person interviews using a guide. 
 
The in-depth interview of different key informants answered some of the main 
research questions such as ‘how the interest rate is set in their respective 
microcredit institutions and why’, ‘how loan interest rates encourage demand for 
clients’, ‘why some households are involved in microcredit service while others are 
not’, ‘perceptions on amount of loan interest rates’, ‘possible solutions in relation to 
loan interest rates and the demand of clients’, etc.   
b) Focus group discussion 
 
Morgan, D.L. (1997:6) defines focus group discussion as a research technique that 
collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher. 
Furthermore, Neuman W. L. (2004:11-300) describes that the focus group has a 
special group discussion setting. The procedure used is that a researcher gathers 6-
12 people in a room with a moderator to discuss a few issues in a discussion that 
usually lasts about 90 minutes. Focus group should be homogenous, but not include 
close friends and relatives. In a typical study, a researcher uses four to six separate 
groups. Claire B., Craig Higson S., Ashraf K. (2008: 43-143) suggests that the 
success of this technique depends in large part upon the skill of the group facilitator. 
 
In order to satisfy the heterogeneous nature of the sampled population, such as 
geographical location, membership status, and legal status of microcredit providers, 
this study planned to conduct seven focus group discussions (five FGDs from clients 
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of sampled microcredit providers and two (from non-clients), each consisting of eight 
homogeneous respondents (in terms of clients and non-clients). According to 
Cathermin T. (2000:35-36), eight is the optimal number of FGD respondents 
suggested in most literature. 
 
Due to the homogeneous nature of clients and non-clients in both urban and rural 
areas, this study conducted four FGDs (two each from urban and rural) through a 
snowball sampling selection of FGD members, especially for the selection of non-
clients, that included clients from all sampled microcredit service providers with 
gender consideration. The distribution of FGD members among sampled microcredit 
providers considered the volume and coverage of each actor who were not included 
in personal interviews. This helped avoid duplication of respondents and it increased 
the number of respondents. 
 
The FGDs was focused on the main research questions including ‘why some 
households are involved in microcredit service while others are not’, ‘reasons for 
their preferences of microcredit institutions’, ‘perceptions on setting loan interest 
rates’, etc. The FGD guide was formulated and pre-tested in one FGD. In order to 
focus on the interest of the topic, the researcher, who provided enough freedom for 
respondents to steer the conversation, guided all FGDs.  
 
4.7.4.4 Qualitative Data Analysis of this study 
 
Microcredit interest rates are often compared with those charged by both commercial 
banks and excessively subsidized lending organizations. Such comparisons are 
inappropriate (Nimal A. 2006:2-7). In order to solve this problem, this study used 
both independent and inter-actor comparisons. In the case of independent 
comparisons, data from each sampled microcredit provider versus their own clients 
was examined using the direct and indirect socioeconomic performance or indicators 
of the clients before and after participating in microcredit during 3-5 years. On the 
other hand, the study examined data based on inter-actor comparison, ‘peer-group’ 
comparisons of credit service providers with similar mission, objectives, and 
characteristics, etc. This helped to compare the effect of loan interest rates on clients 
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of similar objectives and types of clients on repayment rate, default, and economic 
benefits that influence the graduation of clients from one or another schemes to 
satisfy their progressive demand. 
 
The analysis of data generated by the focus groups and key informants was mainly a 
simple descriptive narrative that sought to generalize findings in terms of the group 
or individual key informants using terms such as most, very few, and the majority. 
The content of the discussion was examined relevant to its particular implication for 
the research question that emphasizes the reliability and replicability of observations 
and subsequent interpretation on why something was said. Furthermore, the content 
of the FGD discussion and key informants was examined as to the meaning and its 
implication for the research questions at hand.  
4.7.5 Mixed method approach of this study 
 
With the development and perceived legitimacy of both qualitative and quantitative 
research in the social and human sciences, mixed methods research, employing 
data collection associated with both forms of data, is expanding.  This study used 
mixed method, which addressed the research questions adequately. The mixed 
method employed sequential explanatory designs, one of the major mixed 
approaches that consists of two distinct phases: quantitative followed by qualitative.  
It was not enough to simply collect and analyse quantitative and qualitative data;  
they need to be ‘mixed’ in some way so that together they can form a more complete 
picture of the problem that this study intended to examine. 
 
4.8 Interview procedure 
 
Prior to the visit, the researcher notified the local authority and microcredit actors 
about the intention of the survey in the area. The respondents were first asked for 
their consent and informed about the purpose of the study, which was for  academic 
purpose only. This was to avoid unnecessary expectations of the respondents and to 
give value for their spare time. They were also informed that it was anonymous and 
any information revealed would be kept confidential. 
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  4.9 Research reporting and presentation 
 
The structure of this report was based on the research strategy or approach this 
study followed, mixed method using the sequential approach. The final report of this 
study followed the following structure; 
 
x Quantitative results are presented using Tables, diagrams and analysis 
followed by qualitative information and analysis. 
x In the conclusions or interpretation phase of the study, there are comments on 
how the qualitative result findings helped to elaborate on or extend the 
quantitative results. 
 
 4.10 Measures for reliability and validity  
 
Reliability and validity are central issues in research (Neuman 2004:11-300). They 
represent the yardsticks by which the quality of all kinds of research − quantitative, 
qualitative or participatory – are evaluated. The following sections explain how this 
was done, especially using the questionnaire surveys. 
 
1. Reliability 
 
The reliability of the results of this study materialized through a particular question 
relevant for the survey research that gave the same results over time and when 
applied to different groups or samples.  
 
2. Validity 
 
The validity of the results of this study was ensured not only by the consistency of 
results but also by the quality of the questionnaire that was developed to measure all 
areas relevant to the research issue. 
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 4.11 Ethical considerations 
 
This study followed the necessary ethical principles and guidelines of research and 
respects all conditions of the Research and Higher Degrees Committee in the 
College of Development Studies at UNISA. Ethical approval of this research was 
obtained from the Higher Degrees Committee before research was conducted in the 
Eastern Zone of Tigray, Ethiopia and ethical procedures were followed.  
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on the research methodology and set of data that this study 
uses. Further, it explained how the research was done. Having presented the 
methodology and discussed the data used, the study reports the results/findings of 
this research and analyses the results in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of the exercises performed to answer the main 
research questions of the study, derived from both quantitative and qualitative data.  
Quantitative data was analysed and presented by descriptive statistical tools such as 
mean, percentage (%), standard deviation (SD) and frequency distribution (n). 
Likewise, qualitative data was compiled, organized, summarized and presented in a 
narrative form.  Furthermore, an overview of the kinds of tests performed and the 
numerical statistical tests performed using SPSS Version 2015 to answer the 
research questions are presented. The study also made an effort to triangulate both 
quantitative and qualitative data of relevant discussions. Finally, the chapter closes 
with a conclusion.  
 
5.2 Results of descriptive analysis 
 
Like any other development programme, it is understood that microcredit programme 
eligibility criteria, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of a certain sector 
of the community, determine participation in microfinance in general and the 
microcredit program in particular. Analysing these characteristics was very relevant 
to examine characteristics that influence both the participation in microcredit services 
and the impact of loan interest rates on the poor. Furthermore, the respondents were 
distributed among the sampled regulated and unregulated microcredit providers. In 
general, 471 respondents from different categories (clients, ex-clients and non-
clients) were interviewed, and the findings are presented and discussed below.    
5.2.1 Descriptive analysis of the continuous variables 
 
This sub section presents the result of the continuous variables of the sample 
distribution of the three groups (clients, ex-clients and non-clients) of the 
respondents. Demographic variables (sex, age, marital status, household type, 
family size, respondent’s area, and educational level), economic variables (income 
sources, dependency ratio and active economic forces, expenditures, coping of 
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shock and savings) and microcredit service eligibility criterion (objective of 
microcredit services, level of poverty, and ability to work) were discussed.  
5.2.1.1 Sample distribution of respondents 
 
Initially, the sample design of the microcredit providers was to have two samples 
from regulated and other two from unregulated microcredit providers. However, due 
to the establishment of one new regulated microcredit (AMFISC) and the 
transformation of another one from unregulated to regulated microcredit service 
(from ECSDC to LMFI), this was changed. Thus, the actual sample microcredit 
providers and household respondents of this study were four from regulated (DECSI, 
LMFI, AMFISC, and SCSC) and the other one from an unregulated microcredit 
providers (ERCS). All MCIs (regulated and unregulated) operating in the study area 
are included in this study. 
 
Therefore, Table 5.1 shows the total number of households interviewed for this 
research as 471 (clients, Ex-clients and non-clients), 57 per cent more than the initial 
sample design of the households, which improved the information source of this 
study. 
 
Table 5.1: Sample size of respondents 
Source: Data from fieldwork 2014 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.1, in terms of types of microcredit service providers 
(regulated and unregulated), area coverage (urban and urban) and category of 
respondents (clients, ex-clients, non-clients), this study was inclusive.  
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Regulated 
DECSI 35 40 75    100 63 163    
LMFI 0 0 0 50 0 50 
AMFISC 0 0 0 46 0 46 
SCSC 0 50 50 0 51 51 
Sub total 35 90 125 196 114 310 
 
Unregulated 
ERCS 40 0 40 61 0 61 
ECSDC 35 0 35 0 0 0 
Sub total 75 0 75 61 0 61 
Grand total 110 90 200 50 50 100 257 114 371 60 40 100 
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5.2.2 Respondents and MCIs area distribution 
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, 67% and 33% of respondents were from urban and rural 
areas respectively. Furthermore, Figure 5.1 shows that three of the sampled 
microcredit service providers (LMFI, AMFISC, and ERCS) were operating in urban 
areas, one (DECSI) was operating in both urban and rural while the other one 
(SCSC) was operating only in rural areas. Moreover, it can be calculated from Table 
5.1 that the sample representation of ex-clients and non-clients was 60 per cent from 
urban and 40 per cent from rural areas. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Respondents area distribution 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014. 
 
The study observed that the area distribution of the sampled microcredit providers 
was mainly due to their immediate objectives, influenced by their financial and 
managerial capacity. The dominant urban settings of most sampled microcredit 
providers limited the access of the rural population to credit markets, which affects 
the bargaining power of the rural poor.  
 
5.2.3 Sex composition of respondents 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the sex composition of respondents in each sample category. This 
came to 63 per cent of the total respondents being female while 37 per cent were 
male. Furthermore, the sex composition among the sample categories was; 100%, 
LMFI DECSI AMFISC SCSC ERCS Ex-clients Non-clients Percentage
Urban 50 100 46 0 61 51 9 67
Rural 0 63 0 51 0 21 19 33
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94%, 75%, 74%, 61% 45%, and 24% female from the total number of sample 
respondents of AMFISC, LMFI, ex-clients, ERCS, non-clients, DECSI, and SCSC 
respectively.  
  
 
Figure 5.2: Sex composition of respondents 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5.2 shows that the female representation varied significantly.  It 
can be concluded from the above survey data that the main target of all MCIs was 
female, except DECSI and SCSC, while AMFISC entirely targeted females. This was 
critical, especially when one considers the feminization of poverty theory.  The 100 
per cent targeting of females by AMFISC was mainly related to its objective to 
support poor women in Tigray, which was initiated and led by Women Tigray 
Association (WTA).  Moreover, it can also be observed that majority of the ex-clients 
and non-clients were female, which was supposed to be the main objective of MCIs. 
Therefore, the sex composition of dropouts should be monitored against the stated 
objective of MCIs.  
 
Moreover, it can also be deduced from the above survey findings that 45 per cent of 
the sample respondents from DECSI were female. This was also similar to the ratio 
of female DECSI microcredit clients reported during the study in the study areas. 
Thus, in order to keep its original objective, DECSI should monitor the adequate 
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participation of females in general and poor female households in particular in 
microcredit services. 
 
In addition, SCSC female sample respondents were the lowest (24%), which can 
indicate that the participation of female clients in the community led cooperatives 
was not good. This indicates that female clients could easily be marginalized in all 
MCIs except in the female led AMFISC MCIs. Therefore, in order to secure the 
participation of female clients in MCIs, female led MCIs should be strengthened in 
both urban and rural areas. 
 
In addition, it can also be deduced from Figure 5.2 that the highest number of ex-
client and non-client sampled respondents were female. This indicated that not only 
were female clients more vulnerable to dropout but there is also a sector of the poor 
community not yet addressed by any appropriate MCIs, which affects the main 
objective of the MCIs. This is in line with what Fazel H.A. (2000:8-13) and Amha W. 
(2010:33-35) stated in sections 2.9.1 and 1.6 respectively. 
 
Finally, the study suggested that sampled MCIs are often believed to be an ultimate 
source of empowerment for poor people in general and for the poorest women in 
particular. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily guarantee that all female clients of 
each microcredit loan were the poorest of the poor.  
5.2.4 Household Headship of respondents 
 
Figure 5.3 depicts that out of the total sampled household respondents, 52.2% were 
male household headship while female household headship were at 47.8%. Even 
though the ratio of male and female household headship of the sampled microcredit 
providers varied, all sampled microcredit providers made an effort to address all 
categories of household headships in the study areas. 
 
Similarly, it can be calculated from Figure 5.3 that the majority of DECSI (70%) and 
SCSC (74.5%) respondents were male-headed households while the majority of 
LMFI (74%), ERCS (72.1%), and AMFISC (63%) respondents were female-headed 
households. On the other side, the ratio of household headship of ex-clients and 
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non-clients were similar.  This indicates that there was a diversified household head 
structure of the respondents, which could help to assess the level of economic 
burden of the households.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Household Headship of respondents 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014. 
 
Moreover, as calculated from Figure 5.3, the total household headship of 
respondents were different from the national Figures in that this sample had higher 
female household headships and lower male household headships than the national 
Figure mentioned in section 3.4.2 of this study. This could be the result of a high 
number of female-headed households repatriating from Eritrea and a high number of 
male migrants from the study area. Due to the proximity to the Ethio-Eritrea border, 
and prone to border conflict, there is a high prevalence of youth migration as a 
common practices in the study area. 
 
Finally, it can be concluded from the survey findings above that it was important to 
examine the type of household headships for each sampled MCI because this was 
associated with the number of female clients addressed by each sampled MCI, and 
one of the major social objectives of all MCIs.  Thus, this study concluded and 
suggested that female and female headed households were not consistently 
addressed by the old and big MCIs (DECSI) and community led cooperatives 
(SCSC). Therefore, female led in general and female-headed households in 
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particular should be strengthened and supported through special credit modalities by 
MCIs. 
5.2.5 Age of respondents and their household 
 
Table 5.2 clearly revealed that the total dependency ratio of respondents was 71 per 
cent, which is 67 per cent for youth, and 4 per cent for the elderly.  
 
Furthermore, Table 5.2 illustrates that the respondent’s household total child 
dependency ratio was higher while the total aged dependency ratio and the average 
dependency ratio was lower than the national dependency ratio, mentioned in 
section 3.4.2 of this study.  
 
Additionally, Table 5.2 shows that the comparison of total dependency ratios of the 
sampled respondents ranges from 63 per cent of ex-clients to up to 80 per cent of 
ERCS respondents.  This Figure indicates that households with a high dependency 
ration should design a mechanism to diversify their income through increasing the 
number of HHs income earners and/or looking for secondary jobs and microcredit 
engagement of other family members. From a microcredit service objective point of 
view, all MCIs should also consider the dependency ratio of their clients in general 
and the poor households in particular. Therefore, the household profile of their 
clients matters in order to manage the microcredit service effectively and efficiently; 
this could increase the success of both the borrowers and the microcredit providers.  
  
During the key informant interviews with the credit officers, this study found that 
there was no complete and standardized client registration format in all sampled 
microcredit providers, which could help the MCIs classify and monitor their client’s 
dependency ratio and its impact in managing IGA.   
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   Table 5.2: Age of the respondent’s household 
 
  
MFI 
Age 
0-5 6-14 15-30 31-64  65 and above 
LMFI 
 
N=50 
Count 14 29 38 32 6 
Mean 1.14 1.79 1.79 1.13 1.00 
Std. Deviation .363 .819 1.044 .336 .000 
Sum 16 52 68 36 6 
Child dependency ratio 65 
Aged dependency ratio 6 
Total dependency ratio 71 
DECSI 
 
N=163 
Count 69 122 123 140 15 
Mean 1.29 2.03 2.02 1.66 1.20 
Std. Deviation .457 1.128 1.184 .745 .414 
Sum 89 248 249 233 18 
Child dependency ratio 70 
Aged dependency ratio 4 
Total dependency ratio 74 
AMFISC 
 
N=46 
Count 11 37 36 41 3 
Mean 1.09 1.92 1.94 1.46 1.00 
Std. Deviation .302 .795 .984 .505 .000 
Sum 12 71 70 60 3 
Child dependency ratio 64 
Aged dependency ratio 2 
Total dependency ratio 66 
ERCS 
 
N=61 
Count 21 39 48 49 10 
Mean 1.43 2.00 1.90 1.22 1.30 
Std. Deviation .598 .973 1.276 .422 .483 
Sum 30 78 91 60 13 
Child dependency ratio 71.5 
Aged dependency ratio 8.6 
Total dependency ratio 80 
SCSC 
 
N=51 
Count 11 45 48 46 1 
Mean 1.09 2.04 1.69 1.65 1.00 
Std. Deviation .302 .737 .689 .604 . 
Sum 12 92 81 76 1 
Child dependency ratio 66 
Aged dependency ratio 0.6 
Dependency ratio 67 
Ex-clients 
 
N=78 
N=78 20 54 61 60 6 
Mean 1.25 1.83 1.92 1.52 1.17 
Std. Deviation .444 .863 1.069 .504 .408 
Sum 25 99 117 91 7 
Child dependency ratio 60 
Aged dependency ratio 3 
Dependency ratio 63 
Non-clients 
 
N=22 
Count 7 21 21 26 3 
Mean 1.71 2.19 2.05 1.46 1.00 
Std. Deviation .756 1.167 1.161 .508 .000 
Sum 12 46 43 38 3 
Child dependency ratio 71.6 
Aged dependency ratio 3.7 
Dependency ratio 75 
Total 
 
N=471 
Count 153 347 375 394 44 
Mean 1.28 1.98 1.92 1.51 1.16 
Std. Deviation .479 .970 1.090 .619 .370 
Sum 196 686 719 594 51 
Percentage of sum 8.7 30.5 32 26 2 
Total Child dependency ratio 67 
Total Aged dependency ratio 4 
Average Dependency ratio 71 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
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5.2.6 Family size of households  
 
For the poor, family size has its own advantages and disadvantages in managing 
microcredit. This data enables us to evaluate the dependency rate and the capacity 
to use multiple loans to engage capable members of the family to enhance and 
diversify the family’s income. 
 
Table 5.3 reveals that the average family size of the total respondents was 4.9 which 
was 4.6 for urban and 5.4 for rural respondents, higher than Figures shared at the 
national level. 
 
Table 5.3: Family size of households 
 Family size    
MFI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total Sum Mean 
LMFI 8 4 12 10 8 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 50 193 3.9 
DECSI 5 4 27 33 22 27 22 13 5 4 0 1 0 163 853 5 
AMFISC 0 6 7 13 5 4 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 46 217 4.7 
SCSC 1 1 4 10 16 8 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 51 273 4.5 
ERCS 5 9 7 9 11 9 7 3 0 0 1 0 0 61 263 5.2 
Ex-clients 5 7 5 12 16 11 11 4 0 1 0 0 0 72 347 4.8 
Non-clients 3 2 3 4 3 6 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 28 140 5 
Total 27 33 65 91 81 68 60 29 7 7 1 1 1 471 2286 4.9 
% of total 6 7 14 19 17 14 13 6 1 1 0 0 0 100  
Area distribution of family size of respondent households 
Urban 18 20 42 64 56 48 45 18 2 1 1 1 1 317 1455 4.6 
Rural 9 13 23 27 25 20 15 11 5 6 0 0 0 154 831 5.4 
Total 27 33 65 91 81 68 60 29 7 7 1 1 1 471 2286 4.9 
% of total 6 7 14 19 17 14 13 6 1 1 0 0 0 100  
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
5.2.7 Marital status of respondents 
    
According the Ethiopia Mini Demographic and Health Survey, twenty-six per cent of 
women aged 15-49 have never married, 60 per cent are currently married, 4 per cent 
are living together with a man, and 11 per cent are divorced, separated, or widowed. 
The low proportion (less than 1 per cent) of women age 45-49 who have never been 
married indicates that marriage is nearly universal in Ethiopia. Over the past fifteen 
years, the proportion of Ethiopian women who have never married has not changed 
much (CSA 2014:14-25).  
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Figure 5.4 presents the per cent distribution of respondent’s marital status, according 
to sampled MCIs. The term ‘married’ refers to legal or formal marriage, while the 
term ‘single’ designates one who has never married. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.4; 49%, 27%, 15%, and 10% of respondents were married, 
divorced, widows, and single respectively. This research finding indicates that the 
per cent of married respondents was less while the percentage of divorced, 
widowed, and single (never married) was higher than the national data.  
 
Figure 5.4: Marital Status of Respondents 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014. 
 
Furthermore, it can be calculated from Figure 5.4 that out of the total of 49% of 
married respondents, 45% of the respondents were from DECSI. During the 
household interview, the researcher observed that this was mainly due to the social 
collateral ‘group based’ lending modality of DECSI that discourages others.   
 
Even though each sampled microcredit providers fairly addresses all marital status of 
respondents, the highest ratio of widowed and divorced were from LMFI, AMFISC, 
ERCS, and ex-clients. This was mainly due to the individual loan modality of the 
microcredit providers that avoids group lending and encourages individual efforts 
and responsibilities. 
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5.2.8 Educational level of respondents and their family 
 
This section deals with the educational level of respondents and their household 
members, which is one of the key factors of individual opportunities, attitudes, and 
economic and social status. Even though educational attainment is not the major 
factor, some studies have consistently shown that educational attainment has an 
effect on managing microcredit income generating activities.  
 
The current system of formal education in Ethiopia is based on a three-tiered system 
with eight years of primary education, followed by four years of secondary education, 
and three to seven years of tertiary education. 
 
a) Educational level of respondents 
 
As shown in Table 5.4, 42 per cent of the total respondents (42 per cent from each 
from clients and non-clients) were illiterate, 26 per cent can only read and write, and 
18 per cent of them were in grades 1-4. 
 
Table 5.4: Educational level of respondents 
 
MCIs 1-4 5-8 9-12 Diploma Only read and write Illiterate Total 
LMFI 9 5 2 1 13 20 50 
DECSI 33 18 4 0 37 71 163 
AMFISC 9 3 1 0 12 21 46 
ERCS 13 12 3 0 15 18 61 
SCSC 4 3 0 0 18 26 51 
Ex-clients 8 10 2 1 21 30 72 
Non-clients 10 1 0 0 5 12 28 
Total 86 52 12 2 121 198 471 
Percentage 18 11 3 0 26 42 100% 
Male 31 33 8 2 65 37 176 
Female 55 19 4 0 56 161 295 
Total 86 52 12 2 121 198 471 
Percentage 18 11 2.6 0.4 26 42 100% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, it can be calculated from Table 5.4 above that 40%, 44%, 46%, 30%, 
51%, 42%, and 43% of LMFI, DECSI, AMFISC, ERCS, SCSC, Ex-clients, and non-
client respondents were illiterate. Additionally, as can be calculated from Table 5.4 
that 55% of all females were illiterate and this represents 34% of all who were 
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sampled.  Generally, the study observed that 42% of the total respondents were 
illiterate. This finding was not surprising as the microcredit schemes are directed 
toward mainly the poor families where educational level was not one of the selection 
criteria. 
 
b) Educational level of respondent’s family member 
 
From Table 5.5, it can be calculated that 85.4% were primary, secondary, and 
above, which is 2.96 mean ratio of the respondents. Even though the ratio seems 
relatively good, most of the educated mentioned below were from the urban area. 
 
Even though the educational level was not a criteria of MCIs, this study observed 
that the academic level of the respondents’ family members was important in 
bridging the academic gap of the borrower households in assisting with technical 
knowledge of recording and market information that could contribute to the success 
of the credit management of their family.   
 
Table 5.5: Educational level of respondent’s family members 
 
 
MFI 
Variables 
 
 KG 
 
1-4 
 
5-8 
 
9-12 
 
Diploma 
 1st 
 Degree 
Above  
1st degree 
Can read  
& write 
Illiterate 
LMFI  
N=50 
Mean .18 .50 .62 .94 .06 .06 .04 .06 .16 
Sum 9 25 31 47 3 3 2 3 8 
% of  Sum 13.8% 7.7% 6.5% 9.7% 5.3% 6.5% 40.0% 17.6% 5.1% 
DECSI 
 
N=163 
Mean .20 .72 .90 1.02 .18 .11 .00 .02 .23 
Sum 33 118 147 166 30 18 0 3 37 
% of Sum 50.8% 36.5% 30.8% 34.2% 52.6% 39.1% 0.0% 17.6% 23.7% 
AMFISC 
 
N=46 
Mean .17 .72 1.22 1.15 .13 .17 .04 .07 .04 
Sum 8 33 56 53 6 8 2 3 2 
% of  Sum 12.3% 10.2% 11.7% 10.9% 10.5% 17.4% 40.0% 17.6% 1.3% 
ERCS 
 
N=61 
Mean .10 .87 .98 .95 .07 .03 .02 .07 .70 
Sum 6 53 60 58 4 2 1 4 43 
% of Sum 9.2% 16.4% 12.6% 11.9% 7.0% 4.3% 20.0% 23.5% 27.6% 
SCSC 
 
N=51 
Mean .00 .71 1.63 1.25 .08 .04 .00 .00 .49 
Sum 0 36 83 64 4 2 0 0 25 
% of  Sum 0.0% 11.1% 17.4% 13.2% 7.0% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 16.0% 
Ex-clients 
N=72 
Mean .07 .60 1.07 1.00 .08 .17 .00 .06 .39 
Sum 5 43 77 72 6 12 0 4 28 
% of Sum 7.7% 13.3% 16.1% 14.8% 10.5% 26.1% 0.0% 23.5% 17.9% 
Non-clients 
 
N=28 
Mean .14 .54 .86 .93 .14 .04 .00 .00 .46 
Sum 4 15 24 26 4 1 0 0 13 
% of  Sum 6.2% 4.6% 5.0% 5.3% 7.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 
Total 
N=471 
Mean .14 .69 1.01 1.03 .12 .10 .01 .04 .33 
Sum 65 323 478 486 57 46 5 17 156 
% of total sum  4% 19.8% 29.3% 29.7% 3.5% 2.8% 0.3% 1% 9.6% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014. 
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5.2.9 Religious affiliation of respondents 
 
In Ethiopia, the religion composition is Orthodox 43.5%, Muslim 33.9%, Protestant 
18.6%, traditional 2.6%, Catholic 0.7%, and other 0.7% (2007 Census). Whereas, in 
Tigray Regional state of Ethiopia Orthodox 95.5%, Muslim 4%, Protestant 0.1%, and 
Catholic 0.4% (CSA 2007:14-25). 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Religious affiliation of respondents 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014. 
 
From Figure 5.5 it can be clearly seen that 99.4 per cent of the respondents were 
Orthodox. Even though this is mainly due to the dominant proportion of the Orthodox 
population in the study area, this was not proportional compared with the national 
and regional statistics mentioned above.  Religious affiliation can affect engagement 
of the Muslim community in acquiring interest rate based loans, which is not 
significant in the study area. 
 
 5.3 Income status of the respondent’s household 
 
This section deals with the number of income earners in the respondent households 
from primary, secondary and occasional incomes that could affect their livelihoods 
and help to assess their economic status. 
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5.3.1 Income earners of households 
 
Table 5.6 shows 60.3%, 32.1%, 5.7%, and 1.9% of the respondent’s households 
have one, two, three, and four income earners in their respective households.  
 
Table 5.6: Number of income earners in respondent’s households 
Variables 
 
MFI 
Number of income earners in HH  
Total 1 2 3 4 
 
LMFI 
Count 37 10 0 3 50 
% of Total 7.9% 2.1% 0.0% 0.6% 10.6% 
DECSI 
Count 106 50 6 1 163 
% of Total 22.5% 10.6% 1.3% 0.2% 34.6% 
AMFISC 
Count 25 15 5 1 46 
% of Total 5.3% 3.2% 1.1% 0.2% 9.8% 
ERCS 
Count 45 14 1 1 61 
% of Total 9.6% 3.0% 0.2% 0.2% 13.0% 
SCSC 
Count 16 28 6 1 51 
% of Total 3.4% 5.9% 1.3% 0.2% 10.8% 
Ex-clients 
Count 34 29 7 2 72 
% of Total 7.2% 6.2% 1.5% 0.4% 15.3% 
Non-clients 
Count 21 5 2 0 28 
% of Total 4.5% 1.1% 0.4% 0.0% 5.9% 
Total 
Count 284 151 27 9 471 
% of Total 60.3% 32.1% 5.7% 1.9% 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, Table 5.6 shows proportionally that the highest respondents with two 
income earners were from SCSC (28 respondents), which represent 55% of their 
respondents. The study also observed during the household interview that the 
reason why the majority of SCSC respondents had more than one income earner 
was because of their involvement in both farming and non-farming income 
generating activities. Additionally, it can also be deduced from Table 5.6 above that 
majority of non-clients (55%) respondents were with one income earner in their 
respective households.  
 
Additionally, this study observed from the household interviews that a high number of 
income earners in the household reduce the dependency ratio at the household 
level, which was very useful for the household livelihood. The size of the household 
was assumed to influence the number of income earners in the households but it 
was not necessarily true for all households. This could be affected by different 
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internal and external factors, such as capacity (financial, skill, age, and exposure), 
access to ‘fair’ credit, market, and other factors.  
 
Following the above survey findings, the study also made an effort to test the 
correlation of the number of income earners in HHs with relevant variables to check 
whether those variables are related.  
 
Table 5.7: Correlations of number of income earners with family size 
Correlations of number of income earners with family size 
 Number of total 
earners in HH 
 
Family size 
Number of income earners in 
HH 
Pearson Correlation 1 .354** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 471 471 
Family size 
Pearson Correlation .354** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 471 471 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
It is clear from the above correlation analysis of this study that the number of income 
earners in the HHs is positively correlated with the family size of HHs, which means 
that when the family size increased, the number of income earners in the HHs 
increased and vice versa. Furthermore, the study also assessed the correlation of 
number of income earners in HHs with the respondent’s category, being a 
microcredit client or not.  
 
Table 5.8: Correlations of number of income earners with respondent’s category 
 
Correlations of number of income earners with respondent’s category 
 Number of total 
earners in HH 
Respondent's 
Category 
Number of income earners in 
HH 
           Pearson Correlation 1 .043 
           Sig. (2-tailed)  .348 
           N 471 471 
Respondent's Category 
          Pearson Correlation .043 1 
          Sig. (2-tailed) .348  
          N 471 471 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
It can be concluded from the correlations reported above that the number of income 
earners in the HHs is positively correlated with the microcredit membership status of 
households.  Thus, the number of family income earners was influenced by whether 
or not the HHs was engaged with microcredit services.  
    
 
  
143 
Moreover, this study also assessed the relationship of the number of income earners 
with the HHs school dropout. It is clear from the correlation result below that the 
number of income earners in the HHs is positively correlated with the number of 
school dropouts in HHs. This indicates that, regardless of the reason of school 
dropout, those who discontinue school were involved in the income earning of the 
households.  
 
Table 5.9: Correlations of number of earners with school dropout 
 
Correlations of number of earners with school dropout 
 Number of total 
earners in HH 
Number of family 
members school dropout 
Number of income earners in 
HH 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .143
* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .044 
N 471 198 
Number of family members 
school dropout 
Pearson 
Correlation .143
* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .044  
N 198 198 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The study made an effort to assess the sex distribution of income earners in the 
households. Thus, it can be seen from Table 5.10 below that the total mean of the 
sex distribution of income earners in the households for male and female was 1.13 
and 1.07 respectively.  Even though, the male mean of income earners was slightly 
higher than the female, it can be also calculated from the total sum of the Table 5.10 
below that the total number of female income earners was higher (55.5%) than the 
male (44.5%). This indicated that relatively higher number of female income earners 
were in the respondent’s households. It seems that many of the wives of those men 
who were beneficiaries of the loan were also earning some income from other 
sources.  
 
Furthermore, it is also clear from Table 5.10 that the highest per cent (41.9%) of 
male income earners was from DECSI. This is related not only to the majority 
number of sampled respondents of DECSI who were male (54.6%) but also related 
to the male children of the households who were encouraged to get involved in IGAs. 
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Table 5.10: Sex distribution of income earners in respondent’s households 
 
 
Variables 
Respondents  
LMFI DECSI AMFISC ERCS SCSC Ex-clients Non-clients Total  
 
 
Male 
 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Mean 1.29 1.07 1.20 1.10 1.20 1.14 1.12 1.13 
Sum 18 131 24 23 48 50 19 313 
% of Total Sum 5.8% 41.9% 7.7% 7.3% 15.3% 16.0% 6.1% 100.0% 
 
 
Female 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Mean 1.04 1.01 1.14 1.08 1.07 1.18 1.00 1.07 
Sum 51 97 50 57 46 71 18 390 
% of Total Sum 13.1% 24.9% 12.8% 14.6% 11.8% 18.2% 4.6% 100.0% 
 
 
Total 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
Mean 1.38 1.40 1.61 1.31 1.84 1.68 1.32 1.49 
Sum 69 228 74 80 94 121 37 703 
% of Total Sum 9.8% 32.4% 10.5% 11.4% 13.4% 17.2% 5.3% 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014  
 
5.3.1.1 Income earning pattern /sources of households 
 
This section deals with the earning patterns or sources and amount of income of the 
respondent households on which their livelihood depends, factors that could help to 
understand both the sustainability and the level of vulnerability of their incomes.  
 
According to the Ethiopia Mini Demographic and Health Survey, the overall Gini 
Coefficient for Ethiopia is 0.44. It is higher in rural areas (0.31) than in urban areas 
(0.20), indicating a more unequal distribution of wealth in the rural population than in 
the urban population (CSA 2014:14-25).  
 
a) Household’s Income from primary job  
 
A primary job refers to the main income from a permanent source or occupation, on 
which the individual or household livelihood depends. Due to the absence of records 
and the variance of the permanent activities the respondents engaged in, the 
researcher tried to calculate the household’s income using the simplest way, which 
the respondents could respond to. That is why some gaps exist in the income pattern 
or variables shown on the Table 5:11. 
 
From Table 5.11, it can be calculated that 58%, 6%, 12.7% and 23.4% of the 
respondent’s primary income was earned on a daily, weekly, monthly, and annual 
basis respectively. The study observed during the household interview that the daily, 
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weekly, and monthly earning sources of the respondents were mainly from non-
farming mini-trade activities while the annual primary job earnings were from rural 
agriculture activities. This indicated that 76.7% of the respondent’s household 
primary income depended mainly on mini business activities, a relatively high risk 
and vulnerable means of income. 
 
Table 5.11 also shows that the gap between minimum and maximum income from 
primary jobs or sources of respondent’s household income was high. This indicated 
that there were high-income gaps among the respondent’s households that could 
affect the expenditures and lives of the respondent’s households. 
 
It can also be calculated from Table 5.11, that 58% of the respondents were at the 
poverty line and 18.7% were above the poverty line; 23.4% of those below the 
poverty line those were earning below two USD daily. Those respondents at the 
poverty line (58%) who were earning equivalent to two USD daily were in a 
vulnerable position; the sustainability of their household depends on their future 
income trends. The researcher suggests that those respondents above the poverty 
line who can relatively afford a market based loan interest rates could mislead the 
result of the evaluation of the effect of the loan interest rate on the poor, the purpose  
of this study. 
 
Additionally, it can also be calculated from Table 5.11 that the cumulative result of 
the   households of each category below the poverty line from daily, weekly, monthly 
and yearly primary income was 100% 92%, 89%, 76%, 57%, 21.4%, and 11.5% from 
SCSC, DECSI, AMFISC, LMFI, Ex-clients, Non-clients, and ERCS households 
respectively. This indicates that rural households who depend mainly on farming in 
general and SCSC and DECSI households in particular were more poor and 
vulnerable than the urban households. This is in line with the Ethiopia Mini 
Demographic and Health Survey (CSA 2014:14-25) as stated above. Thus, 
integration of farming with non-farming activities will be helpful for the rural 
households.   
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Table 5.11: Household’s income from primary job (Birr) 
 
 
Variables 
Respondents  
LMFI DECSI AMFISC ERCS SCSC Ex-
clients 
Non-clients Total  
 
 
Daily 
 
Count 38 95 38 54 8 31 9 273 
Minimum 20.00 15.00 10.00 15.00 30.00 5.00 30.00 5.00 
Maximum 300.00 200.00 100.00 200.00 60.00 150.00 150.00 300.00 
Mean 41.00 40.50 33.00 51.00 44.00 65.00 63.00 45.00 
% of count  8.0% 
 
 
Weekly 
Count 6 5 3 0 0 10 4 28 
Minimum 200.00 200.00 300.00 0 0 200.00 $350.00 200.00 
Maximum 1,000.00 5,000.00 7,000.00 0 0 500.00 $500.00 7,000.00 
Mean 516.00 1,260.00 3,100.00 0 0 335.00 438.00 850.00 
% of count  6.0% 
 
 
Monthly 
Count 6 8 5 2 0 30 9 60 
Minimum 500.00 2,100.00 300.00 400.00 0 300.00 300.00 300.00 
Maximum 5,000.00 15,000.00 2,100.00 500.00 0 7,000.00 5,000.00 15,000.00 
Mean 2,600.00 6,387.00 980.00 450.00 0 1,103.00 2,344.00 2,112.00 
% of count  12.7% 
 
 
Annual 
Count 0 55 0 5 43 1 6 110 
Minimum 0 1,000.00 0 2,000.00 5,000.00 3,500.00 5,000.00 1,000.00 
Maximum 0 40,000.00 0 11,500.00 20,000.00 3,500.00 10,500.00 40,000.00 
Mean 0 7,060.00 0 7,780.00 8,883.00 3,500.00 6,833.00 7,762.00 
% of count  23.4% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Moreover, the researcher observed during the household interviews that, due to the 
type of jobs they engaged in, the incomes from primary sources of the respondents 
varied. Therefore, each microcredit borrower should look for income activities that 
encourage more participation of their household members in all possible ways (daily, 
weekly, monthly, and annually).  Thus, increased income sources that are making 
profit not only feed their families but also serve to maintain and scale up the IGAs 
they are engaged in.  
 
Absence of a record keeping skills and recording culture made it difficult to get the 
exact periodical earning amounts of the respondent’s households, which is poor 
financial portfolio of the clients. 
 
b) Household’s income from secondary job and occasional income  
 
A secondary job refers to the secondary income source or occupation to diversify 
incomes and complement the individual or household livelihoods.  
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Table 5.12: Household’s income and occupation from secondary job 
 
MFI 
Secondary job Occasional income 
Birr Birr 
10
0 
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0-
30
0 
40
0-
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0 
80
0-
11
00
 
40
00
-5
00
0 
80
00
 
To
ta
l 
50
-5
00
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00
-5
00
0 
70
00
-1
00
00
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00
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14
00
0 
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l 
LMFI 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
DECSI 3 3 1 3 3 1 14 1 1 0 0 2 
AMFISC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SCSC 0 1 2 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 3 4 
ERCS 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 
Non-clients 0 3 0 1 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 5 7 4 5 3 1 25 2 2 2 3 9 
Percentage from the total respondents (471) 5%  2% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
 
From Table 5.12, it can be seen that 5%, and 2% of the respondents households 
benefited from secondary and occasional incomes respectively. 56% of the 
secondary job income earners were from DECSI respondent’s households. This was 
mainly due to the fact that most DECSI’s client’s households were from rural areas 
whose income source was from both farming and non-farming activities and further, 
encouraged their children to engage in IGAs.   
 
c) Sex composition of primary income earners 
  
Figure 5.6 indicates that the sex composition of primary income earners were 51% 
and 49% female and male respectively. This is similar with the findings of Table 5.10 
above, which is 55.5% female of the total income earners.  There was more than one 
female job earner in some respondent households and females managed most of 
the petty trade. Thus, females were significantly contributing to the main income of 
the respondent households, which their lives depend on.  
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Figure 5.6: Households’ sex composition of primary income earners 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
5.3.1.2 Expenditures of sample HHs in last month (January) 
 
This section deals with the expenditures of sample households that helps to 
compare their income with the consumption and investments that affect their future 
livelihoods.  
 
Table 5.13 shows that major expenditures included food related expenditure (79%) 
followed by 8% and 5% for house rent and firewood. Moreover, Birr 100.00 was the 
minimum while Birr 9,000.00 was the maximum food related expenditure and the 
mean was Birr 939.09, the standard deviation (SD0 was Birr 1,024.76). This 
indicated that the expenditures of respondents varied according to their income, 
which is in line with what Nii K. Sowa C., and Accra D. (2002:8) said in section 2.9.6 
above. Similarly, expenditure gaps of the respondent’s households are also in line 
with the income gaps of the respondent’s households discussed on Table 5.11. 
 
It is clear from Table 5.13 that the food related expenditure was the major 
expenditure (79%) of the most respondents. This is also in line with what Nii K. 
Sowa, CEPA, and Accra (2002:8) talked about in section 2.9.6. 
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 Table 5.13: Summary of sample HH expenditures in last month (January) (in 
Birr) 
 
Variables 
 
MFI 
 
Food   
 
Firewood 
 
Education 
Resident 
house rent  
business 
house rent  
Social  
occasion 
 
Medical  
other  
expense  
LMFI 
 
 
N=50 
 
Min 300.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 2,000.00 700.00 705.00 1,000.00 2,500.00 200.00 400.00 200.00 
Mean 848.00 104.40 34.40 248.60 119.60 16.60 14.20 4.00 
SD 452.65 118.90  112.01 259.65 399.00 48.90 64.20 28.30 
Sum 42,400.00 5,220.00 1,720.00 12,430.00 5,980.00 830.00 710.00 200.00 
DECSI 
 
 
N=163 
 
Min 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 9,000.00 500.00 650.00 3,200.00 1,400.00 500.00 100.00 0 
Mean 1,228.04 39.60 12.88 97.98 57.79 7.36 0.92 0.00 
SD 1,545.32 58.10 83.18 283.83 187.80 49.14 8.70 0.00 
Sum 200,170.00 6,455.00 2,100.00 15,970.00 9,420.00 1,200.00 150.00 0.00 
AMFISC 
 
 
N=46 
Min 105.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 3,000.00 500.00 360.00 600.00 400.00 400.00 0 0 
Mean 855.54 81.76 20.33 146.09 15.65 30.00 0.00 0.00 
SD 575.80 109.75 69.40 167.20 66.10 74.70 0.00 0.00 
Sum 39,355.00 3,761.00 935.00 6,720.00 720.00 1,380.00 0.00 0.00 
ERCS 
 
 
N=61 
Min 150.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 1,500.00 400.00 400.00 500.00 30.00 300.00 180.00 100.00 
Mean 600.98 51.07 31.89 34.75 0.49 75.51 11.48 7.87 
SD 294.20 80.14 73.20 78.00 3.85 70.50 30.65 24.60 
Sum 36,660.00 3,115.00 1,945.00 2,120.00 30.00 4,606.00 700.00 480.00 
SCSC 
 
 
N=51 
Min 200.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 6,000.00 230.00 200.00 0 0 300.00 50.00 0 
Mean 985.20 58.63 4.71 0.00 0.00 63.33 0.98 0.00 
SD 780.34 71.73 28.45 0.00 0.00 86.23 7.00 0.00 
Sum 50,245.00 2,990.00 240.00 0.00 0.00 3,230.00 50.00 0.00 
Ex-clients 
 
 
N=72 
Min 100.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 2,500.00 1,000.00 250.00 1,100.00 600.00 200.00 400.00 0 
Mean 730.28 88.75 14.72 79.58 23.33 26.39 13.33 0.00 
SD 439.87 141.10 45.00 169.30 106.16 49.88 54.67 0.00 
Sum 52,580.00 6,390.00 1,060.00 5,730.00 1,680.00 1,900.00 960.00 0.00 
Non-clients 
 
 
N=28 
Min 200.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 2,100.00 400.00 0 700 400 100 1,500 0 
Mean 746.43 49.29 0.00 64.64 25.00 3.57 53.57 0.00 
SD 500.54 97.56 0.00 160.91 87.67 18.90 283.47 0.00 
Sum 20,900.00 1,380.00 0.00 1,810.00 700.00 100.00 1,500.00 0.00 
Total 
 
 
N=471 
Min 100.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 9,000.00 1,000.00 705.00 3,200.00 2,500.00 500.00 1,500.00 200.00 
Mean 939.09 62.23 16.99 95.07 39.34 28.12 8.64 1.44 
SD 1,024.76 9.18 73.00 220.00 180.50 63.75 76.20 13.00 
Sum 442,310.00 29,311.00 8,000.00 44,780.00 18,530.00 13,246.00 4,070.00 680.00 
% of sum 79 5 1 8 3 2 1 0.1 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
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Following the above survey findings, the study also made an effort to test the 
correlation of household food expenditures with household size and number of 
income earners in the household.  
 
Table 5.14: Correlations of HHs food expenditure with family size 
 
Correlations of HHs food expenditure with family size 
 HH food expense 
in last month 
 
Family size 
HH food expense in last month 
Pearson Correlation 1 .112* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .015 
N 471 471 
Family  size 
Pearson Correlation .112* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .015  
N 471 471 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
It can be seen in the Table 5.14 correlations that food expenditures in the HHs is 
positively correlated with the family size of the households, which means food 
expenditure was influenced by family size of the HHs.  However, family size is not 
the only factor that determines the food expenditure of HHs; small family size can 
also spend more food expenditure than high family size. 
 
Table 5.15: Correlations of HHs food expense with number of income earners 
in the HHs 
Correlations of HHs food expense with number of income earners in the HHs 
 HH food expense 
in last month 
Number of total 
earners in HH 
HH food expense in last month 
Pearson Correlation 1 .090 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .050 
N 471 471 
Number of income earners in HH 
Pearson Correlation .090 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .050  
N 471 471 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
It can also be concluded from the Table 5.15 correlations that the food expenditure in 
the HHs is positively correlated with the number of income earners in the HHs, thus 
the food expenditure was influenced by the number of income earners in the HHs.  
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However, the number of income earners is not the only factor that determines the 
food expenditure of HHs. A high number of income earners may be earning less 
income than a smaller number of income earners. That is why not only the number 
but also the amount of income earning in the HHs matters.  
5.3.1.3 Household coping mechanism with shock and stress 
 
Even though risk is part of life, poor households in particular face risks that others 
don’t face.  This section deals with the households who faced shocks, their coping 
mechanisms and their response mechanisms in case of urgent financial needs.  
 
a. Households who faced shock and stress (last year) 
 
From Figure 5.7, it can be calculated that 67.3 per cent of the total respondent 
households had faced shocks and stresses of different types and to different extents 
last year. Thus, the majority of the households were vulnerable to different types of 
shocks, which could affect both the borrowers and the MCIs.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: HHs facing shock and stress (last year) 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, it can be also calculated from Figure 5:7 that 81%, 80%, 79%, 78%, 
64%, 59%, and 6% households who had faced shocks/stress were from ex-clients, 
DECSI, non-clients, AMFISC, LMFI, ERCS, and SCSC, respectively.   
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It can be noted from the above data that both clients and non-clients were affected 
by shocks and stress. This indicated that there was no significant difference between 
clients and non-clients on shock vulnerability and mitigating risks. 
 
 The researcher also observed the main reason for less SCSC households who had 
faced shocks was due to their family engagement with both farming and non-farming 
activities that enabled them to diversify their income to a greater extent than those 
who depend on only non-farming activities. However, this may not hold true for all 
potential shocks and stress. In managing microcredit services efficiently and 
effectively, a proper understanding of the borrowers’ level of vulnerability matters.  
 
b. Type of shocks and stress households faced last year 
 
As shown in Table 5.16, the increment of food price increases (42%), business 
failure (27%), and natural disaster (17%) were the major types of shocks and stress 
the majority of the respondents’ households faced last year.  
 
Furthermore, from Table 5.16 below it can be concluded that poor economic capacity 
causing economic shocks was the main factor of their vulnerability for different types 
of shocks and stress of the households. 
 
Table 5.16: Type of shocks and stress households faced last 
year 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Deviation Sum % of 
sum 
Acute increment of food price 317 .73 .444 232 42 
Business failure 317 .48 .500 151 27 
Theft 317 .01 .097 3 1 
Health problem 317 .06 .232 18 3 
Death of HH head 317 .01 .097 3 1 
Death of breadwinner 316 .07 .594 23 6 
Marriage breakup 317 .00 .056 1 0 
Natural disaster 316 .30 .459 95 17 
Other shocks 317 .08 .579 26 5 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Moreover, during the household interviews, the researcher observed that some 
households suffered multiple types of stress (economic, heath problems and others). 
In addition, during the household interview the researcher also observed that an 
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inadequate economic benefit from microcredit service was one of the factors that 
contributed to the household’s economic stress.  Thus, loan repayment and re-
investment of the microcredit clients was affected and some of them were forced to 
get a fresh loan in order to pay the old loan. Therefore, pro-poor microcredit service 
devices should be designed for shock or drought prone households.  
 
c. Household’s coping mechanisms 
 
It is clear from Table 5.17 that borrowing from microcredit (30%), borrowing from 
relatives (22%), withdrawing savings (17%), food aid support (15%), and labour 
wage (11%) was the major coping mechanisms applied by clients’, ex-clients’, and 
non-clients’ households. 
 
Furthermore, from Table 5.17 it is clear that the importance of microloan and micro-
savings was helpful for some households, not only to run their mini-trade, but also to 
respond to poverty induced shocks and stresses. The important issue is to identify 
those households who withdrew savings as a coping mechanism.   
 
The researcher made an effort during the FGDs to identify the households who 
withdrew savings as a coping mechanism.  The majority of the FGD participants’ 
opinion was; “those HHs who had savings were relatively better off than others. Like 
those who were living in their own house and running better income generating 
activities”. Therefore, microcredit providers should envision appropriate microcredit 
modalities for the poorest of the poor who are permanently struggling to survive. 
 
 Moreover, as also shown from Table 5.17, 30% of the coping mechanisms applied 
by the client households included borrowing from microcredit; this included getting 
fresh loans not only to mitigate the consequence of the shock but also for loan 
repayment and continuation of their economic activities as the shock had the 
potential to affect reinvestment and their future lives. On the other hand, borrowing 
from microcredit for some ex-client households was not only to mitigate the shock-
induced problems; the shock was what propelled them to join microcredit services in 
the first place. Therefore, the shock induced pull factor of microcredit devices should 
be appropriate for the shock-affected households. 
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The researcher understood during the household interviews that borrowing from 
moneylenders was not an option as a coping mechanism for both poor clients and 
non-client poor households. Rather, it was used by relatively better off households, 
who could afford the extremely high loan interest rate charged and its 
consequences. 
 
Table 5.17: Household coping mechanisms  
 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Deviation Sum % of sum 
Withdrawing savings 313 .28 .450 88 17 
Labour wage 314 .18 .386 57 11 
Selling jewellery 314 .00 .056 1 0 
Reducing no of meals 314 .01 .080 2 0 
Sending children to beg 314 .00 .056 1 0 
Sending children to work 314 .02 .148 7 1 
Selling firewood 314 .01 .080 2 0 
 Looking for food aid 313 .25 .435 79 15 
Borrowing from relatives/friends 313 .36 .481 113 22 
 Borrowing from microcredit 313 .50 .734 156 30 
 Borrowing from money lenders 313 .02 .148 7 1 
Other HH coping mechanisms  313 .04 .296 14 3 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
 
Additionally, the researcher suggested that assessing the coping mechanisms 
applied by the household matters, not only to understand their capacity to respond 
and recover but also to realize to what extent the recovery process was managed 
without compromising their future livelihoods. Poor households are more vulnerable 
and face more risks while simultaneously possessing a lower economic response 
capacity and fewer alternatives.  
 
d. Response in case of urgent financial needs 
 
This sub-section deals with how most poor households in general, and microcredit 
clients in particular, respond to urgent financial needs to run their business and 
manage their livelihoods. This is important for several reasons including the level of 
difficulty in managing urgent financial needs for poor households.  
    
 
  
155 
From Table 5:18, it can be seen that borrowing from microcredit (37%), withdrawing 
from savings (23%), looking for an extra job (14%), selling assets (11%), and 
borrowing from relatives (10%) were the major responses of respondents to meet 
urgent financial needs.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher observed during the household interview that most of 
the client respondents were consistently looking for fresh microcredit loans and 
withdrawing savings; the majority of the ex-clients and non-clients were looking for 
extra jobs or IGAs, and borrowing from relatives as approaches to use in case of 
future urgent financial needs. This aligns with the coping mechanism applied in the 
sub-section Table 5.17. 
 
Table 5.18: Response in case of urgent financial needs 
Variables N Mean Std. Deviation Sum % of  Total Sum 
Assets sale 331 .03 .180 11 11 
Borrow from relatives  331 .16 .370 54 10 
Borrow from other MFI  331 .62 .486 205 37 
Borrow from money lenders  331 .02 .122 5 1 
Pull out children from school  331 .06 .239 20 4 
Reduce consumption expenditure  331 .00 .055 1 0 
Extra work hours  331 .08 .279 28 5 
Looking for extra job  330 .24 .720 80 14 
Withdraw from saving  331 .38 .487 127 23 
Take other action  331 .07 .304 22 4 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Moreover, the researcher also learned from the FGD that the irregular, unpredictable 
and inadequate economic benefit from the microcredit service they engaged in 
forced them to look for fresh fund and exhaust savings, often a small amount, which 
affected not only the repayment but also the reinvestment process of the microloan 
activities, on which their future livelihood was dependent.  
 
From the above findings, it can be concluded that the majority of the credit client 
respondents were dependent on fresh microloans while others were withdrawing 
savings as a coping mechanism and response to future potential financial needs. 
This indicated that most of the client respondents could not build financial security on 
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income loan returns; not only for shocks they currently faced but also for future 
economic shock they might face.  Similarly, ex-clients and non-clients were 
vulnerable to different types of risks that depend mainly on withdrawing savings and 
getting microloans as a means to mitigate risks. 
5.3.2 School dropout of children 
 
This sub-section deals with the reasons, frequency, and sex proportion of the school 
dropout rate for respondents’ children that may help to understand the contribution of 
microcredit services to this issue. 
 
Table 5.19 shows that 30.0%, 16.2%, 13.9%, 13.5%, 11.9%, 8.3%, and 6.3% of the 
total student dropouts were from DECSI, ex-clients’, ERCS, SCSC, LMFI, AMFISC, 
and non-clients’ households respectively. Moreover, it is also clear from Table 5.19 
that not only the majority of the HHs whose children dropped out but also the 
majority of female dropouts were from DECSI, the oldest and largest MFI.  
 
Table 5.19: School dropout of children  
 
 
MCIs 
Variables 
 
Frequency 
Sex  
Male Female  
Total  
sum 
% of  
Total 
 Sum 
 
N 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Mean 
 
Sum 
% of 
 Total Sum 
 
Sum 
 
Sum 
LMFI 
N=50 26 1 3 1.38 36 11.9% 
22 14 36 11.9% 
DECSI 
N=163 59 1 4 1.54 91 30.0% 
45 46 91 30.0% 
AMFISC 
N=46 18 1 3 1.39 25 8.3% 
11 14 25 8.3% 
ERCS 
N=61 26 1 4 1.62 42 13.9% 
18 24 42 13.9% 
SCSC 
N=51 25 1 2 1.64 41 13.5% 
19 22 41 13.5% 
Ex-clients 
N=72 32 1 4 1.53 49 16.2% 
23 26 49 16.2% 
Non-clients 
N=28 11 1 3 1.73 19 6.3% 
11 8 19 6.3% 
Total 
N=471 197 1 4 1.54 303 100.0% 
149 154 303 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, it can be calculated from Table 5.19 that 42% of the total households 
included children who dropped out of school. This indicated that school 
discontinuation was a shared phenomenon of clients, ex-clients, and non-clients. In 
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addition, Table 5.19 shows that the highest mean of school discontinuation was from 
non-clients’ households. 
 
Additionally, it can also be calculated from Table 5:19 that 51% of the total school 
dropouts were female and the remaining were male. The researcher suggests that 
regardless of the reason for the female school dropout, this affects households as 
well as individuals and contradicts the principles and objectives of microcredit 
providers.  
 
The reasons for school discontinuation of the respondents’ children are presented in 
the following Table 5:20.  
 
 Table 5.20: Reasons for children’s school dropout 
 
Variables 
 
MFI 
Financial 
 problem 
Health 
problem 
Family 
problem 
Personal  
problem 
Academic  
failure 
Marriage  Look  
for job 
Other 
reasons 
LMFI 
 
N=50 
Sum 14 16 15 17 15 16 18 15 
Mean 1.40 .64 .60 .68 .60 .64 .72 .60 
% of Total Sum 41.2% 51.6% 62.5% 34.7% 13.3% 30.8% 48.6% 65.2% 
DECSI 
 
N=163 
Sum 2 1 0 5 43 6 10 2 
Mean 1.00 .02 .00 .09 .74 .10 .17 .03 
% of Total Sum 5.9% 3.2% 0.0% 10.2% 38.1% 11.5% 27.0% 8.7% 
AMFISC 
 
N=46 
Sum 1 0 2 4 10 1 2 1 
Mean 1.00 .00 .11 .22 .56 .06 .11 .06 
% of Total Sum 2.9% 0.0% 8.3% 8.2% 8.8% 1.9% 5.4% 4.3% 
ERCS 
 
N=61 
Sum 9 2 1 6 14 9 1 2 
Mean 1.00 .07 .03 .21 .48 .31 .03 .07 
% of Total Sum 26.5% 6.5% 4.2% 12.2% 12.4% 17.3% 2.7% 8.7% 
SCSC 
 
N=51 
Sum 1 0 1 8 8 13 3 0 
Mean 1.00 .00 .04 .33 .33 .54 .13 .00 
% of Total Sum 2.9% 0.0% 4.2% 16.3% 7.1% 25.0% 8.1% 0.0% 
Ex-clients 
 
N=72 
Sum 7 11 4 7 14 6 3 3 
Mean 1.00 .38 .12 .21 .42 .18 .09 .09 
% of Total Sum 20.6% 35.5% 16.7% 14.3% 12.4% 11.5% 8.1% 13.0% 
Non-clients 
 
N=28 
Sum 0 1 1 2 9 1 0 0 
Mean .00 .08 .08 .17 .75 .08 .00 .00 
% of Total Sum 0. 3.2% 4.2% 4.1% 8.0% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 
 
N=471 
Sum 34 31 24 49 113 52 37 23 
Mean 1.13 .16 .12 .25 .57 .26 .19 .12 
% of Total Sum 9% 9% 7% 14% 31% 14% 10% 6% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
As Table 5.20 shows, 31 per cent of the dropouts was due to academic failures 
followed by personal problems and marriage (each 14%), looking for a job (10%), 
financial problems and health problems (each 9%), and family problems (7%). Other 
reasons (6%) were mainly due to joining military service and pregnancy. 
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Furthermore, the reason for the high number of academic failure was discussed 
seriously during the FGDs and HHs interviews. The opinion of the urban 
respondents was; “we were forced to send our children during the half off school day 
plus evening to sell sweets and homemade products to contribute to the household 
income”. This was the common situation not only in the study area but also in most 
urban poor households. Beyond the small economic contribution of the children, they 
were influenced to develop different bad behaviours and practices (developed 
personal problems) that challenged their academic performance and gradually 
forced them to dropout, a scenario that could affect their future. Therefore, in this 
case, academic failure was associated with the economic situation of the 
households. 
 
Even though the association between education and income is not always 
dependable, the researcher learned from the household interviews that some 
households were affected by multiple factors; further, almost all factors for school 
dropout of the respondents’ children mentioned above were highly related with the 
poor economic situation of the households. Thus, the economic benefit of the 
respondents from the micro service they engaged in was not yet able to satisfy one 
of the important social needs (education for their children) of the poor households, 
which is one of the objectives of microcredit service providers.  Hence, the sampled 
microcredit providers should revise their microcredit strategies and instruments that 
aligns with their original objectives and enhances the economic benefits to the 
poorest of the poor. 
5.3.3 Households microcredit history  
 
This section deals with the micro loan history of respondents and helps assess the 
intention of the loan, repayment behaviour and other important perceptions of the 
respondents on microcredit modalities. 
5.3.3.1 Vocational training of respondents 
 
Table 5.21 shows that 59.6% of the total respondents (except non-clients) were 
trained in different skills related to the business they were engaged in; some of the 
SCSC respondents were trained with more than one type of training.  
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Table 5.21: Vocational training of respondents 
 
 
 
Variables 
Name of MCIs  
Total 
 
N=443 
LMFI 
 
N=50 
DECSI 
 
N=163 
AMFISC 
 
N=46 
ERCS 
 
N=61 
SCSC 
 
N=51 
Ex-clients 
 
N=72 
Mini-trade 
 
Count 13 53 8 14 5 19 112 
% of Total 4.7% 19.2% 2.9% 5.1% 1.8% 6.9% 42.4% 
Embroidery 
Count 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
% of Total 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 
Woodwork 
Count 1 2 1 0 0 1 5 
% of Total 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 1.9% 
Metalwork 
Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
% of Total 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8% 
Electrical work 
Count 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 
Tailoring 
Count 1 0 1 1 0 1 4 
% of Total 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 1.5% 
Driving 
Count 0 1 2 0 0 1 4 
% of Total 0.0% 0.4% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 1.5% 
Hairdressing 
Count 1 1 5 1 2 3 13 
% of Total 0.4% 0.4% 1.9% 0.4% 0.7% 1.1% 4.9% 
Handcrafts 
Count 2 0 5 3 0 2 12 
% of Total 0.7% 0.0% 1.9% 1.1% 0.0% 0.7% 4.6% 
Urban farming 
Count 0 0 5 9 2 4 20 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 3.3% 0.7% 1.5% 7.8% 
Rural farming 
Count 0 11 0 27 46 4 88 
% of Total 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 10.1% 17.2% 1.5% 33.3% 
Other 
Count 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
Total 
Total count 19 69 28 56 55 37 264 
% of Total count 7.2% 26.1% 10.6% 21.2% 20.8% 14.0% 100.0% 
% from the  N 38.0% 42.3% 60.7% 91.8% 107.8% 51.4% 59.6% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, it can be shown from Table 5.21 that mini-trade (42.2%) and rural 
farming (33.3%) were the major skill trainings provided for 45.1% clients and ex-
client respondents.  
 
From the above data, it can be concluded that most of the microcredit service 
provision was supported by mini-trade vocational trainings that helped the borrowers 
manage the mini-trade activities in which they engaged. However, the impact of the 
skill training should be monitored professionally in post-training evaluation.  
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5.3.3.2 Loan history of households 
 
This section deals with the reasons for the preference of microcredit providers (pull 
factor), purposes of loans, repayment behaviours, source of repayments, duration of 
loans, and multiple loans of the respondents. 
 
a) Clients and ex-clients’ reasons to prefer a microcredit provider 
 
Table 5.22 revealed that the main factors affecting client respondents’ preference of 
MCIs were a lower interest rate (41.8%) followed by adequate loan amount (35.6%), 
individual credit modality (28.3%), convenient loan disbursement (26.4%), simple 
procedures (25.9%), and others (short repayment time and accessibility) (16.2%). 
Similarly, Table 5.22 shown that the factors influencing ex-clients’ preference for 
MCIs were lower interest rates (69.4%), convenient loan disbursement (52.8%), 
others (short repayment time and accessibility) (43.1%), simple procedures (33.3%), 
and adequate loan amount (18.1%). This indicated that a lower interest rate was the 
one of the main pull factors of both clients and ex-clients for their MCI preference.  
 
Furthermore, it is also clear from Table 5.22 that 100%, 62%, 52.2%, 35.3%, and 
12.9% from ERCS, LMFI, AMFISC, SCSC, and DECSI respondents respectively that 
their MCI preference was based on the interest rate charged by the MCIs they were 
engaged with.  Moreover, an adequate loan amount (64.4%) was the main reason 
for DECSIs respondents to prefer DECSI.   
 
The respondents’ selection criteria of MCIs were also discussed during the FDGs. 
They noted, “We all are poor who were forced to look for lower interest rate MCIs 
that enable us not only to generate better economic benefit but also to smooth our 
repayment performance.  If not, we were exposed for accumulated sizeable interest 
payment that affects both our lives and future”.  
 
During the FGDs, different opinions were also shared from some DECSI 
respondents. They said, “Our criteria was to look for MCIs who can provide us a high 
amount of loan that enables us to expand our business. That is why we prefer to get 
loan from DECSI. Sometimes, we were also forced to look for loans from informal 
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sources with higher interest rate to manage our immediate financial needs”.  
Therefore, it can be concluded from the above results that the respondents’ MCI 
selection criteria varied and was highly associated with their economic situation. The 
researcher realized that there is no one microcredit modality that fits all. Thus, MCIs 
should design different microcredit modalities that can satisfy different sectors of the 
community and complement each other.  
 
 From the above presentation, it can also be concluded that the reasons of 
respondents for their preference of microcredit providers was related with the 
microcredit interest rate modality, mainly associated with the amount of the loan 
interest rate charged by the sampled microcredit providers. The determination of the 
loan interest rate was market based (DECSI) and subsidized (other sampled MCIs). 
 
 Table 5.22: Clients and ex-clients’ reasons to prefer microcredit providers 
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Client respondents           
LMFI 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Sum 31 28 6 27 0 0 11 0 2 20 
% of Total Sum 20% 29.2% 6.1% 24.7% . . 8.3% . 11% 33.3% 
% of sum from N 62% 56% 12% 54% . . 22% . 4% 40% 
DECSI 
N 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
Sum 21 19 43 27 0 25 105 2 5 17 
% of Total Sum 13.5% 19.8% 43.9% 25.7% . 58.1% 79.6% 14.3% 27.8% 28.3% 
% of sum from N 12.9% 11.7% 26.4% 16.7% . 15.3% 64.4% 1.2% 3.1 10.4%  
AMFISC 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Sum 24 5 13 5 0 0 7 2 3 14 
% of Total Sum 15.5% 5.2% 8.6% 4.8% . . 5.3% 14.3% 16.7% 23.3% 
% of sum from N 52.2% 10.9% 28.3% 10.9% . . 15.2% 4.4% 6.5% 30.4% 
ERCS 
N 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Sum 61 13 15 30 0 0 4 10 5 4 
% of Total Sum 38.3% 13.5% 15.3% 28.6% . . 9.5% 2.7% 1.4% 1.1% 
% of sum from N 100% 21.3% 24.6% 49.2% . . 6.6% 16.4 8.2% 6.6% 
SCSC 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Sum 18 31 21 16 0 18 5 0 3 5 
% of Total Sum 11.6% 32.3% 21.4% 15.2% . 41.9% 3.8% . 16.7% 8.3% 
% of sum from N 35.3% 60.8 41.2% 31.4% . 35.3% 9.8% . 5.9% 9.8% 
Total 
N 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 
Sum 155 96 98 105 0 43 132 14 18 60 
% of Total Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% . 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
% of total sum from total N 41.8% 25.9% 26.4% 28.3% . 9.1% 35.6% 3% 4.6% 16.2% 
Ex-client respondents           
Ex-clients 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Sum 50 24 38 11 0 0 13 3 2 31 
% of sum from N 69.4% 33.3% 52.8% 15.3% . . 18.1% 4.2% 2.8% 43.1% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
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Additionally, the study learned from the FGDs that the major factor affecting the 
preference of microcredit service of DECSI (79.6%) was an adequate loan amount, 
which other sampled microcredit providers could not afford and did not offer. This 
was mainly due to the scope of business that DECSI’s respondents engaged in that 
demands a relatively high level of funding.   Thus, it can be concluded that the level 
of loan interest rate sensitivity of the DECSI respondents was low while the other 
respondents was high. This was mainly related with the economic status of the 
respondents that forced them to look for relatively smaller loan with lower loan 
interest rate to engage in petty trade. Consequently, this study realized that it was 
difficult to separate loan interest rate sensitivity and other loan modalities from the 
economic status of the borrowers. This is in line with what Martin I., and Hulem D. 
(2002: 273-275) mentioned in section 2.9.6. 
 
From the above presentation and findings, it can be concluded that the main factors 
affecting respondents’ preference for an MCI were varied. This demands diverse 
microcredit modalities to satisfy the diversified needs of the respondents (borrowers). 
Therefore, the intervention of different microcredit providers with diverse microcredit 
modalities is crucial to more accurately respond to the borrower’s needs. This 
creates the availability of amore and appropriate choices for the poor clients, which 
in turn enhances their negotiation power and encourages microcredit providers to 
complement each other. Ultimately, this approach operates in the best interest of 
both the borrowers and lending schemes.  
 
b) Purpose of loans of clients and ex-clients   
 
Table 5.23 shows 56.7%, 47.9%, 6.1%, and 4.3% of the loan money of client and ex-
client respondents was used to for mini-trade activities, livestock breeding, other 
(consumption and health fees), repayment of debt respectively.  
 
Moreover, as can be calculated from Table 5.23, many of the respondents were 
involved in multiple IGAs; 94.7% of the loan was used for income generating 
activities while 5.3% of the loan was used for shock/stress mitigation.   
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Similarly, the data from the qualitative study obtained from FDGs also agreed with 
the above views. During client and ex-client FDGs, the participants reported that 
“they spent the loan money on new and diversified income generating activities while 
another small number of FDG participants spent the loan money to deal with their 
immediate consumption and shocks. This is in line with what Weiss and Montgomery 
(2005:395-396) presented in section 2.9.6 while contradicting with the opinion of 
Hulme D., and Mosley P. (1996:119-221) mentioned in section 2.6.  
 
Table 5.23: Loan purpose of clients and ex-clients 
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LMFI 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Sum 45 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 
% of Total Sum 17.9 25.0 . . 33.3 . . 1.9 . . . 14.8 
% of sum from N 90 2 . . 2  . 8  . . 8 
DECSI 
N 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
Sum 94 1 0 1 1 2 0 61 0 19 0 19 
% of Total Sum 37.5 25.0 . 100 33.3 40.0 0.0 28.8 0.0  0.0 70.4 
% of sum from N 57.7 0.6 . 0.6 0.6 1.2 . 37.4  11.7 . 11.7 
AMFISC 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Sum 39 1 0 0 0 2 0 17 0 0 1 0 
% of Total Sum 15.5 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 8.0 0.% . 100 0 
% of sum from N 84.8 2.2 . . . 4.3 . 37  . 2.2 . 
ERCS 
N 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Sum 35 1 1 0 0 0 0 46 1 0 0 1 
% of Total Sum 13.9 25.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.7 100 . 0.0 3.7 
% of sum from N 57.4 1.6 1.6 . . . . 75.4  . . 31.2 
SCSC 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Sum 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 3 
% of Total Sum 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.1 0.0 . 0.0 11.1 
% of sum from N 5.9 . . . . . . 96.1 . . . 5.9 
Ex-clients 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Sum 35 0 1 0 1 1 1 35 0 0 0 0 
% of Total Sum 13.9 0.0 50.0 0.0 33.3 20.0 100 16.5 0.0 . 0.0 0.0 
% of sum from N 48.6 . 1.4 . 1.4 1.4 1.4 48.6 . . . . 
Total 
N 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 
Sum 251 4 2 1 3 5 1 212 1 19 1 27 
% of Total Sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
% of sum from N 56.7 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.2 47.9 0.2 4.3 0.2 6.1 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Even though the loan request was not rigid and monitored properly, the purpose of 
loan money of almost all client and ex-client respondents was used for income 
activities and thus a ‘promotional loan’.  Therefore, the opinion of Weiss and 
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Montgomery (2005:395-396) was applicable and aligns with this study. However, this 
finding is contrary to what Humley D. and Mosley P. (1996:119-221) said about this 
in section 2.6. 
 
Furthermore, the reason why poor households were forced to spend the loan on a 
productive use of loan was discussed with FDGs of clients and ex-clients. They said 
the following: “if we do not make any money from the IGAs loan, it is hardly to repay 
the loan with interest, which is very costly for us to tolerate indebtedness that 
aggravates the enforcement, exclusion especially by the regulated microcredit 
providers”. Therefore, utilization of loan money for IGAs was not an option but 
necessary, especially for the poorest borrowers. 
 
 
Additionally, as Table 5.23 depicts, 11.7% of DECSI clients were those who used the 
loan money for their repayment of debt. During the HHs interview, the researcher 
made an attempt to investigate the reasons that forced them to use loan money for 
repayment. They said that “our income from the income generating activities was 
inadequate to cover the loan including interest rates and in some households this 
was due to health problem of the primary income earner of the households.  We 
know its effect on increasing our indebtedness. However, this was the only solution 
we have in order to continue our IGA and avoid enforcement that affects our lives 
and future”. Thus, this study suggested that all microcredit providers should monitor 
and design a problem solving mechanism for such type of borrowers, such as; 
flexible loan modality including cost of loan, and monitoring, follow-up.  
 
From the above survey findings, it can be concluded that the micro loan was not only 
invested for income generating activities but it was also a means for the poor 
borrowers to address basic consumption and other needs. 
 
c) Repayment performance of clients and ex-clients 
 
Figure 5.8 revealed that 86% of the total respondents’ repayment performance was 
always on time. This was followed by mostly on time (8%), sometimes on time (2%), 
rarely on time (2.5%), and failed to pay (1.6%).  
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As can be calculated from Figure 5.8, the distribution of ‘always on time’ repayment 
performances among the clients and ex-clients was 100% from LMFI and SCSC 
each, followed by 98% (ERCS), 89% (AMFISC), 81% (ex-clients), and 74% (DECSI). 
This survey finding witnessed that ex-clients were not only good on repayment 
performance but also better than DECSI’s clients, which seems a paradox. The 
researcher discussed this during the HHs interview using the following question.  
Why do ex-clients with good repayment performance dropout while DECSI’s clients 
with relatively poor repayment performance continue their membership? 
 
The interesting opinion of both clients and ex-clients was “Old DECSI clients were 
reluctant on timely repayment. This was mainly due to the trust built among the old 
clients and DECSI”. This study suggested that trust building and fair tolerance or 
flexibility could be one of the incentives for old clients but MCIs should be aware of 
the danger of distinguishing the ‘elites’ from the poor sector of the community, which 
aggravates marginalization of the poor.  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Repayment performance of clients and ex-clients  
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
In addition, individual ex-client respondents with good repayment performances were 
asked to give their opinion on the reason for their good repayment performance on 
the one side and their dropout from the MCI on the other. Their opinion was the 
following: “due to market problems, cost of basic needs, cost of the loan, we could 
not benefit from the loan money; rather, our indebtedness was increasing and finally 
LMFI DECSI AMFISC SCSC ERCS Ex-client Percentage
Always in time 50 121 41 51 59 58 86
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we decided to drop out safely and look at other options (wage labour etc.)”.  
Therefore, good repayment performance was not always a result of a good loan 
benefit.  
 
The other concern of the researcher from the presentation in Figure 5:8 was the 
reason for the 100% repayment performance of LMFI and SCSC and lower 
repayment rates of other sampled MCIs. The researcher raised a question. What is 
the linkage between repayment performances and the ownership structure of MCIs? 
During the household survey, individual respondents were asked to give their 
opinions on this. Respondents from LMFI said the following: “LMFI is newly 
established by Women Association of Tigray (WAT) to support specially us (female). 
LMFI is ours. The loan interest rate of LMFI (12%) is less than DECSI (18%). Thus, 
the strength of LMFI will enhance our capacity and empowerment”.  On the other 
hand, SCSC similarly said the following: “SCSC was established by our own local 
community members, managed by our own community representatives, it is very 
close to us, and serves us with fair and transparent loan interest rate (9%), which is 
less than DECSI (18%)”. This indicated that the ownership structure of MCIs is one 
of the factors that influences the sense of ownership of the borrowers and offers a 
transparent credit modality, which was very crucial for good microcredit 
performances that benefit both borrowers and lenders. 
 
Based on the survey findings, qualitative study focused, from both rural and urban 
clients’ FDGs, on why repayment performance of borrowers varies and why most 
borrowers in some MCI repayment performances was good while others not. They 
replied “We are primarily worried more on our repayment than satisfying our needs 
and further investment. The cost of repayment failure is high (detention, exclusion, 
sales of property etc.). That is why we all were forced to perform good repayment 
even by compromising our basic needs. Especially, for most poor borrowers like us, 
repayment was not necessarily a result of a good profit from the microcredit 
activities; even some of us repaid the loan while our income was at loss.”  The 
survey findings of FDGs similarly illustrate that all good repayment performance was 
not necessarily the result of good economic benefit from loan IGAs.   
 
    
 
  
167 
Further, the qualitative study in both rural and urban ex-clients’ FDGs on why most of 
the ex-clients repayment performance was good and yet they dropped out from the 
MIC services elicited the following responses.  The ex-clients’ FDGs participants 
pointed out “we realized that excessive enforcement was done for those who failed 
repayment, we don’t want to be similarly victimized. Thus, good repayment 
performance is crucial, not only to continue but also to safely drop out from the MCI.  
Additionally, due to various reasons we could not adequately earn or benefit from the 
micro loan activities, which can cover the loan and its interest rates. Therefore, we 
prefer to drop out safely and look at other activities with what we have including 
wage and daily labourer jobs where we can earn sometimes better than the income 
from the microcredit IGAs we were engaged with.”  
 
In connection to the opinions of the household interviews and FDGs report on the 
repayment behaviour of respondents mentioned above, the key informant Interviews 
(KIIs) reflected a contrasting opinion, as follows: “Our institutions have good 
repayment rate records. This was because of fair and affordable loan interest rate 
charged and the good benefit our clients gained from the microcredit we provided 
them. Thus, a good repayment rate is associated with an affordable interest rate and 
better economic benefit of our clients”.  
 
Furthermore, the KIIs opinion on why ex-clients with good repayment records drop 
out from the MCI also contrasted with the ex-clients’ perspectives.  “Some of them 
could be those who earned better money from the microcredit activities and prefer to 
continue without a further loan and others might have their own reason. However, 
our institution doesn’t have a standard drop out monitoring system”.    
 
From the survey results shown in Figures 5:8 above, it can be concluded that the 
client respondent’s repayment behaviour of the sampled MFIs varied. This was 
mainly associated with the sense of ownership of the borrowers (LMFI and SCSC), 
better advantage on loan interest rate, and the level of satisfaction on the credit 
service modality that encouraged them to continue their engagement, maintaining 
their good repayment records. In addition, a relatively better repayment rate of client 
respondents was recorded in small-regulated MFIs (LMFI and AMFISC), 
cooperatives (SCSC) and NGOs funded unregulated microcredit schemes (ERCS) 
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than the big regulated MFI (DECSI).  This is in line with what Amha W. (2011:18) 
said in section 3:5. 
 
It can be also concluded from the above survey data results that good repayment 
performances of borrowers do not necessarily indicate a result of a good profit from 
the microcredit activities; some of the borrowers repaid the loan while their income 
was at a loss. Therefore, all MCIs should monitor not only the repayment 
performance but also its source as well as a ‘genuine repayment source’.  
Additionally, the researcher observed that ex-clients were good repayment 
performers without enjoying the economic benefit from the credit and maintaining 
their microcredit service engagement. Therefore, good repayment records of MCIs 
do not necessarily indicate a healthy or successful relationship with the borrower and 
their economic well being.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher found out through key informant interviews that experts 
of some sampled regulated MCIs considered high repayment rate as the best 
indicator for a fair loan interest rate charged and is a result of an adequate economic 
return from the borrowers; this is not always right.  On the other side, experts of 
unregulated microcredit providers agreed that, even though high interest rates were 
not the only factor for negative repayment performances, but they make it more 
difficult for the poorest to perform well on loan repayment.  
 
d) Source of timely payment and reasons for not paying loans on time 
 
As shown in Table 5.24, timely repayment of clients and ex-clients respondents was 
98.3% from income of micro loan related activities and the remaining balance was 
from their own income, which is not loan related. The researcher observed during the 
household interview that ex-clients used their own income for their timely repayment. 
This could indicate that the ex-clients were not only repaying from the income of the 
micro loan related return without economic gain but also from their own resources, 
that aggravated their loss ‘for the sake of safely exiting’.  
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 Table 5.24: Reasons for always on time and not on time repayment 
 Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, from Table 5.24 it can also be calculated that the source of timely 
repayment from micro loan related income of each sampled MCI was 100% (LMFI 
and SCSC each), 96.7% (ERCS), 89.1% (AMFISC), 75% (Ex-clients), and 74.3% 
(DECSI) of their respondents. This survey result is similar with the survey findings of 
the repayment behaviour of clients and ex-clients mentioned above. This seems 
good provided that the income from microloan related activities does not 
compromise the ‘fair’ economic benefit of the borrowers from the loan related 
activities, which is ‘fair repayment’.  
 
Furthermore, Table 5.24 revealed that inadequate income (81.9%), and high HHs 
consumption (18.2%) were the reasons of clients’ and ex-clients’ respondents for not 
timely repaying the loan.  Those respondents were from DECSI (54.6%) and ex-
clients (45.5%).  
 
From the above survey results, the researcher suggests that repayment performance 
should be a result of a ‘fair’ benefit of both borrowers and lenders. However, the 
distribution of economic benefit should be more for poor borrowers than the lenders. 
Thus, repayment from the income of loan related activity should not be at the 
expense of the economic benefit of the borrower from IGAs they engaged in, which 
is ‘harmful repayment’.  
 
 
 
Variables 
Name of MFI  
 
Total 
 
N=443 
 
LMFI 
 
N=50 
 
DECSI 
 
N=163 
 
AMFISC 
 
N=46 
 
ERCS 
 
N=61 
 
SCSC 
 
N=51 
 
Ex-clients 
 
N=72 
Loan repayment 
sources for 
paying always on 
time 
From loan related 
activity 
Count 50 121 41 59 51 54 376 
% of Total 13.2% 31.8% 10.2% 15.5% 13.4% 14.2% 98.3% 
Own income (not 
loan related) 
Count 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 
Total 
Count 50 121 41 59 51 58 380 
% of Total 13.2% 31.8% 10.2% 15.5% 13.4% 15.3% 100.0% 
Reason for not 
paying loan on 
time 
Inadequate 
income 
Count 0 4 0 0 0 5 9 
% of Total 0.0% 36.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 45.5% 81.9% 
High HH 
consumption 
Count 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
% of Total 0.0% 18.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.2% 
Total Count 0 6 0 0 0 5 11 % of Total 0.0% 54.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 45.5% 100.0% 
    
 
  
170 
e)     Duration and number of loans (mobility of respondents) 
 
As can be calculated from Table 5.25, 63%, 58%, 54%, and 53% of AMFISC, LMFI, 
ERCS, and SCSC respondents respectively were microcredit clients of DECSI at 
one time. The issue is why the mobility from a well-established MFI to less equipped 
credit service provision?  During the household interview, the respondents said that 
“our mobility from-to happened after we got other opportunities that could better 
satisfy our diverse interest through credit modality, access, loan interest rate, and 
close follow-up”. Therefore, mobility or shifting of respondents from one to another 
MCI was highly associated with looking for better MCIs that can satisfy their diverse 
interests.  
 
Moreover, Table 5.25 shows 42%, 28%, 14%, 10%, and 8% of client respondents 
were DECSI’s clients for 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, 13-16, and 17-20 years respectively.  
Additionally, Table 5.25 shows 21.7%, 13.9%, 8.9%, 7.8%, and 0.4% of DECSI’s 
respondents have been clients of DECSI for 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, 13-16, and 17-20 years 
respectively with a loan frequency of 1-4 (41.0%), 5-8 (8.3%), 9-12 (11.6%), 13-16 
(4.2%), and 17-20 (2.1%). It can be perceived from this survey results that DECSI’s 
current client respondents enjoyed the highest percentage of loan duration and 
frequency of loan with the highest mean of 7.66 years of loan and 5.30 of frequency 
of loan followed by SCSC respondents mean of 4.43 years of loan and 3.43 of 
frequency of loan.    
 
The issue is why and how these clients continued for such a length of time? What is 
the economic benefit (reward) of their long stay while others shift to other microcredit 
service providers?  Based on the above survey results, the qualitative study obtained 
from both rural and urban client FDGs on why some clients stay long while others 
shift to other MCI, rural respondents said that “most of the sampled credit service 
providers (LMFI, AMFISC, and ERCS) were operating in urban areas. Thus, lack of 
credit service options forced us to stay with DECSI for an unreasonable time without 
sustained improvement in our economic status.” 
 
On the other hand, urban FDGs said, “Our main reason for our long membership 
years in DECSI was the amount of loan which other MCIs could not offer to give us”. 
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Therefore, the duration of credit membership matters not only for evaluation of the 
impact of the microcredit for the poor borrowers but also to evaluate why long time 
participation and to look for possible solutions.  
 
During the in-depth interview with the KIIs on the presence of graduation strategy 
and guidelines in their respective MCIs, their response was “there was no written 
and clear national or regional credit clients’ graduation strategy and guideline of 
microcredit clients in their respective MCIs.” The researcher learned from KIIs survey 
that the absence of a microcredit graduation strategy and guideline in all sampled 
MCIs not only made it difficult to monitor the economic and social efficiency and 
effectiveness of the credit programs but it also developed a false perception of the 
MCIs actors. They felt that a long duration of clients was the best indicator of client 
retention.  They were ‘loyal clients’. This misperception can affect and mislead the 
leadership of the microcredit providers and misdirect energies away from the stated 
objectives for their clients.    
 
The study also tried to examine, through FGDs, whether those households who 
participate for a longer period benefit more compared to those participating for 
shorter periods. The shorter period may enable them to afford the current loan 
interest rates charged and encourage them to graduate sooner. Both urban and rural 
FDGs said, “There was no significant and sustained economic improvement among 
the households who had a long or short loan duration (years). The only difference 
was that households who participated for a long loan period were able to secure their 
credit sources while others were shifting to other means, such as wage employment 
and others”. 
 
Moreover, this study positively concludes that when the poor were forced to long-
term participation, not only in one but also in another similar microcredit provider 
without a reasonable economic benefit, the poor were paying an unnecessary cost 
for their future. Long stay microcredit participation has a cost for the lenders as well. 
Therefore, it matters. The duration of participants should be associated and 
managed with the ‘graduation’ of the participant ‘from-to’. A ‘graduation modality’, is 
highly associated with adequate net economic benefit from the micro loan.  This is in 
line with what Wright G. (2000:43) said in section 2.3.3. 
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Table 5.25: Duration and number of loans of clients  
 
 
 
 
Loan 
from 
Variable 
 
 
 
Loan of year 
 
Respondents Frequency of loan (Number) 
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N=
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DECSI 
 
 
1-4 Count 10 61 12 15 15 113 25 99 25 4 9 162 Percentage of total 3.6% 21.7% 4.3% 5.3% 5.3% 40.2% 10.3% 41.0% 10.3% 1.7% 3.7% 67.0% 
5-8 Count 7 39 8 13 12 79 4 20 3 0 0 27 Percentage of total 2.5% 13.9% 2.9% 4.6% 4.3% 28.1% 1.7% 8.3% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 11.2% 
9-12 Count 9 25 5 1 0 40 5 28 2 0 0 35 Percentage of total 3.2% 8.9% 1.8% 0.4% 0.00% 14.2% 2.1% 11.6% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 14.5% 
13-16 Count 1 22 2 3 0 28 0 11 1 0 0 12 Percentage of total 0.4% 7.8% 0.7% 1.1% 0.00% 10% 0.0% 4.2% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 4.6% 
17-20 Count 2 16 2 1 0 21 0 5 1 0 0 6 Percentage of total 0.7% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.00% 7.5% 0.0% 2.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 
Total Count 29 163 29 33 27 281 34 163 32 4 9 242 
Percentage of total 10.3% 58% 10.3% 11.7% 9.6%% 100% 14.1% 67.4% 13.2% 1.7% 3.7% 100% 
Minimum 1 1 2 1 1  1 1 2 1 1  
Maximum 4 20 2 3 15  4 19 2 2 15  
Mean 2.00 7.66 2.00 2.00 4.43  2.25 5.30 2.00 1.50 3.43  
% of count from N 58% 100% 63% 54.1% 53% 75.7%       
 
 
 
AMFISC 
 
 
 
 
1-4 Count 3 1 46 2 0 52 3 1 44 2 0 50 Percentage of total 5.7% 1.9% 88.5% 3.9% 0.0% 100% 6% 2% 88% 4% 0.0% 100% 
Total Count 3 1 46 2 0 52 3 1 44 2 0 50 Percentage of total 5.7% 1.9% 88.5% 3.9% 0.0% 100% 6% 2% 88% 4% 0.0% 100% 
Minimum 1 1 1 2   1 1 1 1   
Maximum 4 3 3 2   4 20 2 1   
Mean 1.67 2.00 1.17 2.00   2.50 3.91 1.02 1.00   
Percentage of count from N 6% 0.6% 100% 3.3%         
 
 
LMFI 
 
 
 
 
1-4 Count 50 4 6 5 0 65 41 4 6 0 0 51 Percentage of total 76.9% 6.2% 9.2% 7.7% 0.0% !00% 80.4% 7.8% 11.8% 0.00 0.00 100% 
Total Count 50 4 6 5 0 65 41 4 6 0 0 51 Percentage of total 76.9% 6.2% 9.2% 7.7% 0.0% !00% 80.4% 7.8% 11.8% 0.00 0.00 100% 
Minimum 1 1 1 2   1 1 1    
Maximum 6 17 9 2   10 12 4    
Mean 2.14 7.38 3.25 2.00   2.75 3.94 2.33    
Percentage of count from N 100% 2.5% 13.0% 8.2%         
 
 
 
SCSC 
 
 
 
 
1-4 Count 0 5 0 0 45 50 0 6 0 0 50 56 Percentage of total 0.0% 8.6% 0.0% 0.0% 77.6% 86.2% 0.00 10.4% 0.00 0.00 86.2% 96.6% 
5-8 Count 0 2 0 0 6 8 0 1 0 0 1 2 Percentage of total 0.0% 3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 10.3% 13.8% 0.00 1.7% 0.00 0.00 1.7% 3.5% 
Total Count 0 7 0 0 51 58 0 7 0 0 51 58 Percentage of total 0.0% 12.1% 0.0% 0.0% 87.9% 100% 0.00 12.1% 0.00 0.00 87.9% 100% 
Minimum  1   1 2  1   1  
Maximum  4   10 4  4   10  
Mean  2.00   1.77 2.50  1.67   1.59  
% of count from N  4.3%   100%        
ERCS 
 
 
1-4 Count 1 1 1 61 0 64  2       61 0 64 Percentage of Total 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 95.3 0.0% 100 1.6% 3.2% 1.6% 95.3 0.00 100% 
Total Count 1 1 1 61 0 64 1 2 1 61 0 64 Percentage of Total 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 95.3% 0.0% 100% 1.6% 3.2% 1.6% 95.3 0.00 100% 
Minimum 2 1 2 1   1 1 1 1   
Maximum 2 1 2 4   2 3 2 2   
Mean 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.50   1.05 2.00 1.05 1.02   
Percentage of count from N 2.0% 0.6% 2.2% 100%         
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
In addition, it can also be deduced from Table 5.25 that the short-term leavers (1-4 
years) were 100% from AMFISC, LMFI, and ERCS each followed by 86% from 
SCSC, and 40% from DECSI.  The majority of short-term leaver’s respondents were 
from late established and smaller MCIs. However, as mentioned above, over 50% of 
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late established sampled MCIs client respondents were DECSI members at one 
time. This indicated that the highest ratio of the client mobility to other MCIs was 
from DECSI. As also mentioned above, the push and pull factors for this mobility was 
highly associated with looking for MCIs which can offer better economic benefits, 
highly related with the cost of the loan, a cost that includes the loan interest rate. 
 
Based on the above survey results the researcher suggested that it is important to 
understand the impact of a long duration of the poor in microcredit participation, the 
pattern of mobility of households from–to MCIs, the push and pull factors for mobility, 
and a tentative time path of the graduation process.  
 
Finally, from the above survey findings and observations, this study insists that not 
only well-established sampled old regulated MFIs (DECSI) but also new established 
regulated microcredit service providers and un-regulated microcredit providers learn 
from the existing experiences on how to manage effective and efficient microcredit 
service with less cost that benefits both the borrowers and lenders. Especially, the 
extended participation of the poor in microcredit service should be managed 
progressively and professionally rather than considered as a mechanism of client 
retention.  
 
f) Loan history of ex-clients  
 
This section deals with the investigation of the duration and number of loans of the 
sampled ex-clients in the sampled microcredit service providers and their effects. 
 
As it can be shown in Table 5.26, the length of the participation of the ex-clients 
respondents was 1-4 years (64.4%), 5-8 years (26.4%), 9-12 years (4.6%), 13-16 
years (3.5%), and 17-20 years (1.2%). Furthermore, the Table shows that the 
number of loans of the ex-clients was 90.5 per cent (1-4 loans), 3.8 per cent (5-8 
loans), 4.8 per cent (9-12 loans), 0 per cent (13-16 loans), and 1 per cent (17-20 
loans). It can be observed from the above survey results that majority (64.4%) of the 
ex-clients’ respondents were short-term loan leaver’s.  
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 From the above survey results, it can also be concluded that a high percentage of 
ex-clients with short loan durations (64.4%) and a low frequency of loan (90.5%) 
witnessed that their stability was not only short but also early.  Regardless, the push 
factor for their subsequent loan and the early exit of clients is one of the ways of 
exclusion for the poor. This is in line with what Simanowitz A. and Walter A. 
(2002:40-41) said in section 2.9.3.  
 
Why do some households drop out while others do not? This was one of the 
research questions discussed during the rural and urban ex-clients’ FDGs.  Both 
expressed similar opinions. “We were forced to drop out to look for microcredit with 
lower loan interest rates and less enforcement.  Meanwhile, we prefer to look for a 
wage and daily labour where we can earn relatively better than the income from the 
loan IGAs”.  
 
On the other hand, when the same question was asked to KIIs, they responded 
differently. “Those who drop out are those who failed repayment due to various 
reasons, mainly due to their own internal problems”. Can it be concluded from the 
different opinions of FDGs and KIIs on why some households drop out while others 
not? There are different perspectives on the impact of loan interest rates among 
borrowers and lenders and repayment failure was considered as a problem of 
borrowers ‘externalization’, which is not fair.   
 
Table 5.26: Duration and number of loan of ex-clients 
 
 
 
Loan of years and 
frequency 
Loan from  
N=72 
Frequency of loan 
N=72 
DECSI AMFISC LMFI SCSC ERCS Total DECSI AMFISC LMFI SCSC ERCS Total 
1-4 
Count 33 2 1 6 14 56 38 2 2 4 30 76 
% of Total 37.9% 2.3% 1.2% 6.9% 16.1% 
64.4
% 
45% 2.4% 2.4% 4.8% 35.7% 90.5% 
5-8 Count 8  
  15 23 3     3 
% of Total 9.2%    17.2% 26.4% 3.6%     3.8% 
9-12 Count 4  
   4 4     4 
% of Total 4.6%     4.6% 4.8%     4.8% 
13-16 
Count 3     3      0 
% of Total 3.5%     3.5%      0.0% 
17-20 Count 1  
   1 1     1 
% of Total 1.2%     1.2% 1.2%     1.2% 
Total Count 49 2 1 6 29 
87 46 2 2 4 30 84 
% of Total 56.3% 2.3% 1.2% 6.9% 33.3% 100% 54.8% 2.4% 2.4% 4.8% 35.7% 100% 
Minimum 1 1 3 2 1  1 1 2 2 1  
Maximum 20 6 6 4 6  20 2 4 3 5  
Mean 4.67 3.50 4.50 2.50 4.14  3.41 1.50 3.00 2.25 2.27  
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
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Another question discussed with KIIs was whether there was an exit interview 
mechanism for ex-clients? They replied, “there was no formal exit interview for drop 
out clients but some effort was made on individual ex-clients”.  These results indicate 
that there was no drop out monitoring mechanism that could not only benefit ex-
clients to re-join but also to retain the existing clients, attract potential clients and to 
identify positive and negative aspects of the drop out of clients that enabled MCIs to 
evaluate one of their social performances. 
 
As Table 5.26 shows, 56.3% of ex-clients were from DECSI followed by 33.3% from 
ERCS. Why there was such a high number of ex-clients from DECSI and ERCS was 
discussed during the KIIs of DECSI and ERCS.  The DECSI KIIs replied, “Compared 
to the coverage and years of the establishment of DECSI, the number of ex-clients 
compared with other MCIs was obviously high, not because of specific problems 
within DECSI.” On the other side, ERCS KIIs replied, “Due to fund flow problems 
from donors, and a lack of timely repaid loans, continuity of loan disbursement was 
jeopardized”. This indicated that donor funded and NGO led microcredit services are 
very vulnerable and need special management systems for sustainability.  
 
From the above findings, the researcher realized that not only the importance of 
analysing why clients drop out but also analysing the ex-client’s loan history was 
crucial to evaluate the consequences of dropping out on ex-clients and microcredit 
providers. This appears to be a significant contribution of this study to the literature 
that rests on empirical observations that motivate the microcredit providers to revisit 
their credit modality, including loan interest rates.  
 
g) Clients with multiple loans 
 
Venkata N.A., and Veena Yamini A. (2010:1-2) mentioned that the trend of multiple 
loans was reinforced by the commercialization of the sector, which is often 
characterized by increased competition for clients and a clear objective to seek 
profitability, resulting in more than one microfinance provider (MFI) operating in an 
area. While this offers members a scope to borrow from multiple sources, it can also 
lead them to over-indebtedness. 
 
    
 
  
176 
Figure 5.9 shows that 13.2% of the total clients of the sampled MCIs were clients of 
more than one microcredit service providers. In addition, it can also be calculated 
from Figure 5.9 that DECSI clients were the majority borrowers from multiple 
microcredit sources.  Furthermore, it can also be calculated from Figure 5.9 that 19% 
of DECSI followed by 17.4% of AMFISC, 6.6% of ERCS, and 6% each from LMFI 
and SCSC of their total respondents were clients of more than one microcredit 
institutions ‘overlapping of households’. Regardless of the ratio, all sampled MCIs 
were exposed to multiple loans to clients.   
 
 
Figure 5.9: Multiple loans of respondents (Overlapping households) 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Why do some households go for multiple loans from the same or different MCIs? 
This was discussed during both household interviews and FGDs. They said similarly, 
“We could not satisfy all our needs from one MCI and we tried to exploit lower 
interest rates from one and a higher loan amount from the other MCI, to engage our 
house members with IGA and diversify our income, to manage financial crises and 
repayment for another loan, and for business expansion”.  
 
Thus, the researcher noticed during the HHs interview that one of the reasons of 
multiple loans of the non-poor respondents was mainly for income diversification 
while the poor respondents was mainly for repaying a loan of other loan, which 
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aggravates their over-indebtedness. This was related mainly with inadequate income 
from the microloan activities that could be also affected by other different reasons as 
well. 
 
The researcher attempted to discuss the presence of multiple loan policy or guideline 
and its management with some KIIs. They replied, “there was not any policy or 
guideline. All credit officers were running mainly to maintain and increase their 
clients. Thus, the monitoring mechanism of multiple loans was poor”. Multiple loans 
of different households were aggravated due to the unfair competition of MCIs 
instead of complementing each other. This is in line with what Venkata N.A., and 
Veena Yamini A. (2010:1-2) mentioned above.  
 
From the above research results it can also be concluded that regardless the extent 
and reasons for taking multiple loans, multiple loans were a common phenomenon in 
all sampled MCIs.  Thus, keeping the balance of looking for unmet demands and 
other reasons of client’s is adequate reason to design on how to manage multiple 
loan for the best interest of both the borrowers and lenders, which could help to 
utilize the scarce resources of MCIs for more effective credit projects. The demand 
of borrowers and supply of lenders for multiple loans should not be a result of 
socially irresponsible competition among MCIs rather it should be a result of socially 
responsible complementarities of MCIs.  
 
Furthermore, based on the above research, the researcher suggests that the 
decision of borrowers for taking multiple loans should be based on the choice of the 
borrowers of borrowing more to either invest more and scale up their business or 
remain working with what they have until they feel comfortable. This is preferable to 
being pushed by the irresponsible competition of the MCIs that aggravates the 
indebtedness of the borrowers, a situation which could affect both the borrowers and 
lenders.  Additionally, it can also be deduced from the above survey results that the 
decision of borrowers for multiple loans should not be only a last option under 
extreme shocks and stresses of the borrowers. Thus, the financial situation of the 
poor borrower is quite vulnerable and needs the socially responsible support on 
initiation and management of multiple loans. 
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 Moreover, the researcher also perceived the following attitude from the household 
interviews with some of the respondents. “Those clients who took repetitive loans 
monopolize the credit membership and scarce resources that create a barrier to 
entry”. This indicates that there was a possibility for an ‘elite’ sector of the community 
to exploit the existing scarce resources of credit programs that exclude others. 
Therefore, a client’s selection biases should be checked critically. Thus, all MCIs 
should have clear multiple loan guidelines and a management modality that can 
benefit both borrowers and lenders. 
5.3.3.3 Household saving performances 
 
This section deals with households’ savings, reasons for savings or not, and 
perceptions on savings of clients’, ex-clients’, and non-clients’ respondents. 
 
The importance of savings for the poor and poorest alike was realized in the early 
1990s. It was the introduction of savings provisions along with credit that charged the 
paradigm in the world of microcredit and the combination came to be known as 
microfinance (Armendariz B. and Jonathan M. 2005:199-245). 
 
a) Household amount of savings  
 
Regardless of the amount of their savings, Table 5.27 shows 61.2 per cent of the 
total sampled HHs have savings in different saving led financial institutions. 
Additionally, it can be calculated from Table 5.27 that the respondents’ savings were 
in MCIs (63.9%), cooperatives (24%), and banks (12.2%). Moreover, it can also be 
calculated that out of the total HHs savings of ex-clients and non-clients, 
respondents’ savings was 6.6% in MFIs, 5.9% in Bank, and 0.4% in cooperatives. 
 
From the above survey results, it can be observed that majority of the households’ 
savings was in savings led MCIs. The researcher learned during the household 
interviews that the main reason of client HHs for savings in MCIs was related with 
their affiliation with the savings led MCIs and for former lending of the clients; the 
reasons for ex-clients and non-clients was to build trust for future credit service and 
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accessibility. Therefore, savings is serving as a pull factor of MCIs for ex-clients and 
non-clients. 
 
Furthermore, it can be shown from Table 5.27 that 98%, 89.1%, 73%, 44%, and 
14.4% respondents of SCSC, AMFISC, DECSI, LMFI, and ERCS respectively have 
savings in different savings led MCIs.   
 
The researcher realized from the credit and savings regulation of the sampled 
savings led MCIs that except ERCS (NGO led credit provider), the remaining were 
using voluntary savings (AMFISC, DECSI, and SCSC), and forced savings (LMFI 
and SCSC).  
 
 Table 5.27: Household savings areas 
 
 
Loan from 
 
 
 Years 
MCIs  
Total 
N=471 
LMFI 
N=50 
DECSI 
N=163 
AMFISC 
N=46 
ERCS 
N=61 
SCSC 
N=51 
Ex-clients 
N=72 
Non-clients 
N=28 
Bank 
Less than 1 year Count 0 1 1 4 0 2 1 9 % of Total 0.0% 2.9% 2.9% 11.4% 0.0% 5.7% 2.9% 25.7% 
1-2 years Count 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 6 
% of Total 2.8% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 2.8% 17.1% 
Above 2 years Count 3 2 2 1 0 11 1 20 % of Total 8.6% 5.7% 5.7% 2.9% 0.0% 31.4% 2.9% 57.1% 
Total Count 4 5 3 5 0 15 3 35 % of Total 11.4% 14.3% 8.6% 14.3% 0.0% 42.6% 8.6% 100.0% 
MFIs 
Less than 1 year Count 3 71 16 4 0 6 1 101 % of Total 1.6% 38.6% 8.7% 2.2% 0.0% 3.3% 0.5% 54.9% 
1-2 years Count 9 19 10 0 1 6 1 46 % of Total 4.9% 10.3% 5.4% 0.0% 0.5% 3.3% 0.5% 25.0% 
Above 2 years 
Count 6 15 6 0 5 5 0 37 
% of Total 3.3% 8.2% 3.3% 0.0% 2.7% 2.7% 0.0% 20.1% 
Total Count 18 105 32 4 6 17 2 184 % of Total 9.8% 57.1% 17.4% 2.2% 3.3% 9.2% 1.1% 100.0% 
Cooperatives 
Less than 1 year Count % of Total 
0 0 3 0 0 1 0 4 
0.0% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 5.8% 
1-2 years Count % of Total 
0 4 3 0 5 3 2 17 
0.0% 5.8% 4.3% 0.0% 7.3% 4.3% 2.9% 24.6% 
Above 2 years Count % of Total 
0 5 0 0 39 4 0 48 
0.0% 7.3% 0.0% 0.0% 56.5% 5.7% 0.0% 69.7% 
Total Count % of Total 
0 9 6 0 44 8 2 69 
0.0% 14.3% 8.7% 0.0% 63.8% 11.6% 2.9% 100.0% 
Grand total Count 22 119 41 9 50 40 7 288 % of Total 7.6% 41.3% 14.2% 3.1% 17.4% 13.9% 2.4% 100.0% 
% of grand total count from N 44% 73.0% 89.1% 14.4% 98.0% 55.6 25% 61.2% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, the researcher also observed from the household interviews that 
voluntary savings   in AMFISC and SCSC were mainly related with the sense of 
ownership and strong institutional affiliation that emanated from the objective of the 
microcredit institutions. AMFISC is under the strong leadership of Women 
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Association of Regional State of Tigray with a strong female membership base and a 
female-centred microcredit project. SCSC is also one of the strong rural cooperatives 
in Tigray, which follows saving first and then get a loan modality (forced savings). 
Clients of both SCSC and AMFISC consider their membership (saving or/and credit) 
is building up the equity of their respective institutions and as a result they expect 
better support individually and collectively.  
 
Finally, it can be concluded from the above research results that the poor 
respondents (clients, ex-clients and non-clients) want to save, can save, and do 
save.  The important issue is why there are savings and who is benefiting more from 
savings. These issues matter and all MCIs should address them seriously and fairly.  
 
Table 5.28: Respondents savings amount (Birr) 
 
Variables 
Respondents  
LMFI DECSI AMFISC ERCS SCSC Ex-clients Non-clients Total  
 
 
Bank 
 
Count 4 5 3 5  15 3 35 
Minimum 2,500.00 0.00 100.00 500.00  300.00 7,000.00 100.00 
Maximum 30,000.00 100,000.00 7,000.00 7,000.00  10,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 
Mean 8,500.00 21,452.18 3,020.00 2,998.40  3,473.33 72,333.33 14,691.24 
Std. Deviation 9,810.71 29,438.77 2,954.15 2,423.84  2,709.10 110,572.75 32,235.77 
Sum 59,500.00 493,400.00 15,100.00 14,992.00  52,100.00 217,000.00 852,092.00 
% of Total Sum 7.0 57.9 1.8 1.8  6.1 25.5 100.0% 
 
 
MFI 
Count 18 105 32 4 6 17 2 184 
Minimum 70.00 0.00 50.00 600.00 900.00 680.00 200.00 50.00 
Maximum 8,000.00 50,000.00 7,600.00 1,200.00 7,050.00 7,000.00 1,480.00 50,000.00 
Mean 1,418.21 2,879.88 1,626.97 987.50 3,291.67 2,112.31 893.33 2,272.18 
Std. Deviation 1,937.85 7,445.91 1,881.33 283.95 2,434.01 1,822.4 646.63 5,380.10 
Sum 39,710.00 239,030.00 53,690.00 3,950.00 19,750.00 27,460.00 2,680.00 386,270.00 
% of Total Sum 10.3 61.9 13.9 1.0 5.1 7.1 0.7 100.0% 
 
 
Cooperatives 
Count  9 6  44 8 7 69 
Minimum  0.00 600.00  1,630.00 200.00 1,480.00 200.00 
Maximum  15,000.00 7,500.00  22,000.00 6,000.00 2,000.00 22,000.00 
Mean  3,719.17 2,300.00  6,224.67 1,522.00 1,740.00 4,568.98 
Std. Deviation  4,208.79 2,602.31  3,712.2 1,692.32 367.70 3,960.06 
Sum  89,260.00 13,800.00  280,110.00 15,220.00 3,480.00 402,070.00 
% of Total Sum  22.2 3.4  69.7 3.8 0.9 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Table 5.28 illustrates that it was not only bank savings that was a significant means 
of respondents’ savings; this was followed by cooperatives and MCIs; non-clients 
savings was the maximum savings of all the respondents.  This indicated that those 
respondents who saved in banks were relatively better off than the others and some 
non-client respondents have saved adequately from their own funds. They were also 
looking at credit with a higher loan interest rate than the savings interest rate they 
earn from their savings. For instance, one of the non-client respondents who was 
repatriated from Saudi Arabia was interviewed by the researcher; he has saved more 
than Birr 200,000 in the bank and yet he applied to borrow Birr 50,000.00 from one 
of the sampled MCIs. His justification was “I prefer to keep my money untouched and 
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start a new business from borrowing”. This was the wrong perception, saving 
(selling) huge amounts of money for a 5 per cent saving interest rate plus inflation 
and yet applying to borrow (buying) a lower amount of money than what he owned 
with the cost of 9%-18% loan interest rate. This is an erroneous perception shared 
by almost all respondents; they should be reoriented on the way that ‘saving or 
investing’ benefits the poor rather than having a savings institution exploit their level 
of awareness. Saving is not always appropriate for income generation. 
 
Based on the above amount of savings of the respondents, the researcher suggests 
that the respondents organize themselves in small local credit and saving 
cooperatives, ‘community led cooperatives’, that enable them to both determine the 
loan modality and satisfy their specific interests, which minimizes the burden on 
MCIs.  This is in line with what David S.G., and Jennifer M.W. (2000:25-36) 
suggested in this regard in section 2.9.5. 
 
Furthermore, the above survey results it can also indicate that the poor are 
interested in saving in areas, which are appropriate for the poor. The poor ‘save’ 
mostly in credit led, regulated MFIs and mainly to meet their basic needs in times of 
insecurity while the rich save largely to invest. No matter how much they save, if they 
continue to save regularly and benefit fairly, their savings portfolio can contribute to 
the overall improvement in their quality of life and help to scale up their mini 
businesses. However, the very crucial issue is the amount of benefits the poor gain 
from the savings. The question of who is benefitting the most from the savings is not 
yet fairly addressed. 
 
Moreover, the researcher suggests that the importance or purpose of saving should 
not be only for emergency response and security (from the borrower’s perspective) 
or for capital building and a loan guarantee (from the lender’s perspective); rather, it 
should go beyond the traditional saving benefits, which is effective and efficient and 
measured by the ‘value of money’ against the benefit for the poor. Therefore, a 
saving policy of each microcredit service provider should be revisited against the 
twin objectives of a ‘fair saving interest rate’ and ‘saving for change’. 
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b) Factors affecting respondents’ decision for not saving  
 
It can be calculated from Table 5.29 that the major reasons respondents gave for not 
saving in MCIs and other financial institutions included lack of money to save 
(81.9%), prefer to invest in IGA (9.3%), low savings interest rate and prefer to save 
in kind (3.3% each), and prefer to save in Ekub (1.7%). Even though lack of money 
was one of the main reasons for not saving, it can be observed also that there were 
respondents who prefer to invest in IGA (start up or/and expansion) rather than the 
saving activities that should be encouraged in order to improve the prospects of the 
graduation process of the poor respondents ‘from-to’. 
 
During the household interview, the researcher asked about on how the lack of 
money affected the inability to save. The reply of the respondents was, “we all know 
the importance of savings and want to save but we don’t have extra money for 
savings, mainly influenced by profit we earn from the IGA loan that could not satisfy 
repayment, run the mini trade, or cover our household basic consumptions. Our 
financial problems were aggravated by frequent exposure to shocks/stress (health 
problem, drought, and cost of living etc.), and market related problems”. It can be 
observed from the respondents’ responses that the main reason for not saving was 
not due to a subjective factor (interest and know-how); rather, it was mainly due to 
objective factors including a sufficient income benefit from the IGA loans.  
 
The above research results indicate that, for the poor, saving is a function of a 
sufficient income increase from the IGA loans, which was not satisfied by the 
sampled MCIs. This is in line with what Hulem D., and Mosley P. (1996:119-221) 
stated in section 2.9.1. Moreover, it can also be deduced from Table 5.29 that the 
percentages of respondents who could not save due to lack of money included 
30.2% (ERCS), followed by 27.5% (DECSI), 18.1% (ex-clients), and 9.4% (LMFI and 
non-clients each).  
 
Table 5.29 shows that respondents who were discouraged from savings due to a low 
saving interest rate included 50% from DECSI followed by 16.7% from LMFI, ERCS, 
and ex-clients each. In addition, it can also be deduced from Table 5.29 that 
respondents who prefer to invest in mini-trade were 35.3%, 29.4%, and 11.8% from 
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DECSI, ERCS, and LMFI, AMFISC, and ex-clients each in that order. These 
research results indicated that lack of money as a reason for not saving was more 
frequently reported by client respondents than by ex-clients and non-clients. 
Therefore, microcredit participation could not necessarily secure a better savings 
profile than non-microcredit participants.  
 
Table 5.29: Reasons for not saving 
 
Variable 
 
MFI 
Lack of 
money 
 Low saving 
interest rate 
Prefer to save  
  in kind 
Prefer to save 
 in Ekub 
Prefer to  
save home 
Invest in mini 
business 
LMFI 
 
N=50 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
% of Total N 9.5% 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 9.8% 
Sum 14 1 1 0 0 2 
% of Total Sum 9.4% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 
DECSI 
 
N=163 
N 48 45 45 45 45 45 
% of Total N 28.6% 27.3% 27.3% 27.3% 27.3% 27.4% 
Sum 41 3 0 0 1 6 
% of Total Sum 27.5% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 35.3% 
AMFISC 
 
N=46 
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 
% of Total N 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.9% 
Sum 8 0 1 0 0 2 
% of Total Sum 5.4% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 
ERCS 
 
N=163 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 
% of Total N 30.4% 30.9% 30.9% 30.9% 30.9% 31.1% 
Sum 45 1 2 0 0 5 
% of Total Sum 30.2% 16.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 29.4% 
SCSC 
 
N=51 
N 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% of Total N 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% of Total Sum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ex-
clients 
 
N=72 
N 31 31 31 31 31 30 
% of Total N 18.5% 18.8% 18.8% 18.8% 18.8% 18.3% 
Sum 27 1 2 3 0 2 
% of Total Sum 18.1% 16.7% 33.3% 100.0% 0.0% 11.8% 
Non-
client 
 
N=28 
N 14 14 14 14 14 14 
% of Total N 8.3% 8.5% 8.5% 8.5% 8.5% 8.5% 
Sum 14 0 0 0 0 0 
% of Total Sum 9.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Total 
 
N=471 
N 168 165 165 165 165 164 
% of Total N 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sum 149 6 6 3 1 17 
% of Total Sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
It can also be observed from the above results that most of the respondents who 
prefer to invest on IGA than savings were from DECSI and ERCS.  During the 
household interview, the main reason observed was associated with a low saving 
interest rate that encouraged them to re-invest for better economic benefit than 
saving. Thus, the respondents are becoming aware of the most cost-effective 
utilization of their very limited resources. 
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It can also be shown from Table 5.29 that the respondents from SCSC ‘reasons for 
not saving’ were reported nil. As mentioned above, the regulation of SCSC was ‘first 
saving for credit’ and “more savings, more credit’ which encouraged them to save 
first in order to get a loan (forced savings) and to save more in order to get more 
loans (voluntary savings).  
 
The researcher checked that all sampled saving led microcredit institutions were 
paying a similar saving interest rate for their clients (5% per annum) while charging 
different and a higher loan interest rate ranging from 9%-18% per annum, which is 
unfair. The researcher noticed from the household’s interview and FDGs that the 
respondents were complaining on the unfair savings interest rate compared with the 
loan interest rate charged by savings led MFIs.  
 
Generally, from the above research findings it can be concluded that promoting and 
encouraging for saving is very crucial for clients, ex-clients, non-clients and saving-
led microcredit service. However, who, when, and what benefit of savings should be 
properly addressed through a ‘fair savings’ modality. Therefore, redesigning a saving 
modality is important for the benefit of both regulated and unregulated microcredit 
service providers to manage for the microcredit objectives they were founded for and 
that should be guiding their policies.  
 
Furthermore, it can also be concluded from the above findings that clients, ex-clients, 
and non-client respondents are becoming aware and sensitive not only to the loan 
interest rate charged but also to the saving interest rate paid. Subsequently, this 
should be reconciled on the basis of ‘fair cost’ for both loan interest rates and saving 
interest rates in a very transparent manner. Hence, both savings and micro loans are 
a function of buying and selling of funds. 
 
c) Ekub savings 
 
Ekub is one of the forms of traditional self-help groups formed voluntarily in Ethiopia, 
which include both saving and credit type associations whose members make 
regular contributions to a revolving loan fund. The formation of “Ekub “is based on 
classes of people who have identical (similar) earning or income. Unlike saving and 
    
 
  
185 
credit cooperatives, it does not bear interest on the money saved (collected) and 
distributed on a revolving loan modality. 
 
Table 5.30: Households Ekub saving (Birr) 
 
 
Variables 
Respondents  
LMFI DECSI AMFISC ERCS SCSC Ex-clients Non-clients Total  
 
 
Monthly 
Ekub  
payment 
(Birr) 
 
N 24 56 16 3 1 17 8 125 
% of Total N 19.2% 44.8% 12.8% 2.4% 0.8% 13.6% 6.4% 100.0% 
Minimum 20.00 0.00 5.00 20.00 940.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 
Maximum 13,400.00 10,000.00 2,000.00 40.00 940.00 5,200.00 600.00 13,400.00 
Mean 1,171.67 1,231.61 235.94 26.67 940.00 563.94 127.50 899.94 
Sum 28,120.00 68,970.00 3,775.00 80.00 940.00 9,587.00 1,020.00 112,492.00 
% of Total Sum 25.0% 61.3% 3.4% 0.1% 0.8% 8.5% 0.9% 100.0% 
 
 
Expected 
Ekub  
earning 
(Birr) 
N 24 56 16 3 1 17 8 125 
% of Total N 19.2% 44.8% 12.8% 2.4% 0.8% 13.6% 6.4% 100.0% 
Minimum 270.00 0.00 115.00 500.00 20,000.00 190.00 100.00 0.00 
Maximum 450,000.00 400,000.00 20,000.00 1,000.00 20,000.00 12,000.00 4,800.00 450,000.00 
Mean 34,093.33 40,712.50 2,442.81 700.00 20,000.00 3,417.35 1,325.00 25,824.16 
Sum 818,240.00 2,279,900 39,085.00 2,100.00 20,000.00 58,095.00 10,600.00 3,228,020.00 
% of Total Sum 25.3% 70.6% 1.2% 0.1% 0.6% 1.8% 0.3% 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
It can be calculated from Table 5.30 that, out of the total respondents, 26.5% of them 
have Ekub; 44.8%, 19.2%, 13.6%, 12.8%, 6.4 %, 2.4%, and 0.8% of the respondents 
were from DECSI, LMFI, Ex-clients, AMFISC, non-clients, ERCS, and SCSC 
respectively. This indicated that, regardless of their financial capacity engagement in 
Ekub, some members from each sampled MCI, ex-clients, and non-clients were 
involved in Ekub, which is, as noted, another other form of a saving and credit 
modality.   
 
Furthermore, it can be shown from Table 5.30 that the highest mean of monthly 
Ekub payment (Birr 1,171.76) expected from Ekub (Birr 34,093.33) was from LMFI 
respondents followed by DECSI, SCSC, ex-clients, AMFISC, non-clients, and ERCS 
respondents respectively; this was almost similarly reported on the maximum and 
minimum monthly of the expected Ekub payment, expected from Ekub.   This 
indicated that there were some respondents of clients and ex-clients with a relatively 
better financial capacity. The researcher observed that due to the financial capacity 
of ERCS respondents, they were the least secure in all aspects. From the survey 
results, it can be witnessed that the participation in Ekub was influenced by the 
financial capacity of the respondents. 
 
The study observed during the household interviews that the participation of the 
households in Ekub not only depends on their financial capacity but that also the 
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purpose of their participation in Ekub was varied; primary considerations were saving 
for repayment security by the poor households and saving for more investment by 
the better-off household’s. This was a similar trend with what was discussed above 
in the saving motives of respondents.  
 
Moreover, Table 5.30 shows that the sum amount of funds rotating in all Ekubs was 
eight times greater than the amount of funds reported on voluntary savings 
discussed on Table 5.28. This indicated that different respondents were using 
different modalities of savings, which should be researched to determine the best 
utilization of all sorts of savings of the respondents which would strengthen the 
‘community led cooperatives’ that could not only satisfy the specific interests of the 
respondents but also reduce the burden of MCIs on managing microloan 
businesses.    
 
Finally, the researcher suggested that the importance of analysing all sorts of saving 
behaviour of the borrowers is not only to secure the financial situation of the lenders 
but is crucially important for the borrowers as support on how to utilize savings for 
increased economic benefit; this could enhance their financial graduation process 
from-to and propose a better way of strengthening “local community led savings and 
credit schemes’. Hence, managing all sorts of the respondents’ savings effectively 
and efficiently matters.  
5.3.4 Reasons to take, dropout, and hide-out of microcredit 
 
This section deals with the respondents’ (clients, ex-clients, and non-clients) 
perceptions on factors that affect the households’ decisions to manage the 
microcredit loan, drop out from microcredit as well as hideaway from microcredit, the 
pull and push factors of microcredit. 
5.3.4.1 Factors affecting household’s decisions on demand for credit  
 
As shown in Table 5.31, factors such as better awareness/experiences (38.0%) 
followed by no alternative (25.8%), collateral (7.9%), credit access (7.8%), better 
family situation (6.4%), good credit history, repayment of other debt (3.9%), market 
access (3.6%), less awareness/experiences on its consequences (1.6% each), 
    
 
  
187 
forced  (1.4%) and better alternative  (0.4%) were perceived by the respondents as 
factors affecting households in their decisions to join and/or demand credit 
participation.  
 
From the above data it can be witnessed that a household’s decision to demand 
credit could be affected by various subjective and objective factors with regard to the 
reasons why some households take credit. This is primarily because of the 
heterogeneous economic situation; perceptions of the respondents, and diverse 
credit modality of the microcredit providers are among others that affect their 
decisions. 
 
Table 5.31: Reasons for households to take microcredit 
 
Variable 
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N=50 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
% of Total N 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 
Sum 1 39 1 0 22 8 1 11 1 1 6 
% of Total Sum 1.8% 11.8% 7.1% 0.0% 9.8% 24.2% 3.2% 16.4% 1.5% 33.3% 42.9% 
DECSI 
 
N=163 
N 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
% of Total N 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 
Sum 2 136 2 1 101 5 15 14 6 1 19 
% of Total Sum 3.6% 41.1% 14.3% 8.3% 44.9% 15.2% 48.4% 20.9% 8.8% 33.3% 11.7% 
AMFISC 
 
N=46 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
% of Total N 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 9.8% 
Sum 0 28 0 0 26 1 0 7 0 1 5 
% of Total Sum 0.0% 8.5% 0.0% 0.0% 11.6% 3.0% 0.0% 10.4% 0.0% 33.3% 35.7% 
ERCS 
 
N=163 
N 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
% of Total N 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 
Sum 0 25 5 10 13 6 5 23 23 0 0 
% of Total Sum 0.0% 7.6% 35.7% 83.3% 5.8% 18.2% 16.1% 34.3% 33.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
SCSC 
 
N=51 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
% of Total N 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 
Sum 2 34 1 1 15 3 3 6 1 0 0 
% of Total Sum 3.6% 10.3% 7.1% 8.3% 6.7% 9.1% 9.7% 9.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ex-clients 
 
N=72 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
% of Total N 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 
Sum 36 51 2 0 33 10 5 4 34 0 2 
% of Total Sum 64.3% 15.4% 14.3% 0.0% 14.7% 30.3% 16.1% 6.0% 50.0% 0.0% 14.3% 
Non-client 
 
N=28 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
% of Total N 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 
Sum 15 18 3 0 15 0 2 2 3 0 1 
% of Total Sum 26.8% 5.4% 21.4% 0.0% 6.7% 0.0% 6.5% 3.0% 4.4% 0.0% 7.1% 
 
Total 
 
N=471 
N 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 
% of Total N 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sum 56 331 14 12 225 33 31 67 68 3 33 
% of Total Sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of sum from total sum 
(873) 6.4% 38.0% 1.6% 1.4% 25.8% 3.9% 3.6% 7.8% 7.9% 0.4% 3.9% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
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Furthermore, it can be shown from Table 5.31 that the total respondents who replied 
‘better awareness/experiences’ on microcredit services as a reason for a 
household’s decision to accept microcredit was 20.8%; from ex-clients it was 
(15.4%) and for non-clients (5.4%). This indicated that both ex-clients and non-
clients were also appreciating the importance of appropriate awareness and 
experience with microcredit services. Therefore, creating proper awareness and 
sharing experiences of successful microcredit entrepreneurs could contribute as a 
pull factor to change the perception of ex-clients and non-clients and encourage 
them to join microcredit services. 
 
Moreover, from Table 5.31 it can be deduced that the total respondents who replied 
‘no alternative’ as a reason for a household’s decision to take microcredit was 78.6% 
from clients followed by ex-clients (14.7%), and non-clients (6.7%). In addition, 62% 
of DECSI clients replied ‘no alternative’ as a reason for households’ decisions to take 
microcredit.   
 
What are the factors for a household’s decision to take microcredit? This was also 
discussed during the FGDs and KIIs. All FDGs replied similarly: “We and other poor 
households don’t have our own capital to initiate IGA and manage our lives. We are 
not eligible for credit in any government and private banks, including the 
moneylenders. Thus, the only option we have was not only to go for microcredit but 
also we were forced to go to very limited MCIs”. On the other hand, the KIIs replied 
similarly but differently: “All households take microcredit not only as a better choice 
but as the best choice that could change their lives”. However, the important issues 
remain.  What have MCIs done and what are they doing with the poorest that are 
intrusted to them? 
 
From the above survey finding it can be concluded that the poorest respondents 
obviously decided to take microcredit in order to fill the gap of their unmet financial 
demand, which was a decision made under financial stress or constraints. This could 
force them to make decisions and prefer the better rather than the worst option: ‘no 
alternative’. Who should determine and qualify the factors that influence the 
household’s decision to take microcredit - ‘better alternative’ or ‘best alternative’? 
Should the households determine this or should the MCI experts and officials? The 
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researcher argues that the choice and participation of the poor households in 
microcredit should really make a difference in the lives of the poor households and 
the poor households themselves without internal and external pressure should justify 
this decision.  
 
As shown in Table 5.31, 3.9% of the respondents’ perceptions on factors that affect 
the decision of households to take a loan was ‘repayment of another loan’ and the 
majority of them were from DECSI.  This research finding is similar with what this 
study discussed on Table 5.23 and Figure 5.9. Therefore, the researcher suggests 
that the purpose of a loan, multiple loan engagement, and a decision for a 
microcredit loan of each household should be managed and monitored 
professionally. The reason is that the economic situations of the poor households is 
diversified and vulnerable; it cannot be managed by a ‘one type fits fall’ microcredit 
modality.  
 
It can be concluded from the Table 5.31 research results that the pull factors that 
affect a household’s decisions to request credit varied. Therefore, evaluating the 
factors that affect a household’s decision to request credit is very important; this is 
true not only to know why some households join credit while others not but also to 
identify what factors affect the decision of each household to request credit. This 
understanding enables MCIs to handle the selection criteria of clients properly in line 
with the objectives of the microcredit project.  
5.3.4.2 Why do households decide to exit or reject microcredit? 
 
Hulme et al. (1999:38) defined a voluntary exit as an exit that occurs when a client 
decides to rest, to transfer to another lending institutions or to completely withdraw 
from the microfinance services; a forced exit takes place when a client is pushed out 
by the staff of microfinance institution or by fellow group members. The drawback of 
this approach is that, in practice, it is difficult to specify which exit is the actual one, 
as voluntary and forced exits often coincide. 
 
Table 5.32 shows that the highest percentage factor that affects households’ 
decisions to exit was insecurity/phobia (40.3%) followed by a group problem 
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(15.8%), high interest rates (15.3%), over enforcement (6.5%), delay of 
disbursement (5.6%), other reasons (5.3%), don’t need loan (4.0%), repayment 
failure (2.9%), no time for meeting (2.0%), short grace period (1.0%), repayment 
frequency (0.8%), and forced savings (0.5%). 
 
Why some households drop out and reject microcredit services was also seriously 
discussed during the FDGs. All FDGs similarly said, “we realized that all poor 
households are interested to take and continue microcredit.  However, a significant 
number of households were afraid to continue or participate because of the 
experiences of other households or themselves who failed repayment and lost their 
property for repayment.  Those who dropped out were not all bad borrowers. Some 
of them failed because of inadequate profit from the loan IGA (market failure, high 
interest rate etc.). They were forced to exit safely (handling their repayment) and 
look at other options such as working with what they have, wage employment, urban 
migration etc. There was no recovery mechanism for those who failed that 
encouraged them to continue or participate in microcredit services.”  
 
This same question was discussed with the KIIs. Most of the KIIs said, “we observed 
that most of the drop out clients were bad performers in terms of repayment and this 
was mainly due to mal-management/utilization of the loan money while other good 
clients were continuing with very good repayment performances”.  Some of the KIIs 
considered other objective reasons for some households to drop out. They said, “we 
realized that some households were forced to drop out due to market failure and 
other objective personal problems (health problem, family size pressure etc.).” 
 
Furthermore, the researcher observed from the key informant interview discussions 
that questions on reasons why some clients drop out while others continue was 
responded to by citing to high repayment rates, generally achieved by microcredit 
organizations; this was cited as a measure of their success. However, much less 
attention has been devoted to the fact that microcredit recipients often drop out of 
the program upon successful repayment (safely exit). Thus, the researcher suggests 
that key questions be addressed by the MCIs. Why do some clients drop out while 
others continue? What type of preventive and recovery mechanism should be 
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designed for credit failures?  What type of entry and exit interviews of clients should 
be in place? These issues should be professionally addressed and managed.  
 
Generally, the researcher also observed from the household interview that the 
respondents explained ‘insecurity/phobia’ as a combined result of different but 
related feelings. These included inadequate profit from the loan (market failure and 
high interest rates etc.), chronic repayment failure that caused excessive 
enforcement and loss of property, absence of preventive and recovery mechanisms 
for potential and actual credit failures. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
‘insecurity/phobia’, the highest push factor that affects households to exit, is related 
with inadequate profit from loans, mainly caused by a high loan interest rate 
charged.  
 
Moreover, it can be shown from Table 5.32 that the total respondents (122 sum) who 
replied ‘high loan interest rates’ as a reason for a household’s decision to drop out 
and reject microcredit represented 28.7% from DECSI followed by 25.4% from ex-
clients, 24.6% from ERCS, 16.4% from LMFI, 5.7% from non-clients, 0.8% from 
AMFISC, and 0.0% from SCSC.  This indicates that the level of sensitivity and 
experience (direct or indirect) on loan interest rates varied among the sampled 
respondents (clients, ex-clients and non-clients). The above-mentioned perception of 
the respondents on ‘high loan interest rate’ does not necessarily reflect the situation 
of the MCI they were personally engaged with. All sampled MCIs were charging 
different loan interest rates and following different monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms for repayment failures.   
 
From Table 5.32, it can also be shown that dropout/exit is a common concern of all 
respondents, which will continue as a result of different factors. Consequently, it is 
very important to monitor the dropout phenomenon not only to convince the exit 
clients to re-join and attract the non-clients but more importantly to retain the existing 
clients and attract others. Thus, all regulated and unregulated microcredit providers 
should design separate client retention and exit strategy guidelines that fit with their 
specific institutional objectives and strategies. 
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Table 5.32: Why do households decide to drop out or reject microcredit? 
 
Variables 
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LMFI 
 
N=50 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
% of Total N 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.4% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 
Sum 1 8 7 3 20 0 2 0 2 35 3 3 
% of Total Sum 2.2% 6.3% 43.8% 9.4% 16.4% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 3.8% 10.9% 13.0% 7.1% 
DECSI 
 
N=163 
N 151 151 151 150 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
% of Total N 37.1% 37.1% 37.1% 37.0% 37.1% 37.1% 37.1% 37.1% 37.1% 37.1% 37.1% 37.1% 
Sum 4 61 0 4 35 0 0 0 13 142 9 4 
% of Total Sum 8.9% 48.4% 0.0% 12.5% 28.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 44.2% 39.1% 9.5% 
AMFISC 
 
N=46 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
% of Total N 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 
Sum 4 8 0 7 1 0 0 0 3 35 3 7 
% of Total Sum 8.9% 6.3% 0.0% 21.9% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.8% 10.9% 13.0% 16.7% 
ERCS 
 
N=61 
N 56 56 56 55 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
% of Total N 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 13.6% 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 
Sum 4 22 9 5 30 4 4 8 7 22 3 0 
% of Total Sum 8.9% 17.5% 56.2% 15.6% 24.6% 100.0% 66.7% 100.0% 13.5% 6.9% 13.0% 0.0% 
SCSC 
 
N=51 
N 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
% of Total N 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.2% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 
Sum 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 28 1 0 
% of Total Sum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.7% 4.3% 0.0% 
Ex-clients 
 
N=72 
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
% of Total N 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 
Sum 29 20 0 4 31 0 0 0 20 42 2 18 
% of Total Sum 64.4% 15.9% 0.0% 12.5% 25.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 38.5% 13.1% 8.7% 42.9% 
Non-client 
 
N=28 
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
% of Total N 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 
Sum 3 7 0 7 5 0 0 0 7 17 2 10 
% of Total Sum 6.7% 5.6% 0.0% 21.9% 4.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.5% 5.3% 8.7% 23.8% 
Total 
 
N=471 
N 407 407 407 405 407 407 407 407 407 407 407 407 
% of Total N 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Sum 45 126 16 32 122 4 6 8 52 321 23 42 
% of Total Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% of sum from total sum (797) 5.6% 15.8% 2.0% 4.0% 15.3% 0.5% 0.8% 1.0% 6.5% 40.3% 2.9% 5.3% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Finally, the researcher noticed from the above survey results that regardless of the 
extent and manifestation, client dropout was a problem for all regulated and 
unregulated MCIs in general and the big MCI (DECSI) in particular. Even though, the 
number of client dropout from each sample microcredit was not clear and deemed 
‘confidential’, the situation indicated that the problem was not addressed 
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professionally. The dynamic of the credit market and the need of the households 
(supply and demand) could influence the mobility of client’s from-to. Actually, the 
interest of this study was not to evaluate the number of client dropouts but mainly to 
assess the factors the affect it: why and who are deciding to drop out? Addressing 
this enables MCIs to design preventive and recovery mechanisms that could help 
both the respondents and sampled MCIs to think and manage client dropout 
differently. 
 5.3.4.3 Effects of microcredit on the wellbeing of client households 
 
This section deals with the impact of microcredit on the wellbeing of clients and 
factors that affect it. 
 
a) Perceptions of client respondents on livelihood before and after loans 
 
Table 5.33 shows that clients perceived that, as a result of getting loans, their 
livelihood was improved: slightly (76.3%), remarkably (12.7%), don’t know (9.4%), 
and no change (1.6%). In addition, with regard to the type of improvement, Table 
5.33 revealed that client respondents perceived improvement as a result of getting a 
loan as quality of meals (27.7%), household income (25.5%), livestock purchase 
(14.8%), household assets building (13.6%), job opportunity (10.6%), children’s 
school participation (6.8%), and the household health situation (0.6%). 
 
From the survey results of table 5.33, it can be observed that microcredit improved 
the client household’s livelihood significantly on consumption smoothing, which is a 
result of income generated by the micro loan activities they were engaged in. 
Therefore, consumption smoothing was the main impact of microcredit for client 
households. It appears that they were forced to spend more of the income generated 
from the microloan activities for consumption than re-investing for their future; this 
was the result of inadequate profits from the microloan IGA, assumed to cover loan 
repayment, consumption, and investing on business expansion. This is in line with 
what Sen A. (1999:47) mentioned in section 2.6-e.  
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Table 5.33: Perception of client respondents on livelihood before and after 
loan 
 
Comparison of life before and after loan * Cross tabulation 
 
Variables 
Name of MFI Total 
LMFI DECSI AMFISC ERCS SCSC 
Comparison 
of life before 
and after 
loan 
Remarkably improved Count 7 23 9 4 4 47 % of Total 1.9% 6.2% 2.4% 1.1% 1.1% 12.7% 
Slightly improved Count 42 126 36 38 41 283 % of Total 11.3% 34.0% 9.7% 10.2% 11.1% 76.3% 
No change Count 0 0 1 5 0 6 % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 1.3% 0.0% 1.6% 
I don't know Count 1 14 0 14 6 35 % of Total 0.3% 3.8% 0.0% 3.8% 1.6% 9.4% 
Total Count 50 163 46 61 51 371 % of Total 13.5% 43.9% 12.4% 16.4% 13.7% 100.0% 
Type of 
livelihood  
Improvement 
Quality of meals 
improved 
Count 41 101 23 14 18 197 
% of Total 5.8% 14.2% 3.2% 19.7% 2.5% 27.7% 
House assets improved Count 14 39 16 22 6 97 % of Total 2.0% 5.5% 2.3% 3.1% 0.8% 13.6% 
Increased HH income Count 35 98 28 18 2 181 % of Total 4.9% 13.8% 3.9% 2.5% 0.3% 25.5% 
Job opportunity 
improved 
Count 14 29 16 11 5 75 
% of Total 2.0% 4.1% 2.3% 1.6% 0.7% 10.6% 
Improved children school 
participation 
Count 6 4 16 10 12 48 
% of Total 0.8% 0.6% 2.3% 1.4% 1.7% 6.8% 
Health situation of HH 
improved 
Count 1 0 3 0 0 4 
% of Total 0.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
Livestock purchased  Count 1 45 5 22 32 105 % of Total 0.1% 6.3% 0.7% 3.1% 4.5% 14.8% 
New house built Count 0 1 1 0 0 2 % of Total 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
Land bought for 
construction 
Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% of Total 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
Other improvements  Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
Total Count 113 317 109 97 75 711 % of Total 15.9% 44.6% 15.3% 13.6% 10.5% 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
During the household interview, the researcher realized that ‘slight improvement’ on 
‘quality of meals improvement’ of the client households was comparing current with 
their previous inferior types of meal consumption, which is mainly quantitative. 
Furthermore, the researcher observed from the survey results and household 
interviews that those who replied ‘slightly improved’ were not only from the poor 
client respondents but also from the relatively ‘better-off’ client respondents as well. 
This showed that the slight improvement in income reported for the poor 
respondents may not be in absolute terms; the marginal benefits may be much 
higher in comparison to their non-poor counterparts. Thus, this should not be 
considered as the best way of evaluating the income of the poor from the microloan 
IGA.  
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The researcher suggests that the economic improvement of the poor from the micro 
loan IGA should be evaluated based on the concrete benefit or objectives of the loan 
project to the poor rather than the marginal economic benefit as compared to the 
‘non-poor’ client respondents; the small economic benefit from the micro loan IGA 
can impact the ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ clients differently. 
 
Moreover, during the household interview, the researcher tried to clarify why some 
client respondents replied ‘do not know’ and ‘no change’ as the result of getting a 
loan based on their livelihood.  Most of them reflect that they could not differentiate 
an improvement in their livelihood after their microcredit participation.  
 
The perception of client respondents on their livelihoods with and without microcredit 
engagement was also discussed during the FGDs. There were different perceptions. 
Some of the FGDs members said, “Our life might be worse than we are now. Our 
children might discontinue schooling and join street children. A micro loan was the 
only option for our lives”. Other members of FGDs said, “we might engage ourselves 
in different IGAs or manage with what we had. But we don’t know what would have 
been be our fate. It might have been better or worse.” It can be observed from the 
FGDs perceptions that some of the borrowers’ lives was better now than without 
microcredit while other respondents’ lives cannot be managed without microcredit. 
Therefore, identification of the dependency rate of borrowers matters to design 
client’s protection that reduce the costs and increase the benefits of the most 
vulnerable borrowers. 
 
Furthermore, from the above survey results it can be concluded that the quantitative 
and qualitative impact of microcredit on the livelihood of the respondents varied 
because of different subjective and objective factors. These factors included poverty 
level, vulnerability, diversification of income, market situation, access to credit, family 
size, and cost of loan that include loan interest rate.  These variables could 
potentially affect the impact of microcredit on the livelihood of the poor. 
Consequently, the researcher suggests that microcredit service providers should 
focus on specific segments of the community (gender, area, age, capable disability 
etc.), following appropriate modalities that fit with the specific segment, rather than 
trying to address all segments of the community insufficiently.  This encourages 
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MCIs to complement each other for the best interest of both borrowers and lenders 
and could potentially render unfair competition irrelevant.  
 
b) Client’s reasons for no improvement and possible solutions  
 
Table 5.34 shows that the major reasons for no improvement in the livelihoods of the 
households included inflation (31.3%), price of food and non-food items (28.1%), market 
problems (23.3%), high loan interest rates (18.8%), health problems (6.3%), and large family 
size (3.1%).  
According to the Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia, the inflation rate in Ethiopia 
was recorded at 5.9 per cent in November of 2014.  The inflation rate measures a 
broad rise or fall in prices that consumers pay for standard basic goods. As can be 
shown in Table 5.34, inflation was the major factor that negatively contributed to the 
client households’ livelihoods, which can aggravate other economic areas (interest 
rates, market problems etc.) and social factors (family size, health problems etc.). 
Thus, this study observed that the poor borrowers were more vulnerable for inflation 
than other borrowers; this was true not only in handling their microloan IGA 
effectively and efficiently but also to satisfy their basic consumption (food, health, 
nutrition, education etc.).  
It can be deduced from Table 5.34 that the client respondent’s opinion for the 
solution of poor improvement of their livelihood was looking for lower loan interest 
rates (32.5%) followed by ‘continuing credit and manage it differently’, ‘working with 
what they have’ and ‘don’t know’ (22. 5% each), and ‘drop out from credit’ (0.0%). It 
can be concluded from these survey results that solution driven is one of the pull 
factors for microcredit for households. 
  
In addition, Table 5.34 shows that 17.5% of opinions of ‘looking for lower interest 
rate’ were from DECSI respondents followed by 7.5% (LMFI and AMFISC each). 
From this survey results, it can be concluded that none of the client households 
preferred to exit from microcredit as a solution for their poor livelihoods improvement. 
This was in line with the survey findings discussed in Table 5.31 ‘no alternative’. 
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Table 5.34: Clients reasons for no improvement and possible solutions  
Reasons for no improvement and possible solutions * Cross tabulation 
 
Variables 
Name of MCIs  
Total LMFI DECSI AMFISC ERCS SCSC 
Major 
reasons for 
no 
improvement 
Health problem 
Count 0 0 0 2 0 2 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0% 6.3% 
Family size 
Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% of Total 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
Interest rate 
Count 0 5 1 0 0 6 
% of Total 0.0% 15.6% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 18.8% 
Inflation  
Count 1 2 2 2 3 10 
% of Total 3.1% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 9.4% 31.3% 
Market problem 
Count 0 0 1 3 0 4 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 8.6% 0.0% 23.3% 
Price of food & Non-
food items  
Count 2 1 3 2 1 9 
% of Total 6.3% 3.1% 9.4% 6.3% 3.1% 28.1% 
Total 
Count 4 8 7 9 4 32 
% of Total 12.5% 25.0% 21.9% 28.1% 12.5% 100% 
Possible 
solutions 
 Drop out from 
credit 
Count 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% of Total 0.0% 0.00% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Continuing credit & 
manage differently 
Count 2 0 1 4 2 9 
% of Total 5.0% 0.0% 2.5% 10.0% 5.0% 22.5% 
looking for less 
interest rate 
Count 3 7 3 0 0 13 
% of Total 7.5% 17.5% 7.5% 0.0% 0.0% 32.5% 
Working with what 
I have 
Count 0 3 1 2 3 9 
% of Total 0.0% 7.5% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 22.5% 
I don’t know 
Count 0 1 2 4 2 9 
% of Total 0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 10.0% 5.0% 22.5% 
Total 
Count 5 11 7 10 7 40 
% of Total 12.5% 27.5% 17.5% 25.0% 17.5% 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
  
It can be shown from Table 5.34 that loan interest rate was the major concern 
(15.6%) of DECSI respondents. This indicates that loan interest rate charged by 
DECSI was not affordable by some clients of DECSI. 
 
As it can be observed from the above survey results and analysis that due to the 
heterogeneous nature of the client households, the effects of microcredit on a client’s 
livelihood varied; the reasons for, and possible solutions, also varied accordingly, 
which was a function of interrelated variables. The important issue is to appreciate 
the effect of each variable on another. All variables were highly interrelated each 
other. 
 
Finally, the above survey results and analysis encouraged the conclusion that it 
seems to be very difficult to expect the inclusive and sustained satisfaction of poor 
borrowers on both consumption and investing in sustainable productive businesses 
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from small loans with higher loan interest rates; this is aggravated by vulnerability 
related to various economic and social phenomenon. Therefore, in order to address 
this controversy and adapt to the heterogeneous nature of the poor sector of the 
community, microcredit services should be revisited in a flexible, innovative, and 
community led/based modality.  
 
c)  Livelihood situation of ex-clients before and after drop out  
 
This subsection deals with the perception of ex-clients (before and after dropping 
out) and non-clients (no microcredit participation) on respondents’ livelihood, 
comparing this with the perception of client respondents presented in Table 5.33 and 
Table 5.34.  
 
It can be deduced from Table 5.35 that ex-client and non-client respondents 
perceived that their livelihood was improved; slightly (20.8% and 50%), no change 
(44.4% and 33.3%), remarkably (1.4% and 5.6%), slightly worse and much worse 
(0.0% each) respectively. 
 
In addition, with regard to the type of improvement, Table 5.35 also depicts that ex-
client and non-client respondents perceived an improvement on quality of meals 
(48.0% and 50.0%), household income (40.0% and 39.0%), and household asset 
and health improved (4.0% and 5.6%) respectively.  
 
From table 5.35 research results, it can be observed that the livelihood improvement 
of ex-clients and non-clients was mainly around consumption smoothing, similar to 
the clients’ livelihood improvement discussed in Table 5.33. These research results 
indicate that there was no significant difference in the livelihoods of the majority 
clients, ex-clients, and non-clients. Thus, the majority of the clients, ex-clients, and 
non-clients IGA return was mainly for ‘hand to mouth’ and/or for ‘survival’ economic 
efforts that forced them to remain in poverty.  
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Table 5.35: Livelihood situation of ex-client and non-client respondents 
Comparison of ex-clients and non-clients livelihood * Cross tabulation 
Variables  
 
Total 
 
Respondents 
Remarkably 
improved 
Slightly 
s improved 
No 
 change 
Slightly 
 Worst 
Much  
more worst 
Ex-clients Count 1 15 24 29 3 72 % of Total 1.4% 20.8% 33.3% 40.3% 4.2% 100.0% 
Non-clients Count 1 9 8 0 0 18 % of Total 5.6% 50.0% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
Types of livelihood improvement 
Respondents Quality of meals improved 
Increased 
household 
Income 
Household 
assets 
improved 
Children 
school 
participation 
Health 
situation of 
HH improved 
Total 
Ex-clients Count 12 10 1 1 1 25 % of Total 48.0% 40.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
Non-clients Count 9 7 1 0 1 18 % of Total 50.0% 39.0% 5.6% 0.0% 5.6% 100.0% 
Reasons for remarkable and slight improvement 
Respondents Working with  what I have 
Support of friends  
and relatives 
 
Formal  
employment 
Safety net 
 
Labour sale 
 Total 
Ex-clients Count 13 1 1 3 1 19 % of Total 68.4% 5.3% 5.3% 15.9% 5.3% 100% 
Non-clients 
Count 5 0 0 4 2 11 
% of Total 45.4% 0.0% 0.0% 36.4% 18.2% 100% 
Reasons for no improvement (No change, slightly worse, and much more worse) 
Respondents Lack of fair credit  access  Family size 
Repayment 
of last loan Inflation 
Market 
problem Total 
Ex-clients Count 24 7 6 26 9 72 % of Total 33.3% 9.7% 8.3% 36.1% 12.5% 100% 
Non-clients Count 6 2 0 7 4 19 % of Total 31.6% 10.5% 0.0% 36.8% 21.1% 100% 
Possible solutions for no improvement (No change, slightly worse, and much more worse) 
Respondents To join microcredit 
To look for lower  
interest rate MCI 
To work with 
what I have 
Family or 
friend support Do not know Total 
Ex-clients Count 26 36 5 4 1 72 % of Total 36.1% 50.5% 6.9% 5.6% 1.4% 100% 
Non-clients Count 7 9 0 3 0 19 % of Total 36.8% 47.4% 0.0% 15.8% 0.0% 100% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, Table 5.35 shows that major reasons for remarkable or slight 
improvement on the livelihoods of the ex-client and non-client respondents included 
working with what they have (68.4% and 45.4%) followed by safety net (15.9% and 
36.4%), and labour sales (5.3% and 18.2%) respectively. These research findings 
indicate that ex-clients and non-clients have alternatives other than microcredit 
services to manage their livelihoods.  
As can be also observed from Table 5.35, the contribution of the safety net on the 
livelihoods of the non-client respondents was high; that encouraged them to spend 
more of their time on this than the clients.   
Also, it is clear from Table 5.35 that the major reasons for the ‘no livelihood 
improvement’ of ex-client and non-client respondents was inflation (36.1% and 
36.8%), lack of fair credit access (33.3% and 31.6%), market problems (12.5% and 
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21.1%), family size (9.7% and 10.5%), and repayment of last loan (8.3% and 0.0%) 
respectively.  Firstly, It can be observed from these survey results that inflation, 
market problems, fair credit access (cost of the loan and others), and family size 
were the factors that commonly affected the livelihood of both clients, ex-clients, and 
non-clients. Secondly, repayment of the last loan was a post dropout problem of 
some ex-client respondents that created a chain of problems with micro loans. 
Thirdly, all mentioned factors that affect livelihoods were highly related with the 
economic capacity and level of vulnerability of the respondent households; this was 
similar to the reasons mentioned above by the clients for ‘no improvement in their 
livelihoods’. Therefore, in order to manage MCIs effectively and efficiently, designing 
a loan modality that fits with the poverty situation of borrowers is crucial, which is one 
of the main objectives of all pro-poor MCIs.   
It can also be shown from Table 5.35 that the major view of ex-client and non-client 
households for the solutions of their poor livelihood improvement was to look for 
lower interest rate MCIs (50.5% and 47.4%), to join microcredit (36.1% and 36.8%), 
and to work with what they have (6.9% and 0.0%) respectively. From the above 
survey results it can be concluded that both ex-clients (those with direct experience 
of microcredit) and non-clients (indirect experience of microcredit) were sensitive to 
the loan interest rate charged; this is similar to the view of client respondents 
discussed in Table 5.34 above.  
 
Finally, it can be concluded from the above survey results that it was not only the ex-
clients and non-clients that were interested in micro loans; client respondents were 
not interested in dropping out of the micro loan they had. The microloan was one of 
the preferred means for the majority of respondents for security of livelihood; due to 
various reasons, the demand of both clients and non-clients for micro loans was not 
satisfied by the sampled microcredit providers. Therefore, the microcredit modality in 
general and the affordability of the loan interest rate in particular, should be re-
designed in a way that satisfies the needs of poor borrowers. The above survey 
findings and conclusion is in line with what Fazle H.A. (2000: 8-13) points out in 
section 2.9.1. 
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5.3.4.4 Perception of household on loan interest rates 
 
This section addresses the perceptions of client, ex-client and non-client 
respondents on loan interest rates charged by the sampled microcredit providers.  
 
a) Evaluation on loan interest rates charged 
 
It can be calculated from Figure 5.10 that 50.1%, 24.5%, 17.8%, and 7.5% of client 
respondents evaluate the loan interest rates charged as high, reasonable/affordable, 
low, and ‘I don’t know’ respectively. Similarly, 45.0%, 40.0%, 8.0%, and 7.0% of ex-
client and non-client respondents evaluate the loan interest rates charged as high, 
reasonable/affordable, low, and ‘I don’t know’ respectively. This indicated that a 
significant number of client and non-client respondents were sensitive to interest rate 
charged as ‘high price sensitivity’.  This is in line with what Dehejia R., Montgomery 
H., and Jonathan M. (2005:5) cited in section 2:10.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Perception of respondents on loan interest rates charged 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Furthermore, it can also be calculated from Figure 5.10 that 29.9%, 11.3%, 8.9%, 
6.7%, and 0.5% of those who said the loan interest rate charged was high were 
clients from DECSI, SCSC, AMFISC, LMFI, and ERCS respectively.  Figure 5.10 
also revealed that 35.0% of ex-clients and 10.0% of non-clients evaluate the loan 
interest rate charged as high. From this survey result, it can be observed that the 
LMFI DECSI AMFISC ERCS SCSC Ex-clients
Non-
clients
Low rate 4 3 1 57 1 6 2
reasonable/affordable 17 61 7 2 4 30 10
High rate 25 85 33 1 42 35 10
I don’t know 4 14 5 1 4 1 6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
    
 
  
202 
majority of DECSI clients were not comfortable with the amount of loan interest rates 
charged. The researcher suggests that DECSI should work on how to align the loan 
interest rate with the poor. This in line with what Letanaha E. (2009:11) said about 
Ethiopian MFIs in section 1.3. 
 
Moreover, it can also be calculated from Figure 5.10 that 16.4% of DECSI’s clients 
were among those who said that the loan interest rate was reasonable/affordable. 
This indicated that not only the borrowers of different MCIs but also the borrowers of 
the same MCI were not a homogeneous group; that is why their micro loan needs 
and support varied. This is in line with what Martin I., and Hulme D. (2002:273-275) 
stated in section 2.9.6. 
 
The perception and evaluation of respondents on loan interest rate charged was also 
discussed during the FGDs. Similarly, different opinions were reflected. The majority 
of the FDG participants said, “even though the amount of the loan interest rate we 
are charged was good compared with the amount of individual money lenders, it was 
high and beyond our economic capacity to afford it”. A small number of FGD 
participants said, “the amount of loan interest rate charged was fair; rather, our main 
problem is market failure and inflation”.  
 
Hence, in order to address the heterogeneous economic situation of the poor 
borrowers’ microcredit modalities in general, and loan interest rate in particular, 
different levels of support should be designed that include subsidies. This is also in 
line with what Martin I., and Hulme D. (2002:273-275) said in section 2.9.6. 
 
b) Impact of loan interest rates on households 
 
From Figure 5.11, it can be calculated that client responses on the impact of loan 
interest rates were as follows: little net profit (34.8%), reduces further demand for 
credit (30.7%), repayment problems (15.4%), affects wellbeing (11.6%) and 
increases indebtedness (6.7%). Similarly, the responses of ex-clients on the effects 
of loan interest rates was as follows: little net profit (48.0%), affects wellbeing 
(17.0%) repayment problems (13.0%), increases indebtedness (12.0%), reduces 
further demand for credit (10.0%).  From the above results it can be observed that 
    
 
  
203 
‘little net profit’ was noted as the highest impact of loan interest rates for both clients 
and non-clients. Even though all variables of high loan interest rate effects are highly 
interrelated, it can be concluded that ‘little net profit’ from the loan IGAs was not only 
the main reason for other effects of high loan interest rates but also the common 
concern of clients, ex-clients and non-clients. 
 
Furthermore, it can be observed from the above survey results that repayment was 
the common problem for both clients and non-client respondents, which can 
discourage the client’s further credit requests, encourage the ex-clients drop out 
decision, and discourage both ex-clients and non-clients to join microcredit services.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Impact of loan interest rates on households 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Perceptions of the impact of the loan interest rate were also discussed during the 
FGDs. The opinion of respondents who perceived the loan interest rate as high said, 
“we were forced to pay our loan not only from our very little net profit but also while 
our income was at a loss, which affects our future and livelihood as well”.  Thus, the 
effect of the loan interest rate on the poor borrowers was serious; it affected not only 
the objective of the micro loan IGAs but also the livelihoods of the poor households. 
Therefore, the loan interest rate should be evaluated and designed from the poor 
borrowers’ perspectives.  
 
LMFI DECSI AMFISC SCSC ERCS Ex-clients
Non-
clients
Little net profit 18 73 16 15 7 35 13
repayment problem 8 42 5 1 1 10 3
Reduce demand 16 16 12 29 41 7 3
Increase indebtedness 5 16 1 1 0 9 3
Affect  well-being 3 13 11 5 11 17 0
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From the above results it can be concluded that interest rates charged erode the 
amount of profit that the borrowers are expected to gain. Consequences of a low 
profit from the loan include repayment problems, reduced demand and increased 
indebtedness, affecting the wellbeing of the borrowers. Thus, the study observed 
that the effect of high loan interest rates is multi-dimensional. This is in line with what 
Claire M. (2013:1-3) talks about in section 2.10.2. 
 
From the above findings, it is also possible to conclude that the interest rate is one of 
the main reasons for the lower profit or income of the poor from the loan project. 
When clients are unable to increase their income from the loan, they obviously not 
only default on their loans, falling into a debt trap, thus reducing demand, but also 
are unable to invest in their savings accounts. It is difficult to isolate ‘little net profit’ of 
the borrowers from the micro loan project with other variables. Therefore, the amount 
of income that the poor borrowers gain from the loan project matters for the success 
of both borrowers and lenders success. This is in line with what Waterfield (2011, no 
page number) stated in section 2.8.  
 
 ‘Indebtedness’ and ‘repayments’ are highly related.  Hence, repayments do not 
necessarily treat Indebtedness. The researcher grasped that some borrowers repay 
one micro loan by taking another micro loan from another microcredit service. Thus, 
they have multiple loans and the repayment of the previous loan is managed not 
from the return of the loan but from another loan source; this exacerbates the over-
indebtedness of the borrowers. Thus, the researcher suggests that repayment levels 
should not always be considered as the best indicator for good microcredit 
performance. The source of repayment and the enforcement mechanisms used 
should be seriously addressed. It can be concluded that an unhealthy repayment 
source is equivalent to an unhealthy microcredit performance that negatively affects 
both the borrowers and the lenders.  
 
Finally, it was revealed through the in-depth discussion with the focal group 
discussions and the researcher recognized that although the interest on loans is one 
of the major factors for the financial burden of microcredit users, it was not 
necessarily the only contributing factor to borrowers being unable to make 
repayments on time. 
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c) Perception on amount of saving interest rate paid 
 
As discussed in Table 5.29, one of the reasons the respondents gave for not being 
able to save was a low saving interest rate gained compared with the amount of loan 
interest rate charged. This indicated that some of the respondents were not only 
aware of the loan interest rates charged, but also aware of the saving interest rate 
gained.  Thus, in order to encourage and mobilize savings, ‘fair loan interest rates’ 
enable users to scale up their loan IGAs and receive a fair profit from the loan 
project, creating more savings for more and continuous investments. 
 
 Even though loan interest rates and fair profit from the loan IGA was not the only 
determinant variable for saving decisions of the poor households, it would be unfair 
to encourage the poor to save without a fair saving interest rate, which is ‘saving for 
change’.  
5.3.4.5 Household income trends of the last year 
 
It can be calculated from Figure 5.12 that 48.2%, 38.3%, 10.5%, and 3% of client 
households’ income trend over the last year was fluctuating, increasing, stable, and 
decreasing respectively. 60.0%, 18.0%, 12.0%, and 10.0% of the non-client 
households’ income trend of the last year was fluctuating, stable, increasing, and 
decreasing respectively. It can be observed from the findings of this survey that the 
main pattern of income trends for both client and non-client households was 
‘fluctuating’, which indicated that not only the business they were engaged in was 
‘fragile’ but also their source of income was unstable and insecure. This demands 
special attention and professional support. 
 
During the household interviews, the researcher observed that the increasing income 
pattern of most respondents was not an absolute term; rather it was on relative term. 
They expressed as ‘having something’ better than ‘nothing’. The researcher also 
learned that assessing the pattern of the microcredit income of households was 
important not only to evaluate the income flow but also to assess the vulnerability of 
means of income of the respondents.  
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Figure: 5.12: Households’ income trends of the last year 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
In addition, the researcher noticed that the fluctuating nature of income of the 
household matters; this impact influences the income flow of the households, affects 
the economic benefit of the borrowers and the possibility to secure a loan repayment 
without compromising the future of the poor households. 
5.3.4.6 Income comparison of clients and ex-clients/non-clients  
 
This section addresses the perception of clients and non-clients on the economic 
impact of microcredit.’ 
 
a) Ex-clients and non-clients’ perception on client’s income 
 
Figure 5.13 reveals that the perception of non-clients on client’s income as a result of 
their participation in microcredit as ‘they don’t know’ (48%), client’s income slightly 
improved (37%), no difference (8%), client’s income highly improved (5%), and 
client’s income highly worsened (2%).  
 
From these survey findings, it can be observed that 48 percept of the non-clients 
were not in a position to assess the impact of a micro loan on a client’s income. 
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During the HHs interviews, the researcher tried to discuss this issue with some 
respondents. Their response was that they were not aware of or motivated by the 
participation of the clients. This could negatively affect the pull factor for joining non-
clients to microcredit possibilities; a good perception of non-clients over the benefits 
of clients from their participation could have a positive impact on their future 
participation. Therefore, microcredit institutions should be aware of and assess the 
influence of their clients not only on non-clients but also on clients of other 
microcredit institutions. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.13 the non-clients’ perception on client’s income as a result of 
their microcredit participation was that ‘client’s income was slightly improved’ (37%). 
As to why client’s income was slightly improved, the perception of non-clients was 
that this was due to a client’s self-employment, a positive perception that could 
enhance the pull factor for attracting non-clients. Therefore, good microcredit 
performance and benefit from loan IGAs serves not only to retain clients but also to 
pull others towards microcredit services.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Perception of non-clients on client’s income 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
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The researcher observed, both during the household interview and from the research 
results above, that the opinions of the non-clients on the income of the clients as a 
result of their participation in microcredit were not, as such, strong. Their comparison 
was based more on quantitative measures than on qualitative ones. Generally, this 
indicated that the perceptions of non-client respondents on the client’s economic 
impact of microcredit did not lead to an eager sense of appreciation that might pull 
them to apply for microcredit themselves.  Therefore, the performance of clients can 
serve as both push and pull factors of microcredit engagement for non-clients.  
 
b) Clients perceptions of ex-clients’ and non-clients’ income 
 
Figure 5.14 shows that the perception of clients on non-clients’ income as a result of 
not participating in microcredit was ‘they don’t know’ (48.9%), slightly worsened 
(23.4%), highly worsened (19.9%), no difference (3.2%), slightly improved (3.0%), 
and highly improved (1.6%).  
 
Therefore, the study observed from the above research results that majority of the 
client respondents could not assess the economic impact of the non-clients as a 
result of not participating in microcredit as compared with their own membership. 
This was not a matter of culture or any social norms or values; rather this may 
indicate that they could not properly compare the comparative advantages of their 
own microcredit participation with their peers and visa-versa. Thus, microcredit 
institutions should be aware of and assess how their clients perceive their 
participation compared not only with non-clients but also with clients of other 
microcredit providers through a ‘clients’ satisfaction monitoring system’, which is not 
yet applied by any sampled MCIs.  
 
Form Figure 5.14, it can also be seen that 23.4 per cent and 19.9 per cent of client 
respondents perceived that the incomes of non-clients were affected negatively as a 
result of not participating in microcredit. During the household interview, some of the 
clients were asked about why non-clients’ income was affected negatively; their 
opinion was mainly associated with a lack of self-employment of the non-clients’ 
households that would enable them to generate more income. 
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The other important issue discussed with some respondents during the household 
interview was why some of the non-clients’ income was improved without 
participating in microcredit while other non-clients were affected negatively. Their 
response was, “those households who improved their income without participating in 
microcredit were those who have better initial start-up capital, diversified household 
income sources, living in their own house, and who committed themselves to 
manage their lives without a micro loan”. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Perception of clients on ex-clients’ and non-clients’ income  
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded from the above research results that even though 
pro-poor microcredit was very important for the poor, it is difficult to conclude that the 
livelihoods of the poor entirely depend on microcredit. Due to various reasons, there 
are some poor households who are managing their livelihood economies without 
microcredit. Thus, the opportunity cost for the poor of engagement in microcredit 
should be understood and carefully considered.   
5.3.4.7 Future intention to join a microcredit service (non-clients) 
 
This subsection addresses the perception of ex-clients and non-clients regarding 
their interest and intention to join microcredit services, and reasons for their 
decisions. 
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It can be calculated from Figure 5.15 that 91% of ex-clients and non-clients 
expressed their intention to join microcredit services. However, the preference of ex-
clients was not necessarily to re-join their previous microcredit institutions. The good 
news was that their discontinuation from microcredit was not final. The researcher 
confidently concludes that ex-clients and non-clients may join microcredit service 
provided that their ‘interest’ is satisfied through alternative preferences of microcredit 
modalities including a fair loan interest rate. 
 
Moreover, it can also be calculated from Figure 5.15 that the preference of 
microcredit institutions of ex-clients and non-clients was ERCS (61.5%), any with low 
loan interest rate (29.7%), SCSC (4.4%), DECSI (3.3%), and AMFISC (1.1%).  
Additionally, it can also be calculated from Figure 5.15 that the reasons for their 
preference of the microcredit institution was because of low loan interest rate (43%), 
close follow-up, fair enforcement (23% each), individual base loan (5.2%), large 
amount of loan (3.7%), simple procedures (2%), and a grace period (1.5%) 
respectively.  
 
It can be concluded from the above research results that a low interest rate is one of 
the major factors that may encourage non-clients to join MCIs. Thus, a low interest 
rate is a pull factor; a high loan interest rate is a push factor. 
 
a. Ex- clients’ and non-clients’ intention to join microcredit  
 
It can also be concluded from figure 5.15 survey results that the major factor influencing the 
preference of ex-clients and non-clients regarding joining microcredit services was the 
amount of loan interest rate charged. Therefore, the major problem of the poor households is 
not only access to credit but also the amount of a loan interest rate.  
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Figure 5.15 Intention to join and preference of microcredit service  
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
 
b. Ex-clients’ and non-clients’ reasons for not joining microcredit  
 
From Figure 5:16 it can be calculated that 9 % of the total ex-client and non-client 
respondents decided not to join any microcredit services in the near future. 
Furthermore, It can also be calculated from Figure 5.16 below that the factors that 
affected their decision for not joining was ‘afraid to take a loan’ (44.4%), being biased 
and looking at other sources (22.2% each), and no need (11.1% each). 
 
The highest percentage reason for not joining was ‘afraid to take loan’. This was 
discussed with some respondents and their response was, insecure of its economic 
benefit and enforcement’.  This is in line with the decision of respondents to drop out 
discussed above. Regardless of the number of respondents, the insecurity/phobia of 
respondents on some microcredit services should be managed fairly. 
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Figure 5.16: Reasons for no intention to join microcredit service 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
5.3.4.8 What do households like most about microcredit service? 
 
This subsection addresses the perception of clients and non-clients on what they like 
most about MCIs.  
 
Table 5.36 shows that the major reasons for a client’s positive attitude toward MCIs 
include ‘being better than money lenders’ (23.3%), simple procedure (15.9%), low 
loan interest rates (15.4%), individual based loan (10.8%), loan disbursement 
(10.7%), support of credit officers (8.3%), accessibility (7.8%) and getting alternative 
credit services (5.2%).  
 
Moreover, Table 5.36 depicts that ‘better than money lenders’, group based loan, 
and field officers support (24.9% each), lower interest rate (11.2%), simple 
procedures (6.2%), and getting alternative MCIs (4.2%) were the major reasons for 
non-clients’ positive attitudes towards MCIs.  
 
It can be calculated from the data in Table 5.36 that 56.7 per cent of respondents’ 
perceptions of what they like most about microcredit services cited the lower interest 
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rates charged by LMFI, AMFISC, SCSC, and ERCS; 60.7 per cent of DECSI 
respondents noted that the loan interest rate charged by DECSI needs improvement.  
 
Furthermore, this issue was also discussed during FGDs of both clients and non-
clients and they said, ‘MCIs are by far better than individual moneylenders and 
banks. This is because of the high interest rates of moneylenders and inaccessibility 
of banks for the poor.  Both are serving the better-offs”. 
 
From the above survey finding, the researcher grasps that the comparison of 
moneylenders, banks and MCIs was based on ‘better than worst’ option that invades 
the social objective of MCIs. Therefore, the comparison of the respondents was not 
correct, because these lenders have different objectives and platforms. The 
researcher suggests that the comparison of MCIs, banks, and moneylenders should 
be evaluated against their objectives. This is in line with what Meyer R.L (2002:2-5) 
mentioned in section 2.7. 
 
Table 5.36: What households like most about microcredit service 
Most like about microcredit *Cross tabulation 
Variables 
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To
ta
l 
Clients 
LMFI 
N=50 
Count 0 12 24 9 0 16 16 0 0 11 9 22 4 123 
% of Total 0.0% 1.5% 3.0% 1.1% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 1.1% 2.7% 0.5% 30.6% 
DECSI 
N=163 
Count 115 7 34 26 4 22 24 1 0 18 19 139 2 296 
% of Total 0.0% 0.9% 4.2% 3.2% 0.5% 2.7% 3.0% 0.1% 0.0% 2.2% 2.3% 17.1% 0.2% 36.5% 
AMFISC 
N=46 
Count 1 20 5 11 3 4 8 0 1 7 5 19 2 86 
% of Total 0.1% 2.5% 0.6% 1.3% 0.4% 0.5% 1.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.9% 0.6% 2.3% 0.2% 10.6% 
ERCS 
N=61 
Count 0 59 32 17 0 28 6 1 1 0 33 0 0 177 
% of Total 0.0% 7.3% 3.9% 2.1% 0.0% 3.4% 0.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 4.1% 0.0% 0.0% 21.8% 
SCSC 
N=51 
Count 0 27 34 24 0 18 9 0 2 6 1 9 0 130 
% of Total 0.0% 3.3% 4.2% 3.0% 0.0% 2.2% 1.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.1% 1.1% 0.0% 16.0% 
Total 
N=371 
Count 1 125 129 87 7 88 63 2 4 42 67 189 8 812 
% of Total 0.1% 15.4% 15.9% 10.7% 0.9% 10.8% 7.8% 0.2% 0.5% 5.2% 8.3% 23.3% 1.0% 100.0% 
Non-clients  
Ex-clients 
N=72 
Count 0 38 24 0 72 0 3 0 2 12 72 72 1 296 
% of Total 0.0% 9.4% 6.0% 0.0% 17.9% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.5% 3.0% 17.9% 17.9% 0.2% 73.6% 
Non-client 
N=28 
Count 3 7 1 0 28 0 2 0 2 5 28 28 2 106 
% of Total 0.7% 1.7% 0.2% 0.0% 7.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.2% 7.0% 7.0% 0.5% 26.4% 
Total 
N=100 
Count 3 45 25 0 100 0 5 0 4 17 100 100 3 402 
% of Total 0.7% 11.2% 6.2% 0.0% 24.9% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 1.0% 4.2% 24.9% 24.9% 0.7% 100.0% 
Client and non-clients 
Total 
N=471 
Count 4 170 154 87 107 88 68 2 8 59 167 289 11 1214 
% of Total 0.3% 14.0% 12.7% 7.2% 8.8% 7.2% 5.6% 0.2% 0.7% 4.9% 13.8% 23.8% 0.9% 100.0% 
Source: Data from fieldwork, 2014 
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As it can be shown in Table 5.36 that 26.6 per cent of the respondents (15.4% 
clients and 11.2% non-clients) said a lower interest rate was what they most liked 
about microcredit service and referred to the lower loan interest rate charged by 
ERCS, LMFI, AMFISC, and SCSC, the appropriate comparison that helped reinforce 
their comments; further, they insisted that DECSI to revise and improve its 
microcredit market modality to benefit both DECSI and its borrowers. 
 
The study observed from the above research findings that all poor households seek 
microcredit services to fill the gap of their resource limitations, resources not 
available to invest on areas that make a difference in their livelihoods. However, the 
factors affecting their interest on microcredit noticeably varied. This was mainly 
because of the heterogeneous nature of the ‘poor’ households. Thus, understanding 
what exactly the poor households need matters in managing microcredit for the 
benefit of the borrowers in general and poor borrowers in particular.  
 
5.3.4.9 What improvements do households need in microcredit services? 
 
This subsection deals with the reflection of client and non-client respondents on what 
improvement they need in MCIs. 
 
Table 5:37 shows that the perception/suggestion of the client respondents on how 
they microcredit services to improve and includes the amount of loan (22.6%), loan 
interest rates (21.1%), loan term loan (15.2%), individual base loan (8.4%), fair 
saving interest rate, (7.9%), grace period (7.2%), loan procedure (6.1%), field 
officers’ support (3.7%), appropriate enforcement (2.4%), addressing the very poor 
(0.9%), and compulsory savings (0.4%).  
 
Furthermore, it can be deduced from Table 5.37 that the perception of non-clients on 
what improvements they would like to see in microcredit services included amount of 
loan (24.0%), loan interest rates (22.1%), appropriate enforcement (17.0%), 
addressing the very poor (12.9%), loan term loan (6.4%), field officers support 
(5.5%), grace period (5.1%), individual base loan (4.1%), loan procedure (2.3%), 
compulsory savings (0.5%), and fair saving interest rate, (0.0%). 
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Table 5.37: What kinds of improvements do households need in microcredit service? 
 
Needs improvement  * Cross tabulation 
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Client 
LMFI 
N=50 
Count 24 6 27 47 6 2 0 5 0 13 0 130 
% of Total 3.6% 0.9% 4.0% 7.0% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 19.4% 
DECSI 
N=163 
Count 99 16 68 15 8 5 1 30 11 40 1 294 
% of Total 14.8% 2.4% 10.2% 2.2% 1.2% 0.7% 0.1% 4.5% 1.6% 6.0% 0.1% 43.9% 
AMFISC 
N=46 
Count 11 10 17 6 7 7 0 15 1 0 4 78 
% of Total 1.6% 1.5% 2.5% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.6% 11.7% 
ERCS 
N=61 
Count 2 5 33 30 24 3 2 4 3 0 1 107 
% of Total 0.3% 0.7% 4.9% 4.5% 3.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 16.0% 
SCSC 
N=51 
Count 5 4 33 4 3 8 0 2 1 0 0 60 
% of Total 0.8% 0.6% 4.9% 0.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 9.0% 
Total 
N=371 
Count 141 41 178 102 48 25 3 56 16 53 6 669 
% of Total 21.1% 6.1% 22.6% 15.2% 7.2% 3.7% 0.4% 8.4% 2.4% 7.9% 0.9% 100.0% 
Non-clients 
Ex-clients 
N=72 
Count 31 4 43 8 7 8 0 7 23 0 26 157 
% of Total 14.3% 1.8% 19.8% 3.9% 3.2% 3.9% 0.0% 3.2% 10.6% 0.0% 12.0% 72.3% 
Non-client 
N=28 
Count 17 1 9 6 4 4 1 2 14 0 2 60 
% of Total 7.8% 0.5% 4.1% 2.8% 1.8% 1.8% 0.5% 0.9% 6.4% 0.0% 0.9% 27.7% 
Total 
N=100 
Count 48 5 52 14 11 12 1 9 37 0 28 217 
% of Total 22.1% 2.3% 24.0% 6.4% 5.1% %5.5 0.5% 4.1% 17.0% 0.0% 12.9% 100.0% 
Client, and non-clients 
Total 
N=471 
Count 189 46 230 116 59 37 4 65 53 53 34 886 
% of Total 21.3% 5.2% 26.0% 13.1% 6.7% 4.2% 0.4% 7.3% 6.0% 6.0% 3.8% 100.0% 
Source: Own field data collection and analysis, 2014 
 
From the above data it can be observed that both clients and non-clients need the 
most improvements on the amount of a loan followed by a change in the loan 
interest. The reflections of the clients and non-clients were very similar on those 
issues. The major difference appeared regarding the third major need, which was the 
loan term for clients; the third major issue for non-clients was the enforcement. This 
indicated that there were more phobias around MCIs in non-clients than among the 
clients. This could be a matter of past experiences and perceptions on this regard.  
 
Another interesting point from the above survey findings was the reflection of the 
clients and non-clients on improvement of ‘addressing the very poor’. The researcher 
tried to discuss this issue with some of the non-clients’ respondents. Their response 
was, ‘the very poor sector of the community is still marginalized from microcredit and 
this was due to a lack of an appropriate credit modality that fits with their socio-
economic situation’.  This indicates that the respondents were concerned about the 
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very poor people who were eligible bur not yet addressed by MCIs. This opinion was 
in line with what Jonathan M., and Haley D. (2002:31) address in section 2.9.1.  
 
Moreover, the opinion of the clients and non-clients on the improvement of 
addressing the very poor is also in line with one of the serious criticisms on 
microfinance services mentioned by Jonathan M. (1999:1569-1614) in section 2.11, 
and with what Latifee H.I. (2009:15-17) mentioned in section 2.12. 
 
This study also observed that the respondents in general, and the poor respondents 
in particular, were aware and sensitive not only to loan interest rates charged but 
also to savings interest rates paid, including on forced savings. This aligns with the 
findings of Table 5.29 as discussed. 
 
Finally, it can be observed from Table 5:37 that the complaint around the amount of 
loan and loan interest on the one side, and an insistence on addressing the very 
poor seems contradictory; to accomplish both is very difficult from an MCI.  This is in 
line with what Nazrul I. (2009:15-17) said in section 2.11.  These difficulties are a 
result of the heterogeneous status and diversified needs of the respondents that 
demand different types of microcredit methodologies. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter helped to test the main research questions and to verify the empirical 
impact of microcredit loan interest rates on the access and benefit of the poor clients 
while executing the social objectives of microcredit providers in Tigray Regional 
State. The next chapter will summarize the findings, draws conclusions and offer 
policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of this study was not only to demonstrate the impact of the loan 
interest rate on the poor in the case of Tigray, Northern Ethiopia, but also to address 
and improve the negative effects of loan interest rates in a way that could potentially 
result in benefits for both borrowers and lenders of regulated and unregulated MCIs. 
 
This research utilized a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to examine 
the impact of loan interest rates. The basis for the important contribution of this study 
is the enquiry of the impact of loan interest rate with respect to demand for credit, 
return on loan, loan repayment, savings, indebtedness, multiple loans, the 
graduation process, and the wellbeing of the poor.  
 
 After a careful analysis of data collected, key findings of the specific objectives of 
the study are chronologically presented. Following this, the study concludes on the 
major issues of the study and suggests potential recommendations and frameworks 
that could improve the performance of MCIs in general and the sampled MCIs in 
particular.   
 
6.2  Key findings of this study 
 
This section deals with major findings of key results (not all data) related to 
implementation and the impact of loan interest rates.  
6.2.1 Targeting of the MCIs 
 
Three of the MCIs (LMFI, AMFISC, and ERCS) were operating in an urban setting; 
one MCI (SCSC) operated in a rural setting while the other MCI (DECSI) was 
operating in both urban and rural settings. The dominant urban targeting of the 
microcredit providers not only limited the credit market access alternative (physical 
barrier) of the rural households but also affected their bargaining power.  The area 
distribution of the MCIs was mainly due to the immediate objective of the MCIs, 
influenced by the financial capacity of the MCIs. 
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Female targeting of the MCIs was significantly varied while AMFISC entirely targeted 
females. The majority of ex-clients and non-clients were female (prone to dropout); 
improving their wellbeing was supposed to be one of the main objectives of MCIs. 
6.2.2 Poverty status of the households 
 
The majority of households (81%) were at and below the poverty line and the 
remaining were above the poverty line (19%).  Additionally, the majority (60%) of the 
households have one income earner in their household; 77 per cent of the 
households’ primary income was mainly dependent on mini-business activities, a 
relatively high risk and vulnerable means of income.  
Sixty-seven per cent of the client and non-client households had faced shocks and 
stresses that were highly related to economic stress. Fresh loans from microcredit 
(30%) and borrowing from relatives/friends (22%) were the major coping 
mechanisms applied by the households. In addition, forty-two per cent of the total 
households’ children faced school dropout.  The reason for the educational failure 
was mainly associated with the economic situation of the households.  
Income trends over the last year of the majority of clients (48%) and non-clients 
(60%) showed fluctuation.  Thus, not only the business they were engaged in was 
‘fragile’ but also their source of income was unstable and insecure. 
6.2.3 Pull and push factors of microcredit 
 
a. Pull factors of microcredit  
 
Lower interest rates were the main pull factors of MCIs (except DECSI), attracting 
the majority of clients (42%) and non-clients (69%).  Thus, a lower lending interest 
rate was the major pull factor of MCIs; a lower interest rate not only encourages 
clients to continue their participation; it also motivates non-clients to join microcredit. 
 
On the other hand, high loan amounts were the main pull factor of DECSI for 
households who were looking for a high loan amount to expand their businesses. 
When DECSI could not provide them an adequate loan they were forced to get loans 
from moneylenders, with a higher interest rate. Therefore, not only the pull factor of 
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MCIs varied but also inaccessibility to a high loan amount by MCIs may serve as a 
pull factor for moneylenders. 
 
Access to credit was a common pull factor for all MCIs, which enabled both clients 
and non-clients to engage with new or/and diversified income generating activities, 
‘promotional loans’, to deal with their immediate consumptions and shocks. This is in 
line with what Weiss and Montgomery (2005:395-396) presented in section 2.9.6 
while contradicting the opinion of Hulme D., and Mosley P. (1996:119-221) 
mentioned in section 2.6.  
b. Push factors of microcredit 
 
An inadequate net profit from a loan was the major push factor of MCIs for both 
clients (34.8%) and non-clients (48%); this forced DECSI’s clients to shift from 
DECSI to other lower lending interest rate MCIs.  
 
Insecurity/phobia (40%) and ‘afraid to take loan’ (40%) are highly associated feelings 
influencing ex-client and non-client households not to join microcredit. The other 
push factors were repayment failure and unfair enforcement. 
Diverse households have different reasons not only when they decide to join and 
stay in microcredit schemes (pull factors) but also when they decide to decline the 
microcredit services (push factors). That is why factors that affect the households’ 
preference of MCIs (pull factors) and reasons for dropout (push factor) varied. There 
were mainly associated with the diverse economic situations and different demands 
of the microcredit modality for households on the one hand and diverse microcredit 
modalities of the MCIs on the other hand.  
6.2.4 Determination of lending interest rates by MCIs 
 
The microcredit modality of DECSI was market based, which implies a higher loan 
amount with a higher loan interest rate. Other sample microcredit providers were 
subsidized based and offered a lower loan amount with a lower loan interest rate. 
The market based lending interest rate of DECSI was high for the poorest sector of 
the community; this deters their engagement and return from loan IGAs, which in 
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turn affects the social objective of DECSI. This is in line with what Sunita P. (2003:9-
12) said in section 2.10.1.  
Most of the poor household’s (42% of clients and 69% of non-clients) prefer smaller 
loan amounts with a lower interest rate (subsidized microcredit modality) while 80% 
of DECSI clients who were mostly from non-poor households preferred a higher loan 
amount with a higher loan interest rate (market based microcredit modality). 
Loan interest rates are calculated based on whether a MCI is market or a subsidised 
microcredit modality. That is why not only the loan amount and loan interest rate of 
the MCIs varies but it also explains why the households’ preference of microcredit 
providers varies.  
6.2.5 Impact of loan interest rates on households 
 
Little net profit from loans was the main negative spill over impact of loan interest 
rates that affect both client (35%) and non-client (48%) households.   Even though all 
variables on the impact of loan interest rates are highly interrelated, little net profit 
from loan IGAs was the main cause for other impacts of the loan interest rates. This 
is because a lower net profit from a loan is an immediate effect of loan interest rate 
which discourages clients’ further demand for credit, demotivates non-clients to join 
microcredit services, affects genuine repayment performance, increases 
indebtedness, discourages savings, increases forced multiple loans, aggravates 
dropout, and affects the well-being of households. 
 
Without increasing the economic benefit from the microcredit loan of borrowers 
through a fair interest loan and other pro-poor microcredit modalities, it would be 
very difficult for the poorest households to manage and benefit from microcredit and 
to lift them up from poverty. Thus, an inadequate net profit from a loan is not only the 
main negative impact of a loan interest rate but it is also one of the determinant 
factors of the success of both borrowers and lenders. 
 
Generally, the negative impact of a loan interest rate on poor households is not only 
in line with what Sen A. (1999:47) mentioned in section 2.6-e; Hulem D. and Mosley 
P. (1996:119-221) stated in section 2.9.1; and Stewart R, van Rooyen C, Dickson K, 
Majoro M, and de wet (2010:5) mentioned in section 2.10, but this study also proved 
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its diversified negative impact on the poorest households, which is the main objective 
of the study. 
 
6.2.6 Household’s lending interest rate sensitivity 
 
The highest number of client (50%) and non-client (45%) households evaluates the 
loan interest rates charged as high. Thus, both clients and non-clients were sensitive 
to interest rates charged, ‘high price sensitivity’.  This is in line with what Dehejia R., 
Montgomery H., and Jonathan M. (2005:5) cited in section 2:10.  
 
Furthermore, the highest numbers of DECSIs’ (30%) clients were among the client 
households who believed that the loan interest rate charged was high. Thus, some of 
the DECSI clients were not comfortable with the amount of loan interest rates 
charged. This in line with what Letanaha E, (2009:11) said about Ethiopian MFIs in 
section 1.3. 
 
Moreover, sixteen percent of DECSI’s clients were among those who believed that 
the loan interest rate was reasonable/affordable. Therefore, not only the borrowers of 
different MCIs but also the clients of the same MCI were not a homogeneous group; 
their microloan needs and support varied. This is in line with what Martin T., and 
Hulme D. (2002:273-275) stated in section 2.9.6. 
 
It is difficult to separate loan interest rate sensitivity and affordability from the 
economic status of the borrowers, which is associated with which households can 
adequately generate an economic return from the loan IGAs. This is in line with what 
Nimal A. (2006:2-7) mentioned in section 1.3 and also in line with what Martin I. and 
Hulem D. (2007: 273-275) mentioned in section 2.9.6. 
 
Therefore, the major problem of the majority of clients’ and non-clients’ poor 
households was the amount of the loan interest rate charged. This is in line with 
what Gert M. (2004:17-75) expressed as the danger of MFIs sustainability in section 
2.3.4 above but contradictory with what Subrata K.M (2009:87-88) mentioned in 
favour of a high interest rate in section 2.10. However, this study consistently proved 
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that the amount of loan charged, especially by DECSI, is neither affordable nor 
acceptable by the poor households, even by DECSI’s clients.  
 
6.2.7 Non-clients’ access to informal financial markets 
 
 
Borrowing from moneylenders was not an option. This was true for both clients and 
non-clients’ poor households not only under a normal situation but also under 
economic shocks as a coping mechanism. Rather, it was applied by relatively better 
off households who can afford the extremely high loan interest rate charged by 
informal financial markets and absorb the consequences.  
 
The informal financial market was restricted for poor households. That is why, 
microcredit is considered by both poor clients (79%) and non-clients (21%) as the 
only alternative for them. The crucial issue is what MCIs are doing with the poorest 
that are entrusted to MCIs. 
 
6.2.8 Complementing mechanisms of MCIs 
 
The main factors that affect households’ selection of their MCIs was varied, which 
demands diverse microcredit modalities to address the diversified needs of 
households. This was highly associated with the economic situation of the 
households and different microcredit modalities applied by MCIs. There is no one 
microcredit modality that fits all.  
Poor integration and complementary mechanisms of MCIs aggravate the problem of 
microcredit services. All MCIs were struggling to address the same sector of the poor 
community using different microcredit modalities, including the lending interest rate. 
Thus, credit officers of different MCIs were operating primarily to maintain and 
increase their client base. 
Furthermore, monitoring mechanisms for multiple loans was poor; this was 
aggravated due to the unfair competition between MCIs rather than an attempt to 
complement each other. The demand of borrowers and the supply of lenders for 
multiple loans was a result of socially irresponsible competition among MCIs instead 
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of socially responsible complementary collaboration between them. This is in line 
with what Venkata N.A. and Veena Yamini A. (2010:1-2) mentioned. 
 
6.2.9 Inclusive microcredit services of MCIs 
 
The dominant urban settings of most sampled microcredit providers exclude the rural poor 
households from microcredit services (physical barrier/exclusion). Therefore, the area 
distribution of the microcredit providers was one of the limitations of inclusive microcredit 
services of MCIs.  Additionally, the sex inclusion in microcredit services varied among 
MCIs. 
 
Further, the highest number of ex-client and non-client respondents was female. This 
indicated that not only more female clients were vulnerable to dropout but also that a 
greater sector of the poor households were excluded from MCIs; this exclusion 
affects the primary objective of MCIs, that of serving households with low incomes. 
This is in line with what Fazel H.A. (2000:8-13) and Ameha W. (2010:33-35) stated in 
sections 2.9.1 and 1.6 respectively.  
 
The high percentage of ex-clients with a short loan duration (64%) and low frequency 
of loan (91%) witnessed that their stability or duration was short and early.  The early 
exit of clients is one of the ways to exclude the poorest households; this affects the 
potential inclusivity of microcredit services. This is in line with what Simanowitz A. 
and Walter A. (2002:40-41) said in section 2.9.3.  Moreover, those clients who took 
repetitive loans, denying space for new entrants, create a monopolization of credit 
membership. Thus, an elite sector of the community exploits the existing scarce 
resource of credit programs that exclude the poor households; this also negatively 
affects the inclusive potential of microcredit service. 
 
Another interesting point that both clients and non-clients strongly reflect is on their 
need for MCIs to improve on ‘addressing the very poor’.  Therefore, the poorest who 
were eligible were not yet adequately addressed by MCIs; this affects the inclusivity 
of microcredit services. This opinion was in line with what Jonathan M. and Haley D. 
(2002:31) discuss in section 2.9.1. Furthermore, the opinion of the clients and non-
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clients on exclusion of the poorest households is also in line with one of the serious 
criticisms on microfinance services mentioned by Jonathan M.  (1999:1569-1614) in 
section 2.11 above, and with what Latifee H.I. (2009:15-17) mentioned in section 
2.12. 
Additionally, with the exception of DECSI, the sample MCIs predominantly target the 
poorest, lending a smaller amount with lower interest rate. Targeting the poorest 
sector of the community is highly dependent on the mission and objectives of the 
MCIs. This is in line with what Ledgerwood J. (1999:2-34) said in section 2.9.3, 
which this study also realized. 
6.2.10 Ownership structure of MCIs 
 
The ownership structure of DECSI was shared between associations and NGOs 
(75%), and regional government (25%). The distinct role of associations, NGOs, and 
regional government on influential pro-poor credit and saving modality is not visible.  
 
AMFISC is owned and managed by the Women’s Association of the Regional State 
of Tigray; a local rural community owns SCSC. Not only the clients of AMFISC and 
SCSC but also the community at large view their membership (saving or/and credit) 
as building up the equity of their respective institutions and as a result they expect 
better support individually and collectively. That is why voluntary savings   in 
AMFISC and SCSC was mainly related with a sense of ownership and a strong 
institutional affiliation that emanates from the ownership structure and the objectives 
of the microcredit institutions.  
 
ERCS microcredit service is donor funded and managed by the Ethiopian Red Cross 
Society, which is viewed by the community as a humanitarian group dedicated to the 
poor. This is one of the main challenges of donor funded NGOs microloans in 
general and ERCS in particular. It is one that could be a threat for the microcredit 
market in general and donor funded microloans in particular unless managed 
professionally.   
 
The ownership structure of the MCIs is highly related with the funding sources of the 
MCIs; funding sources are associated with their level of either for-profit or socially 
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oriented objectives. DECSI’s funding source depends predominantly on bank loans 
and deposits; others depend on donor’s funds (ERCS) and deposits of their 
members and donor’s funds (AMFISC, LMFI, and SCSC). This is in line with what 
Cull et al (2009:190-192) mentioned in section 2.10.4. 
 
6.2.11 Implications of major key findings 
 
The above-mentioned key findings of this study could contribute to improving the 
MCIs credit modality and serve the best interest of both borrowers and lenders in 
general and the poorest households in particular. Moreover, the major findings of this 
study contribute to the knowledge base around microcredit. This refers not only to 
the importance of complementing approaches between MCIs but also reinforces the 
fact that this complementarity leads to far more effective and efficient microcredit 
performances of borrowers and MCIs, making competition between MCIs irrelevant.  
 
Furthermore, the major key findings showed the contribution of donor funded NGOs 
microloan to reaching the poorest sector of the community. This should encourage 
NGOs to integrate microloans with humanitarian and development commitments 
(introducing a new pro-poor field) and minimize the burden of regulated MCIs on 
reaching the poorest community.  
 
There were conflicting opinions, not only among borrowers and MCI KIIs but also 
among KIIs of different MCIs, related to the impact of the loan interest rate. There 
was also some literature that undermines the impact of the loan interest rate. This 
study demonstrated that the debate on the impact of the loan interest rate continues 
and needs further study. Further, it underlines the possibility and importance of 
complementing rather than competing on the part of different microcredit modalities. 
This approach could benefit all types of microcredit modalities and borrowers. 
 
6.3 Major conclusions 
 
This section deals with summarizing the entire study and draws conclusions on the 
implementation and major impacts of loan interest rates.  
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6.3.1 Targeting and poverty status of households 
 
Even though most of the households were poor, due to the dominant urban setting of 
the MCIs and vulnerability of females to dropping out, the MCIs actually exclude the 
rural households in general and rural females in particular, which are the poorest 
sector of the community. This goes directly against one of the main objectives of the 
MCIs to improve the wellbeing of the poorest households. Therefore, the poorest 
households need a pro-poor microcredit modality that develops special 
methodologies for reaching them through poverty-driven microcredit. 
6.3.2 Factors that affect households receiving loans 
 
A lower interest rate was the main pull factor of the LMFI, AMFISC, SCSC, and 
ERCS MCIs that attract most of the poorest clients and ex-clients to use of a 
microcredit loan. The very reason why the poorest households looked for a smaller 
loan with lower loan interest rate was that it enables them not only to generate a 
better economic benefit but also to manage microloan IGAs effectively and 
efficiently.   
 
A high loan amount was a key pull factor for the DECSI MCI that attracted non-poor 
households. They can tolerate the higher loan interest rate of DECSI, in order to run 
and expand their small and medium enterprises. Therefore, factors that affect 
households’ applications for loans varied. These variations are mainly related to the 
economic situation of the households.  
 
Even though access to credit is a common factor that attracts all households, it 
meant many different things to those who applied or considered applying for a loan.  
Additionally, access to credit is a means not an end. The poorest households were 
not looking for just any microcredit service; they were exclusively looking for those 
MCIs with lower lending rates.  Thus, the poorest households were more attracted to 
microcredit access plus lower interest rates services.  
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6.3.3 Factors that affect MCIs when granting loans 
 
The factors that affect MCIs’ decisions to grant a loan depend on the objective, mission, and 
institutional setting of the MCIs. The small MCIs focus on specific areas (rural or urban) and 
specific sectors of the community (female, youth, etc.). They primarily focus on the poorest 
households, the poverty driven factor, through small loans for petty-trade. The large MFIs, 
like DECSI, focus predominantly on the small enterprise owners, the non-poor, through high 
loan amounts, given primarily to support the economically active sector of the community. 
The study identified that the more the MCIs institutional setting grows and develops, the 
more likely they are to draw away from the poverty driven loan factors and link with the 
commercially driven loan factors. This definitely affects the lending interest rate as it then 
mirrors the commercial loan interest rate. 
6.3.4 Determination of lending interest rate of MCIs 
 
The calculation of a loan interest rate was varied.  It is either similar to the market 
rate (DECSI) or it is subsidised based (LMFI, AMFISC, SCSC, and ERCS). The 
market based loan interest rate determination was mainly used for profit and was 
associated with the capital structure of the MCIs. Thus, it was not pro-poor.  The 
subsidized based rate was geared to social benefits in general, and the poorest in 
particular. Therefore, it was mainly a cost recovery modality. The determination of 
the interest rate of MCIs was highly associated with the school of thought (Welfarist 
or Institutionalist) on which the MCI was built.   
Due to the financial structure and market based loan interest rate determination, the 
lending interest rate by DECSI was considerably higher than not only other MCIs but 
also those of government and private banks.  The lending interest rate of DECSI was 
affordable for small enterprises owners who found it difficult to access loans from 
banks; it was not affordable for the poorest households who found it difficult to 
access loans from both DECSI and banks. 
The study concludes that there is a trade-off between serving the poorest 
households and securing institutional financial sustainability based on the lending 
interest rate determination of MCIs.  This challenges both the social responsibility of 
MCIs and the interest rate transparency of the MCIs. Furthermore, the study shows 
that there is a positive relationship between the determination of interest rates and 
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the social objectives of the MCIs. Socially oriented and responsible MCIs determine 
interest rates in favour of the poorest households and vice versa.  
6.3.5 Impact of loan interest rate on the households 
 
The study attested that the loan interest rate in general, and DECIS’s loan interest 
rate in particular, erode the amount of profit that the borrowers expect to gain. This 
erosion of profit caused reduced demand, repayment problems, demotivated 
savings, aggravated dropouts, and increased indebtedness.  It also jeopardized the 
graduation process of the poor and affected the wellbeing of the borrowers. Thus, 
the effect of loan interest rates was multi-dimensional; they affect the poorest of the 
poor and implicate the social responsibility of MCIs.  
 
Furthermore, the study understood that the affordability of a lending interest rate 
should be evaluated based on the specific socio-economic context of households. 
That is why majority of households complained about the amount of lending interest 
rate while the minority non-poor households did not. 
 
The lending interest rate sensitivity or response of households varied based on their 
economic status. However, the level of loan interest rate sensitivity from the poor 
was high because this affects all aspects of their lives. Loan interest rate sensitivity 
and other loan modalities are inseparable from the economic status of the borrowers. 
Therefore, the poorest households’ problem is not only access to credit but access to 
credit with a lower loan interest rate. Access without a lower interest rate for the 
poorest of the poor is unworthy of the mission and objectives of MCIs. 
6.3.6 Non-clients and informal financial services 
 
Both Informal financial services and banks are inaccessible to the poorest non-client 
households. Microcredit is the only appropriate financial means for those poorest 
non-client households provided that the microcredit modality is pro-poor.  
6.3.7 Complementing mechanisms of MCIs 
 
Like any social school of thought, microcredit has also different schools of thought 
within it that seem to be opposing each other; however, upon closer examination 
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these schools of thought possess areas where they can complement each other for 
the best interest of both schools of thought. Therefore, complementarity of all 
microcredit providers and modalities is not only possible but necessary.  
 
That said, there is no current effort, guideline or MoU between MCIs that enables 
them to complement and partner with each other. Addressing this issue is crucial as 
the disorganized interventions and socially irresponsible competition of MCIs 
ultimately contributes to the exclusion of the poorest of the poor.  
Therefore, in order to address the diversified needs of the poorest households 
effectively and efficiently with scare resources, MCIs’ coordination and 
complementing of MCIs is crucial; this collaboration makes competition irrelevant 
and enables MCIs to be more productive and socially responsible. 
Thus, MCIs should design different microcredit modalities that can satisfy different 
sectors of the community and complement one another in common areas of social 
obligations for more effective and efficient microcredit performance. 
6.3.8 Inclusive microcredit services 
 
Area based marginalization of the rural poor, high female dropout, early dropout of 
clients, ‘elite’ repetitive loan access, not reaching the poorest households, and unfair 
competition demonstrates that there is a lack of MCIs’ inclusive financial services 
implementation; additionally, the MCIs have failed to address the strategy that 
caused the exclusion of the extremely poor households, which forced them to remain 
under poverty. An inclusive microcredit service is very difficult without genuine 
socially responsible strategies and frameworks of MCIs.  
6.3.9 Ownership structure of MCIs 
 
Those MCIs owned by the community (AMFISC and SCSC) and NGO led (ERCS) 
build a community sense of ownership while DECSI does not possess this. The 
ownership structure of MCIs was associated with the capital structure of MCIs; this 
not only influences the extent of the pro-poor microcredit platform of the MCIs but 
also the community sense of ownership. Thus, DECSI’s microcredit modality caused 
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by its ownership and capital structure had a relatively lower positive outcome on a 
pro-poor microcredit modality and a sense of community ownership. 
 
6.4 Major recommendations 
 
This section deals with major recommendations on policy issues, practical issues, 
and suggestions for further research related to the implementation and impact of 
loan interest rates. 
6.4.1 Policy issues 
 
a. Ownership of microcredit by the ‘unbanked’ poor  
 
Basically, microcredit should not only lend to the poor but should also be managed 
by the poor. Thus, the ownership of microcredit matters; managing microcredit, 
including loan and saving interest rate settings for both the best interest of the 
poorest and the microcredit service, should be considered as a community and 
social strategy. Developing community led microcredit strategies matters more than 
competing for socially responsible microcredit services. 
 
Savings from the poor clients and non-clients was one of the main financial sources 
of the sampled saving-led microcredit in general and DECSI, in particular. Therefore, 
the poor households were not only borrowers with a high cost (buying) but also 
lenders with low cost (selling with a low saving interest rate), which was determined 
by others. 
 
In order to secure the ownership and management of microcredit by the poor, the 
regulation of microcredit funding sources should be revised including: 
 
x Very small shareholder price that accommodate the poorest households 
x Participation of the poorest as board members at all levels (regional, zonal, 
district) beyond their shareholding. 
x Dividends for the poor shareholders. 
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x Eventual transformation to community led MCIs. 
x Encouragement and support for the establishment of community led MCIs. 
 
b. Revisiting the microcredit modalities 
 
The poor are not homogeneous; their levels of poverty, capacity, and their needs are 
diverse, a factor that demands a different type of innovative and flexible microcredit 
interventions and treatments. Existing microcredit modalities could not meet all of the 
needs of the poorest of the poor. Some fundamental changes in policy, structure, 
and modalities are required to address approaches that match the diverse and 
special needs of the poor as they manage their households and loan IGAs.  
 
Each microcredit model’s (both regulated and unregulated) accessibility potentially 
make some difference, at least in the lives of the people they reach. However, 
microcredit should think differently beyond reaching the people (access to credit) that 
mat significantly change mainly the lives of the poorest of the people.  
 
Therefore, the following changes are important to consider: 
x Developing new service products and flexible loan modalities that meet the 
initial and shock/stress induced urgent financial needs of the poor clients. 
x Creating linkages not only with the government but also with NGO 
(unregulated credit services) donor funded MCIs for self-revolving credit 
schemes and and community led microcredit schemes. 
x Developing a pro-poor loan loss arrangement and management ‘loan loss 
prevention mechanism’ beyond the current MCI guarantee arrangements. 
 
c. Revisiting the MFIs regulation 
 
Revision of regulation is important not only because of the heterogeneous nature of 
the poor and the loan modality of the existing regulated microcredit services, but also 
because of the emergence of some NGOs like ERCS working on ‘self-revolving 
credit schemes’ that have showed that donor funded credit schemes are benefiting 
the extreme poor with lower loan cost without distorting the microcredit market. 
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These contribute not only to filling the gap created by the high loan interest rates of 
the regulated microcredit services but they also reduce the burden on regulated 
MCIs.  
 
Thus, the existing MFIs regulation should be revised in a way that accommodates 
the donor funded credit schemes (unregulated) not only to integrate humanitarian 
activities with micro loans but also to complement the regulated microcredit market 
for more effective and efficient microcredit performance.  
 
Furthermore, most of the non-private MCIs, including DECSI, was transformed into 
MCIs from charity and relief organizations. Currently, the minimum amount of capital 
required to start a MCI is two million Birr, which most donor funded NGOs can afford. 
The important issue is how to integrate not only with the humanitarian and 
development commitments of NGOs but also how to integrate with the regular MCIs 
in general and community led microloans like cooperatives in particular. This should 
be discussed and designed with an appropriate modality of NGO donor-funded micro 
loans, enabling them to utilize the huge donor funds of many NGOs for more 
sustainable pro-poor activities.  
 
In order to serve the growing Ethiopian population in general and the growing micro 
loan demands of the ‘unbanked’ poor in particular, MCIs should examine how to 
expand their services by accommodating other actors, including NGO donor-funded 
micro loans. The accommodation of NGO microloans becomes more important when 
some MFIs are looking to transform into regular banks in an ‘upward financial 
integration’. This may be the best alternative to maintain the primary objective of 
regular MCIs, as it will be more difficult for the transformed MCIs to serve both the 
poorest and maintain their regular bank services. Without this, the poorest 
households will be even more excluded from the regular MCIs.  
 
When banks are looking at expanding their services downward, MCIs should look 
even more downward toward in-depth financial integration instead of visa versa. This 
will enable MFIs to serve more ‘unbanked’, the poorest sector of the community. 
Otherwise, MFIs will become victims of losing their own objectives.  
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Therefore, a significant amount of donor funds of NGOs should be integrated with 
the community led micro loan because donor funded NGOs’ microcredit is a basis for 
community led microcredit. This could minimize the danger of the ‘upward financial 
integration’ of MFIs uprooting MFIs from their original pro-poor objective and finally 
negatively affecting the poorest sector of the community.  
 
d. Aligning ‘fair price’ with ‘fair profit’ 
 
The establishment of socially responsible community led microcredit services is 
crucial for balancing ‘fair price’ with ‘fair profit’ in a way that addresses the 
microcredit special needs of the poorest. During the setting of the loan interest rate 
(loan cost), not only the profit but also the risk should be fairly distributed between 
among the lenders and borrowers. Therefore, the ‘cost’ and ‘profit’ distribution 
among the lenders and the ‘poor’ borrowers should be ‘less cost’ but ‘more profit’ for 
the poorest, which can be covered through economy of scale and a mechanism for 
subsidy. This is important because while microcredit is not a charity, it is also not a 
moneymaking scheme to gain a profit from the poorest; rather it is socially oriented 
strategy. 
 
Aligning a ‘fair price’ with a ‘fair profit’ modality is one approach that may help the 
poorest and could also serve as one of the best alternatives for unfair competition 
among MCIs.  
 
e. Develop graduation ‘from-to’ strategy 
 
The importance and good performance of microcredit aims to encourage poor 
households to graduate positively and build their financial capacity with consistent 
good repayment performance, expansion of loan IGAs and eventual graduation out 
of the MCIs and poverty.  
 
Each regulated and unregulated microcredit provider should have a clear graduation 
strategy or roadmap that indicates what, how, when, and who fits with the objectives 
and target groups of the microcredit providers.  One graduation strategy could not 
serve equally not only for all regulated and unregulated microcredit providers but 
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also for similar MCIs. Thus, each microcredit provider should develop their own 
graduation strategy that can complement the graduation strategies of other MCIs.   
 
Each microcredit provider should develop flexible and an incentive-based modality 
that enables successful clients to drop out (graduate from-to) positively within 
relatively few years. This will discourage the prolonged participation in a microcredit 
program without it making a significant difference in the lives of the poor. It could 
also protect the old clients from the development of a ‘microcredit dependency 
syndrome’ as well as discourage the elite members of the community from 
monopolizing microcredit loans.  
 
Conceptual framework of graduation process illustrated in the following Figure 6.1.  
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Figure 6.1: Conceptual framework of graduation of the poor to MFIs and sustainable income 
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f. Design ‘Saving for real change’ 
 
The poor households are not saving from their extra but from what they have 
available for their basic needs, often compromising them. Therefore, saving 
for the poor is part of an investment, expecting a proportional return. In order 
to benefit the poor, microcredit saving rates should be proportionally fair with 
the loan interest rates. if not, the poor will suffer as a result of the combined 
effects of a high loan interest rate (buying) and a low saving rate (selling); this 
affects the graduation process ‘from-to’.  Thus, the appropriateness of ‘saving’ 
or ‘investing’ for the poor should be consulted and managed in a transparent 
and socially responsible way. 
   
6.4.2 Practice issue 
 
a) Adapt pro-poor lending interest rates  
 
Even though an alternative to microcredit services is very limited, the poorest 
households categorically consider the interest rate charged as an important 
factor before they apply for any loan. The amount of loan varies among the 
poor households while the amount of microcredit loan interest rate charged is 
almost similar. Loan interest rates should be charged according to the amount 
of loan applied for; small loan amounts should attract a low interest rate and 
visa versa. This could allow paying the cost and gaining the benefit 
proportionally of ‘pro-poor’ loan interest rate settings. What can make this 
attractive to MCIs is not only the smaller amount of the loan but also the lower 
loan interest rate for the poorest that enables them to earn a better return and 
the MCIs to fulfil their social mandate.  
 
The source of profits for savings-led MCIs was from both the loan interest rate 
(selling with high cost) and savings (buying with less cost) than inflation, loan 
loss, and operational costs calculated in favour of the MCIs. Therefore, loan 
interest rates should be calculated based on the best economic return on 
loans for the poor rather than the savings-led MCIs. This should be 
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periodically monitored and revised. The poor have only one option, which is a 
microloan, while MCIs have other sources of profits that can secure their 
financial sustainability. Thus, the primary economic benefit from microcredit 
should be for the poor through a lower loan interest rate for the poor. 
 
b) Complementing rather than competing 
 
In a fair free market, not only the unregulated microcredit providers but also 
the private moneylenders can play a positive role in the credit market for the 
non-poor sector of the community. This role would enhance the financial 
accessibility for some non-poor households. However, unregulated 
microcredit providers, whose main source of income comes from donor’s 
support for those poor who are the potential clients of the regulated 
microcredit providers, should be considered as complementing the microcredit 
market with lower interest rates rather than competing with the regulated 
microcredit market. Thus, there should be a forum where the regulated and 
unregulated microcredit providers share their experiences on how to manage 
the microcredit market both individually and collectively.  
 
As the microcredit market is not yet saturated, competition with unregulated 
and peer MCIs for the same target group is not advisable. Competition among 
MCIs can become irrelevant and unnecessary if stakeholders work together to 
identify market niches and innovative microcredit modalities that can 
complement each other. Exploring the complementarity of all microcredit 
providers is not only possible but necessary.  Therefore, different microcredit 
modalities of MCIs should be considered as a reason for complementing each 
other, not competing with one another.  
 
c) Specializing on a specific segment of the community 
 
Only a few microcredit service providers could adequately address the 
heterogeneous needs of a community. Therefore, each microcredit provider 
should identify their niche target where they can, satisfy their objectives, and 
make a difference for their target group by utilizing their expertise and 
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differentiation. Because the poor have different needs and seek different 
credit modalities, management skills, and follow-up to satisfy their specific 
needs, each microcredit provider is encouraged to specialize in a specific 
microcredit area and specialize on a target group.   
 
Some of the possible specializations could be based on geography (urban 
and rural), a specific segment of the community (female, youth, disabled, 
educationally deprived, entrepreneurs, detained, retired, internally displaced, 
commercial sex workers, HIVAIDS victims, disaster affected, and other), and 
occupation (self-employed, civil servant and others).  
 
d) Promoting a ‘Self-revolving’ credit scheme modality 
 
The purpose of the very existence of microcredit services in general and the 
unregulated microcredit service in particular is to support the poorest, to lift 
them out of poverty through pro-poor innovative, participatory, and flexible 
microcredit modalities that include a lower interest rate and encourage the 
poor to benefit from the loan project, enhancing the graduation of the poor 
from-to. Thus, a special credit scheme modality that encourages the 
graduation of the poor needs to be designed. 
 
A ‘self-revolving’ credit scheme modality was initially designed by the 
researcher and has been implemented in Adigrate, town in the Eastern Zone 
of Tigray since 2006.  This has been funded by ICRC and implemented by 
ERCS, scaled up to other regional states of Ethiopia that were funded by 
other donors. This innovative and flexible microcredit modality proved that 
donor funded micro loans could support the poorest without distorting the 
microcredit market; this challenges the myths on unregulated donor-funded 
micro loan services, empowering the poorest to manage micro loans and 
enable them to solve their own economic problems.  
 
This modality differs from the traditional revolving credit scheme, with the 
following main innovative and flexible features, which address and empower 
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the poorest sector of the community and makes a micro loan scheme 
sustainable and scalable:  
 
x The initial loan is determined by the cost of the type of mini-business 
proposed by the household and technically supported by experts. 
x The household is aware that the loan will revolve within the household 
till the household graduates or outgrows financial demands within or 
with other MFIs, which is a basis for lifting out of poverty. 
x Monthly repayment is considered as a ‘reserve or savings’ for the 
household for a further regular loan or response to an emergency 
financial demand. 
x  In case of an urgent financial need related to an immediate profitable 
activity ‘seasonal productive activities’, the household can re-borrow 
from the household’s repaid amount of money for 1-3 months with 
almost zero interest rates. The more they repaid, the more they secure 
both for their future regular loan and for an urgent financial demand.  
x The loan period of one loan term is two years and the amount of loan 
of each household is revised every two years.  
x The amount of loan ranges from Birr 1,500 up to Birr 10,000. The 
amount of the loan for each borrower increases based on their 
business progress and inflation.  
x Every borrower is expected to graduate or outgrow financial demand  
(More than Birr 10,000) from MFIs or banks after 5-6 years. 
x The loan interest rate setting is flexible and depends on the type of 
business and the time of the initial return from the loan. The first term 
(the first two years) is zero interest rates followed by a second (5 % per 
annum), and third (9% per annum). Prior discussion with all 
households on the loan interest rate modality is crucial. 
x The target population is ‘productive poorest of the poor’, not 
necessarily ‘economically active poor’; these are mainly female headed 
households, living with HIV, deportees, and unemployed youth who 
qualify for engagement with loan IGAs. 
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x This modality creates a sense of ownership, security, and responsibility 
that encourages the development of self-governing and self-motivated 
households of the poorest with no unfair enforcement. 
x Eventually, the self-revolving credit scheme modality intends to 
organize interested households to serve as a basis for a community led 
microcredit scheme.  
x There is close monitoring and support to enable all necessary 
protective measures. 
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Figure 6.2: Conceptual model of self-revolving microcredit scheme 
 
 Source: The Author 
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6.5 Suggestions for further research 
 
This study was based mostly on primary data supported by secondary data 
obtained from different sources (regulated and unregulated) of microcredit 
respondents (urban and rural). This data enabled the researcher to present 
conclusive theoretical and empirical propositions, especially on improving the 
loan interest rate to benefits the sampled microcredit providers, clients, and 
non-clients for better microcredit scheme management. Additionally, this 
study has provided groundwork for the following further study. 
 
a.  ‘Self-revolving credit scheme’ 
 
As clearly mentioned above, this modality is new but it currently has 
documented practices. Success has primarily been checked in only one area; 
where it has been scaled up, it has not yet been adequately evaluated. It 
needs further study on its management, implementation, and impact in 
different socio-economic settings.  
 
b. ‘Saving or Investing’ 
 
Most of the respondents has concerned around the economic benefit of 
saving when comparing the amount of the saving rate against the investment 
’value of money’, ‘saving or investing’. Thus, why should one save? Who 
should save? When are the best times to save? Pros and cons of saving and 
investing for the poor needs further study. 
 
c. Managing multiple borrowing 
 
Due to various internal and external reasons the same households are taking 
additional loans from the same or different microcredit providers. Thus, what 
is wrong with the multiple borrowing for the poor household? How should it be 
managed? This needs further study 
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d. Transformation of an MFI into a regular bank 
 
What is the solution for the growing Ethiopian population that demands an 
expansion of microcredit services for the poor? ‘Upward financial integration’ 
or ‘downward financial integration’ of MFIs? This should be genuinely 
assessed not only from the perspective of the financial capacity of the MFIs 
but primarily from the objective of MFIs and the poorest that are entrusted to 
MCIs. Therefore, the impact of transformation or scaling up of MFIs into 
regular banks on the poorest needs further study. “Where are the MFIs 
heading in the future?” 
 
7. Overall conclusion 
 
Even though analysing the effects and impacts of microcredit in general and 
the loan interest rate in particular is not easy, the research questions and 
objectives of this study have been adequately addressed and achieved.  
 
The theoretical and the empirical literature related to the impact of loan 
interest rates on the poor verified that a high interest rate is one of the main 
factors that erodes the amount of profit the borrowers gain from the loan 
IGAs. Consequences of a low profit from the loan caused by a higher loan 
interest rate include repayment problems, reduced demand, increased 
indebtedness, dropout, jeopardized graduation process from-to, and affect to 
wellbeing of the borrowers. Thus, the study observed that the effects of high 
loan interest rates are multi-dimensional. Further, a significant number of poor 
client and non-client households are more sensitive to the interest rate 
charged, ‘high price sensitivity’, than to the access of microcredit.  
 
Moreover, only households who can generate an adequate economic return 
from loan IGAs can afford the higher loan interest rates. Therefore, the study 
realized that economic return from IGAs should not only be greater than the 
loan interest rates but should also adequately satisfy loan repayments, the 
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basic needs of the households, and enhance the graduation process of the 
household from-to. 
 
Furthermore, the study recommended very crucial policy and practical issues 
that could contribute to better performance of both microcredit borrowers and 
lenders as well as inspire areas for future research.   Moreover, based on the 
major key findings and conclusions, the study recommends other very 
important issues for further study; these areas will serve to further improve the 
performance of microcredit in general and loan interest rate implementation in 
particular. 
 
Finally, the major key findings, conclusions, and recommendations drawn 
from this study contribute to improving the performance of both borrowers and 
lenders (regulated and unregulated MCIs).  They also contribute to the body 
of microcredit knowledge.  Further, they contribute suggestions for changing 
and integrating the field of NGOs donor-funded microcredit with micro loans 
based on proven empirical experience. This encourages seeing other MFIs as 
complementary rather than seeing them as competitors. Finally, it proposes 
very crucial future research areas to complement the on-going debates 
around the implementation and impact of interest rates on the poor. 
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Annex: 1 
 
Questionnaire code: 
______________ 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Greet the household first and then introduce yourself as follows: 
 
My name is ________________ and I am trained enumerator to collect data. The 
overall objective of this research survey is to develop an understanding of the effects 
of loan interest rate of different microcredit providers in your area, to create proper 
perceptions, to develop appropriate products equivalent with the fell needs of the 
poor people. The interview will take about one hour. All the information I obtain will 
remain strictly confidential. Only the summary of the discussion will be included in the 
final report, but none of your individual comments will be identified with your name. 
During this time, I would like to speak with the household head or any other adult 
representing the household. May I start now? 
 
Zone:___________________________________________________ 
Wereda:____________________________________________________ 
Tabia:_______________________________________________________ 
Kushet:_____________________________________________________ 
 
Starting time___________________ Ending time___________________ 
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PART I: MICROCREDIT HOUSEHOLD RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
NB: All type of household respondents (Clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients) 
 
Questions and filters Possible answers/coding 
categories 
Skip to/ 
remarks  
 
Q100 
 
Respondent’s category 
Client 1  
Ex-client 2  
Non-client 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NB: All type of household respondents (Clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients) 
 
Questions and filters 
Possible answers/coding 
categories 
Skip to/ 
 remarks  
Q101 Full name of the respondent?  
 
Q102 
 
What is the type of the 
household? 
Male-headed 1  
Female Headed 2  
Single  3  
 
Q103 
 
Sex of the respondent? 
Male 1  
Female 2  
 
Q104 
 
Respondent’s age? 
Age in complete year _  
I don’t know 77  
No response 88  
 
 
 
Q105 
 
 
 
What is your marital status? 
Single 1  
Married 2  
Polygamous 3  
Divorced/separated 4  
Widow 5  
No response 88  
 
 
Q106 
 
 
Respondent’s relationship to 
head of the household? 
Spouse 1  
Son/Daughter 2  
Grand child 3  
Brother/Sister 4  
Parents 5  
Other relatives 6  
Q107 Have you ever been to formal 
school? 
Yes 1  
No 0 Skip to 
Q 109 
 
Q108 
 
What is the highest-grade level 
you have completed? 
Write the grade level _  
 
Read and write    
yes 1  
No 0  
No response 88  
Section 2: Demographic features of respondents 
 
 
Section 1: Identification 
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Q109 
 
 
What is your religion? 
Islam 1  
Orthodox 2  
Protestant 3  
Others_______ 4  
No response 88  
 
Q110 
 
Respondent’s area status 
Urban 1  
Rural 2  
 
Q111 
What is the size of your 
household, including yourself, by 
sex?  
Write in number. 
Male _  
Female _  
Total _  
 
 
Q112 
 
What is age of your family 
members?  
 
Write in number. 
Up to 5 years _  
6-15 years _  
16-30 years _  
31-65 years _  
Above 65 years _  
 
 
 
Q113 
 
 
 
What is the educational level of 
your family members? (Formal 
and informal education) 
 
Write in number 
Kindergarten _  
First cycle (1-4 grade) _  
Second cycle (5-8 grade) _  
 High Scholl (9-12 grade) _  
Diploma _  
First degree _  
Above first degree _  
Read and write only _  
Illiterate  _  
 
Q114 
 
Is there any member of your 
family who discontinue 
schooling? 
Yes 1  
No 0 Skip to 
Q117 
I don’t know 77  
 
Q115 Number of your family who 
discontinue schooling?  
Male _  
Female _  
 
 
 
Q116 
 
 
 
What are the reasons for 
discontinuing (drop-out) 
schooling of your family 
member? 
Financial problem 1  
Health problem 2  
Family problem 3  
Personal problem 4  
Academic failure  5  
Marriage 6  
Financial problem 7  
Looking for job 8  
Other specify____________ 9  
I don’t know 77  
 
 
 
 
 
Q117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the technical/vocational 
training/skill of the respondent 
and its family members? 
 
Write in number 
Mini-trade/street trade (Gullet) _  
Embroidery _  
Metal /wood work _  
Electrician _  
Tailor _  
Driver _  
Cobbler _  
Hair dressing/barber _  
Hand crafts _  
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Urban farming _  
Rural farming _  
Others specify___________ _  
No response 88  
Q118 Number of Earners of household 
members (Including the 
respondent and excluding unpaid 
family workers) 
Write in number 
 
Male 
  
 
Female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Household respondent’s income (earner-1) 
 
NB: for clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients 
 
  
Questions and filters 
Possible answers/ coding categories Ship 
to/ 
remark 
Frequency Income (Birr) 
Q119 What is your income 
from your primary 
occupation (earner-1)? 
Write in Birr (local 
currency) 
Daily 1   
Monthly 2   
Annually 3   
Occasionally 4   
Q120 What is your income 
from your secondary 
occupation (earner-1)? 
Write in Birr (local 
currency) 
Daily 1   
Monthly 2   
Annually 3   
Occasionally 4   
 
 
3.2 Income of other earners of the respondent’s family from primary and 
secondary occupation 
 
NB: for clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients 
 
 
  
Questions and filters 
Possible answers/ coding 
categories 
 
Age 
 
Sex 
Ship 
to/ 
remark Frequency Income 
(Birr) 
Q121 What is the income from earner -
2 of your household? 
Write in Birr (local currency) 
Daily 1     
Monthly 2     
Annually 3     
Occasionally 4     
Section 3: Income of household respondents 
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Q122 What is the income from earner -
3 of your household? 
 
Write in Birr (local currency) 
Daily 1     
Monthly 2     
Annually 3     
Occasionally 4     
Q123 What is the income from earner -
4 of your household? 
 
Write in Birr (local currency) 
Daily 1     
Monthly 2     
Annually 3     
Occasionally 4     
3.3 Other household regular monthly incomes 
 
NB: for clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients 
 Questions and filters Possible answers/ coding 
categories 
      Birr (local currency) 
Ship to/ 
remark 
Q124 Pension   
Q125 Domestic remittance   
Q126 Foreign remittance   
Q127 Rent   
 
 
 
 
Major consumption/expenditure of the household (Consumption of the last 
month only) 
NB: for clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients 
 Questions and filters Possible answers/ coding 
categories 
         Birr (local currency) 
Ship to/ 
remark 
Q128 Food related 
expenditures 
  
Q129 Firewood and fuel 
expense 
  
Q130 Educational expenses   
Q131 House rent (residential 
use) 
  
Q132 House rent (Business 
use) 
  
Q133 Social occasions   
Q134 Medical expenses   
Q135 Others   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4: Expenditure of household respondents 
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NB: for clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients 
 
 
  
Questions and filters 
 
Possible answers/ coding categories 
Ship 
to/ 
remark 
Q 136 Did your family face any 
shocks and stresses during 
last year? 
Yes 1  
No 0 Skip to 
139 
 
 
Q137 
 
 
 
 
Which of these shocks and 
stresses your family faced 
during the last years? 
 
 
Multiple answers possible 
Acute increment of price of food items 1  
House hold business failure 2  
Loss of income from wages 3  
Theft  4  
Illness or (accidents of the HH 
members) 
5  
Death of the head of the household 6  
Death of bread winner of the 
household 
7  
Marriage break-up 8  
Other, specify------------------------ 9  
 
 
 
Q138 
 
 
 
During these shocks and 
stresses, what were your 
coping mechanisms? 
 
 
 
 
Multiple answers possible 
Withdraw from savings 1  
Labor wage 2  
Distress sells: household utensils 3  
Distress sells: house furniture 4  
Distress sells: houses or part of 
houses  
5  
Distress sells: part of land 6  
Distress sell: jewelry 7  
Reduce numbers of meals 8  
Sent children out to beg 9  
Sent children out to work 10  
Sell fire wood and charcoal 11  
Looking for food aid 12  
Borrow from relatives/friends 13  
Borrow from microcredit 14  
Borrow from money lenders 15  
Other, specify------------------------ 16  
 
 
 
Q139 
 
 
In case of urgent financial 
needs/ financial emergency, 
Sale of asset /livestock’s 1  
Borrow from relative /friends 2  
Borrow from other Micro-credit
 providers 
3  
Section 5: Coping with shock and stress 
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what steps you will now look 
for or adopt? 
 
 
[Multiple Answers Possible] 
Borrow from Money lender 4  
Pull out children from school 5  
Reduce consumption expenditure 6  
Extra working hours  7  
Looking for extra new job 8  
Withdraw from savings 9  
Others specify_____ 10  
I don’t know 11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Voluntary saving 
 
NB: For Clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients 
  
Questions and filters 
Possible answers/ 
coding categories 
Ship to/ 
Remark 
 
Q 140 
 
Did you have voluntary saving?  
Yes 1  
No 0 Skip to 
Q142 
No response 88 Skip to 
Q143 
 
 
 
Q141 
 
 
 
 
If your answer for Q140 is “Yes”, 
where, when did you start to save, 
and the current amount. 
 
(Multiple answer possible) 
 
Where 
 
Bank 1  
Formal MFI 2  
Cooperative 3  
 
 
When 
One year 1  
Two years 2  
Three years 3  
More than four 
years 
4  
 
Current 
amount 
(Birr) 
1000-2000 1  
2001-3000 2  
3001-4000 3  
4001-5000 4  
More than 5001 5  
 
 
Q142 
 
If you have no voluntary savings, 
what is/are the reason/s?  
(Multiple answer possible) 
Unable to save 1  
Too low saving interest rate 2  
Prefer to save in kind 3  
Prefer to save in Equip  4  
Prefer to save in home 5  
 Prefer to invest on mini business 6  
I don’t know 7  
Others specify __________ 8  
Section six: Saving behaviour 
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Q143 Are you (any member of your 
family) currently a member of 
Ekub? 
Yes 1  
No 0 Skip to 
Q146 
 
Q144 
 
If your answer for Q143 is yes, 
how much do you contribute 
monthly?  
 
Write in Birr 
Less than 50 1  
51-100 2  
101-200 3  
201-400 4  
401-600 5  
601-1000 6  
1001-2000 7  
More than 2001 8  
 
Q145 
 
If your answer for Q143 is yes, 
what is the expected earnings 
from your contribution to Ekub?  
 
Write in Birr 
Less than 1000 1  
1000-2000 2  
2001-3000 3  
3001-4000 4  
4001-5000 5  
More than 5001 6  
 
 
6.4 Forced saving 
 
NB: For client household respondents only 
Q146 Did you have forced 
saving? 
Yes 1  
No 0 Skip to Q148 
 
 
Q147 
 
 
If your answer for Q146 
is “Yes”, where, when did 
you start to save, and 
what is the current 
amount? 
 
Where 
Formal MFI 1  
Cooperative 2  
 
When 
One year 1  
Two years 2  
More than three years 3  
 
Amount  
1000-1500 1  
1501-2000 2  
More than 2001 3  
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NB: for clients, Ex-clients, and Non-clients 
 Questions 
and filters 
 
Possible answers/coding categories 
 
 
 
 
Q148 
 
 
 
 
 
From which 
institutions 
have you 
get loan, 
duration, 
and 
frequency. 
 
Multiple 
responses 
possible 
 
Loan 
from 
 
Yes -1 
 
No- 0 
For how 
many 
years  
How many 
times? 
Frequency of 
loan 
Minimum and 
maximum amount 
of loan (Birr) 
Min Max 
Bank      
DECSI      
SCSC      
ERCS      
ECSDC      
AMFI      
Money 
lenders 
     
Other 
specify__ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What was the purpose 
of your loan? 
 
 
Multiple responses 
possible 
Purpose of loan Code Ship to/ 
remark 
Petty trading 1  
Embroidery/handcrafts 2  
Metal work 3  
Wood work 4  
Hairdressing/Barber 5  
House construction 6  
House maintenance 7  
Livestock purchase 8  
Bicycle rent  9  
Cart service (Gari) 10  
Repayment of debt 11  
Death/illness of household 
member 
12  
Others specify_______ 13  
 
Q150 
 
Why do you prefer to 
get loan from 
microcredit sources you 
mention on Q148?  
 
Multiple responses 
possible 
Free interest rate 1  
Lower interest rate than 
others 
2  
Simple procedures and 
application 
3  
Convenience of loan 
disbursement 
4  
Group support and help 5  
Individual credit 
modality/system 
6  
Compulsory saving 7  
Voluntary savings 8  
Adequate amount of loan 9  
Adequate grace time 10  
Long repayment time 11  
Section seven: Loan history 
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Others specify 12  
 
Q151 
 
How was your 
repayment behavior? 
Always on time 1  
Mostly on time 2  
Some time on time 3  
Always not on time 4  
 
 
Q152 
 
 
If your repayment was 
always on time, What 
were the repayment 
sources? 
From loan related activity 1  
From own income (other 
than loan related) 
2  
From friends/ relatives 3  
Loan from money lenders 4  
Loan from other microcredit 
institution 
5  
Sales of pre-loan 
assets/animals 
6  
Sales of assets purchased 
by the loan 
7  
Other specify_________ 8  
 
 
 
Q 
153 
 
 
 
If your repayment was 
not on time, What was 
the reason/s? 
Poor/inadequate income 1  
Family conflict 2  
Payment of other loan 3  
Theft/robbery 4  
High household consumption 5  
Death/Illness of household 
member 
6  
Other 
specify_______________ 
7  
Q154 Is there any loan, which 
you did not pay at all? 
Yes 1  
No 0 Skip to Q156 
 
 
Q155 
 
 
If yes for Q154 how 
loan was repaid 
eventually?  
 
(Multiple answer 
possible) 
Loan from other microcredit 
institution 
1  
Loan from relatives/friends 2  
From own income  3  
Loan from money lenders 4  
Sales of pre-loan 
assets/animals 
5  
Sales of assets purchased 
by the loan 
6  
Others 
specify_____________ 
7  
Q156 Did you give any credit 
to someone but not yet 
collected? 
Yes 1  
No 0 Skip to Q158 
 
 
Q157 
 
 
If your answer for Q156 
is yes, how much was 
the amount of Birr you 
lend? 
Less than 50 1  
51-100 2  
101-200 3  
201-400 4  
401-600 5  
601-1000 6  
1001-2000 7  
More than 2001 8  
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8.1 Perception on microcredit service provision (accessibility and availability) 
 
NB: for all clients, ex-clients, and non-client respondents 
 
 Questions and 
filters 
Possible answers/coding categories Code Ship to/ 
remark 
 
 
 
 
Q158 
 
 
 
 
Why some 
households join 
microcredit 
services? 
 
[Multiple 
Answers 
Possible] 
Better family situation 1  
Better awareness and experiences 2  
Lack of awareness of its consequences 3  
Forced credit 4  
No other option 5  
No repayment failure (Good credit story) 6  
Better market access 7  
Better access to credit services 8  
Better social or material collateral 9  
Others specify _________ 10  
I don’t know 11  
 
 
 
 
 
Q159 
 
 
Why some 
household’s 
dropout or did not 
join the microcredit 
services? 
 
 
 
[Multiple 
Answers 
Possible] 
 
Delay of credit disperse 1  
Had problems with other group members 2  
No time for frequent meetings 3  
Do not need credit or service anymore 4  
High interest rate 5  
Forced savings 6  
Repayment frequency 7  
Absence or short of grace period   8  
Over enforcement 9  
Insecurity/phobia 10  
Repayment failure 11  
Others specify ________ 12  
I don’t know 13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 8 : PERCEPTIONS 
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8.2 Perception on impact of microcredit service  
 
 
8.2.1 For client respondents only 
 Questions and filters Possible answers/coding 
categories 
Ship to/ 
remark 
 
Q160 
 
How do you compare your 
overall quality of life before and 
after getting the loan?  
 
Remarkably improved 1  
Slightly improved 2  
Same (no Change) 3  
Slightly worst  4  
Much more worst 5  
I don’t know 6  
 
Q161 
 
 
If your answer for Q160 is 
“remarkably/slightly improved”, 
what are the actual 
improvements in your 
livelihoods?  
 
 
 
[Multiple Answers Possible] 
Quantity of meals increased by 1  
House hold assets improved 2  
Income of the household 
increased 
3  
Creates job opportunity 4  
Children school participation 
secured 
5  
Health situation of the household 
improved 
6  
Livestock purchased 7  
Build a new house on own land  8  
Bought land for new house 
construction  
9  
Moved relative to own rented 
house  
10  
Others specify_____ 11  
 
 
Q162 
 
 
If your answer for Q160 is “no 
change” or “slightly/much more 
badly” what are the reasons? 
 
[Multiple Answers Possible] 
Health problem 1  
Unaffordable family size 2  
Unaffordable interest rate 3  
Inflation 4  
Market related problem 5  
High price of food and non-food 
items 
6  
Others-specify 7  
I don’t know 8  
Q163 If your answer for Q160 is “no 
change”/ “slightly/much more 
badly” what type of possible 
solutions are you looking? 
 
[Multiple Answers Possible] 
Dropout from credit 1  
Continuing credit and manage 
differently 
2  
Looking for less interest rate loan 3  
Working with what I have 
(exclude loan) 
4  
I don’t know 5  
Others specify ___ 6  
    
274 
 
 
 
8.2.2 For Ex-client/non-client respondents only 
 
  
Questions and filters 
Possible answers/coding 
categories 
Ship 
to/remark 
 
Q164 
 
How do you compare your overall 
livelihoods before and after your 
microcredit credit services drop out or 
not getting microcredit loan at all?  
Remarkably improved 1  
Slightly improved 2  
Same (no Change) 3  
Slightly worst  4  
Much more worst 5  
I don’t know 6  
 
 
Q165 
 
 
If your answer for Q164 is remarkably 
improved, slightly improved or no 
change. What could be the reason?  
[Multiple Answers Possible 
Working with what I have 1  
Friends/relatives 
support/loan 
2  
Engaging on formal 
employment 
3  
Safety net 4  
Cash for work 5  
Sales of labour 6  
Others specify 7  
I don’t know 8  
 
 
 
Q166 
 
 
 
If your answer for Q164 is “no 
change”/ “slightly”, What could be the 
reason? 
 
[Multiple Answers Possible] 
 
Health problem 1  
Unaffordable family size 2  
Repayment of the last loan 3  
Inflation 4  
Market related problem 
(sales, profit, etc.) 
5  
High price of food and non-
food items 
6  
Lack of credit access 7  
Others-specify  8  
I don’t know 9  
Q167 If your answer for Q164 is “no 
change”/ “slightly” much more badly” 
what type of possible solutions are 
you looking? 
[Multiple Answers Possible] 
 
To join microcredit loan 1  
Looking for less interest 
rate loan 
2  
Working with what I have 
(exclude loan) 
3  
Looking family/relative 
support 
4  
I don’t know 5  
Others specify 6  
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8.3 Perception on trends of household income 
 
NB: for Clients, Ex-client/non-client respondents 
 
  
Questions and filters 
 
Possible answers/coding 
categories 
Ship 
to/remark 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How was your family monthly 
income of the last one year?  
Improved by 200% 1  
Improved by 100% 2  
Improved by 50% 3  
Improved by 25% 4  
Improved by 10% 5  
Improved by 5% 6  
No change 7  
Deceased  by 200% 8  
Deceased by 100% 9  
Deceased by 50% 10  
Deceased by 25% 11  
Deceased by 10% 12  
Deceased by 5% 13  
I don’t know 14  
 
Q169 
 
What is the trend of your monthly 
income of the last one year? 
 
STable 1  
Increasing 2  
Deceasing 3  
Fluctuating 4  
I don’t know 5  
 
 
8.4 Perception on comparisons of microcredit service of client versus ex-
clients/non-clients 
8.4.1 Only for ex-clients /non-client household respondents 
 Questions and filters Possible 
answers/coding 
categories 
Ship to/ 
remark 
 
Q170 
How do you compare your household 
livelihood/income with other household 
who are getting credit?  
Great differences 1  
Slight differences 2  
No differences 3  
I don’t know 4  
8.4.1 Only for client household respondents 
 
Q171 
How do you compare your household 
livelihood/income with other household 
who are not getting microcredit credit?  
Great differences 1  
Slight differences 2  
No differences 3  
I don’t know 4  
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8.5 Perceptions on microcredit loan interest rate 
 
NB: for Clients, Ex-client/non-client respondents 
 Questions and filters Possible answers/coding 
categories 
Ship to/ 
remark 
 
Q172 
How do you evaluate the 
amount of microcredit loan 
interest rate charged? 
Low rate 1  
Reasonable/affordable 2  
Unreasonable/unaffordable 3  
I don’t know 4  
 
9: Future intention to join microcredit services  
 
NB: for Ex-client/non-client household respondents 
 Questions and 
filters 
Possible answers/coding 
categories 
 Ship to/ 
Remark 
Q173 Do you have an 
intention to join take 
microloan? 
Yes 1  
No 0 Ship to 176 
 
Q174 
 
If your answer for 
Q173 is yes, Which 
microcredit do you 
prefer? 
DECSI (MFI) 1  
SCSC (cooperatives) 2  
ERCS (NGO) 3  
ECSDC (NGO) 4  
Other specify_____ 5  
Q175 
Why do you prefer 
to join the 
microcredit 
institution you 
mention? 
Lower interest rate 1  
Simple procedures and application 2  
Large amount of loan 3  
Longer loan term 4  
Larger grace period  5  
More visit and personal attention of 
field officer 
6  
Withdrawal of compulsory saving 7  
Individual based loan system 8  
Appropriate enforcement 9  
Others specify __________             10  
 
 
Q176 
 
If your answer for 
Q173 is No, What is 
the reason/s?  
[Multiple Answers 
Possible] 
I hate and afraid taking loan 
(frustrated) 
1  
Bad information from clients (biased) 2  
I do not need loan (I have enough of 
my own) 
3  
I prefer taking from other sources 4  
Others, (specify)_____________ 5  
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NB:  for clients, Ex-clients/ Non-clients 
 
 
 
 
 
Q177 
 
 
 
Name three things 
that you like most 
about micro-credit 
services? 
 
[Multiple Answers 
Possible, the top 
three only] 
Free interest rate 1 
Lower interest rate than others 2 
Simple procedures and application 3 
Convenience of loan disbursement 4 
Group based loan 5 
Individual credit modality 6 
Accessibility 7 
Compulsory saving 8 
Voluntary savings 9 
Creating credit alternative  10 
Personal attention  (support) of field officer 11 
Bette than money lenders 12 
Others specify ____________                        13 
 
 
 
Q178 
 
 
Name three things 
that you would like to 
be improved on 
micro-credit 
services? 
 [Multiple Answers 
Possible, the top 
three only] 
Lower interest rate 1 
Simple procedures and application 2 
Large amount of loan 3 
Longer loan term 4 
Larger grace period  5 
More visit and personal attention of field officer 6 
Withdrawal of compulsory saving 7 
Individual based loan system 8 
Appropriate enforcement 9 
Addressing very poor 10 
Others specify ________________                         11 
 
 
Thank you for your time and valuable information 
     
Enumerator’s Observations / Remarks  
 
1. _______________________________________________________ 
2. ______________________________________________________ 
 
Name of Enumerator ____________Signature ____ Date of Interview ______ 
 
Name and Signature of Supervisor ___________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 9 : Comments and recommendations 
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PART II: Key informants check list 
Warming up questions 
Organization………………………………Position………………………………… 
Education………………Years of experience in the organization…………… 
Section one- Outreach performance 
 
x Total numbers of clients_________ (end of 2013) 
x Gender distribution of clients – male_______ Female________ 
x Is the number of clients increasing or decreasing?  Comparing the 
last 3-5 years. 
 Increasing________ 
 Deceasing________  
x Why increasing or decreasing (Give three major reasons) 
 ___________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________ 
x Does your microcredit service reach the poor? If yes, how do you 
justify it? 
 _______________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________ 
x Who is considered as a “poor”? (from your organization’s context) 
 _______________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________ 
x How do you identify the poor people from the community? 
 ______________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________ 
x Number of dropouts in the last three years. Years 
2010_______2011______2012_____ 
 
x Who are the most who left (dropout) the membership? 
_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________ 
x Reasons for drop out 
_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________ 
x Number of graduates in the last three years. Years 
2010_____2011____2012___ 
x Who are the most who graduate from your microcredit services? 
_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________ 
x Reasons for graduation? 
_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________ 
x To which microcredit or financial services they graduate? 
¾ Other microcredit service provider……. 
¾ Other microfinance service provider…… 
¾ Bank……….. 
¾ I don’t know………. 
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x Is there any dropout or graduation monitoring system in your 
institution? Yes…No… 
x If yes, how? 
_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________ 
x If no, why 
_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Section two- Perception of clients on the service provision 
 
x How do you evaluate the satisfaction of the clients? 
_________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
x How do you evaluate the perception of the clients on the following 
issues:  Using 1 (poor), 2  (average),  3 (good), and  4 (excellent)  
 
Area Rating Comment 
Interest rate   
Amount of loan   
Economic Improvement   
 
x What are the most common complaints of the clients 
_________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________ 
Section three – Loan interest rate   
 
x What is the amount of loan interest rate your microcredit institution 
charge? 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
x How do you compare the interest rate with other microcredit providers? 
________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________ 
x What is your impression on interest rate clients pay on 
loan?(affordability) 
___________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ 
x Is there any complaint on the amount of loan interest rate?  
Yes…No… 
x If yes, which of the clients are the most complainers of the amount of 
interest rate on loan?  
__________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ 
x If no, why? 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
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x What is the interest rate paid for deposit/saving in your organization? If 
there is deposit/saving services. If no, skip. 
____________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________ 
x What is your opinion on the interest rate paid for deposit/saving? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
x What is the opinion of your clients on the interest rate they earn from 
deposit/saving? 
___________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
x Is there any compliant on the interest rate paid for deposit/saving? 
Yes… No…. 
x If yes, what are the complaints? 
________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________ 
x If no why? 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
x Which clients are the most complainers of the amount of interest rate 
for their deposit/saving?  
_________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ 
Section four – opinion on unregulated microcredit (NGO’s and government) 
x How do you evaluate the role and procedures of unlicensed micro-
credit services? 
Strength/ Positive: 
1. ______________________________________________________ 
2. ______________________________________________________ 
Weakness/ Negative: 
1. ___________________________________________________ 
2. __________________________________________________ 
x How do you evaluate the relationship and integration of operating 
licensed and un-licensed micro-credit providers? 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 Section five – Recommendation 
 
x What do you recommend for more effective and efficient 
microcredit service provision in our region? 
1. _______________________________________________ 
2. ________________________________________________ 
x Can you provide us additional material? 
¾ Annual report 
¾ Research document 
¾ Evaluation report 
¾ ETC 
Thank you for your time and valuable information  
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PART III: Focus group discussion checklist 
1. What forced you to take a loan? 
2. What was the initial purpose and practical uses of the loan you take? 
3. How was your repayment performance? 
4.  When you were taking the loan did you like the interest rate charged? 
5. What Interest rates do you think will be fair to clients? 
6. Do people take loans from others in this place? 
7.  Why do people take loans from others other than the micro credit 
institution? 
8. What are the advantages and disadvantages of taking a loan from a 
micro credit institution? 
9. How can micro credit institutions improve their services to people? 
10. Have people who have taken loans improved in their livelihoods 
compared to those who did not take any loans? Why 
